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Abstract  
This thesis studies the promotion and financing of industrial diversification in natural 
resource-dependent countries. After a brief introduction, the research contribution to the 
existing literature is discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
Chapter 2 attempts to answer the following question: Does financial development 
induce the diversification and complexity of exports in natural resource-dependent countries? 
Financial development and deregulation are standard recommendations in order to achieve 
greater industrial and economic development in these countries. However, using standard 
panel data econometrics, this chapter shows that financial development has no positive 
impact on export diversification or complexity. It argues that a general financial 
development policy recommendation is not expected to be a key for industrial and export 
diversification in these countries. This result provides an essential motivation for the 
following chapters.  
Chapter 3 looks at the financing of industrial diversification in two specific countries, 
namely Chile and Malaysia, which were both natural resource-dependent, but managed to 
successfully diversify their respective economies. The two countries have followed different 
strategies. In Chile, diversification has been towards niche natural resource-based industries, 
while in Malaysia the strategy has been to defy comparative advantages, resulting in 
specialization in sophisticated and high value added products. This chapter examines the role 
of the state and the financial system in financing the industrial diversification. The main 
finding is that in both countries the state has always played a key role in directing finance to 
strategic sectors and in contributing to the emergence of new industrial activities. 
Diversification in Chile and Malaysia has not occurred through free market operations and 
liberalized financial systems settings. 
Chapter 4 concentrates on promoting industrial diversification in oil dependent 
countries using Saudi Arabia as the case study. It starts by reviewing various strategies of 
economic diversification in the context of resource-dependent countries. In particular, it 
reviews the literature on resource-based industrialization (e.g. Perez, 2015), the literature on 
the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework (i.e. Lin 2011) and the literature on 
the product space theory (i.e. Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009). This chapter, then, uses these 
frameworks to suggest possible diversification strategies in Saudi Arabia and to assess the 
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government’s recently promoted diversification plan (Vision 2030). Furthermore, the 
potential role of the Saudi financial system is fully examined. 
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  Introduction 
Diversification of economic and industrial activities is considered to be crucial to create 
employment opportunities, and to promote technological development and economic 
prosperity. In resource-dependent countries, the process of industrial diversification takes 
place by reducing the reliance on raw materials and traditional products towards technology 
intensive manufacturing (Reinert 2007). However, despite the windfall resource revenues, 
these countries have not been able to channel them in favour of productive and 
technologically intensive industrial activities1. 
The main aim of this research is to answer this question: how can resource-dependent 
developing countries promote and finance industrial diversification? This research is guided 
by three sub-questions that have been derived after examining the related literature: 
A. Does financial deepening promote industrial diversification and upgrading in resource-
dependent developing countries?  
B. Can state-directed credit help to promote industrial diversification?  
C. What type of industrial strategy should a resource-dependent country follow? What are 
the sectors that can be targeted?  
Before addressing these questions, it is important to say that, in the literature on industrial 
development in resource-dependent developing countries, the emphasis has been mainly 
devoted to the overwhelming resource curse literature, i.e. a negative impact of natural 
resources on industrial and economic development. This resource curse has been explained 
through different theories such as the Dutch Disease, rent-seeking behaviour, volatility 
damage, and the curse in financial development. 
 The Dutch Disease terminology refers to the crowding-out effect of the Dutch natural 
gas discoveries, around 1959, on manufacturing sector activities, essentially through the real 
exchange rate appreciation. This theory demonstrates that the influx of resource revenues 
generates great demand for non-tradable goods and raises their prices. This results in a loss 
of tradable goods competitiveness, i.e. manufacturing, and real exchange rate appreciation 
(Corden 1984). An alternative explanation lies in the rent-seeking behaviour by societies in 
resource-rich countries. This theory argues that resource revenue discourages the 
                                                          
1 For instance, high technology exports have accounted for 17.4 percent of the total developing world’s exports in 
1995; in 2016 their share increased to 22.3 percent. On the other hand, in resource dependent counties high 
technology products barely increased from 0.56 to 0.62 percent of their total export basket (High-technology 
exports data are according to Lall (2000) definition, and they are retrieved from the UNCTAD database). 
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entrepreneurial spirit in society. Because of the substantial wealth flowing around the 
government, entrepreneurs find it more profitable to participate in rent-seeking and 
unproductive activities to benefit from that wealth2 (Beblawi 1987; Torvik 2002). The third 
explanation highlights the volatility in natural resource income. Volatility in commodity 
prices may cause output fluctuations and discourage human capital development, investment, 
and economic development3 (Ramey and Ramey 1991; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009).  
 A fourth major explanation is the financial development curse. This theory suggests 
that resource-dependent countries have under-developed financial systems, which hinders 
the transformation of resource wealth into productive sectors. Therefore, financial 
development allows the absorption of commodity wealth (Beck and Poelhekke 2017) and 
the promotion of greater economic and industrial development (Beck 2011). Rather than 
suggesting the use of directed credit towards non-resource tradable sectors to mitigate the 
Dutch Disease, this theory recommends financial liberalization and a reduction in state-
directed credit in order for the financial system to channel resources to more productive 
investment and, thus, mitigate the Disease (Beck and Poelhekke 2017). Recently, the IMF 
(2016) argued for the need to reduce state-directed lending in order to achieve greater 
economic diversification. 
 Despite theoretical and empirical challenges facing the resource curse theory (they 
will be discussed extensively in Chapters 2 and 4), its related literature typically highlights 
a negative perspective (‘half-empty’) of natural resource abundance and, more importantly, 
underestimates the role of economic policies in mitigating the resource curse. On the other 
hand, there is a relatively scarce amount of literature that looks at the positive perspective 
(‘half-full’) of natural resource abundance and the opportunities to develop the 
manufacturing sector around the natural resource sector (i.e. Hirschman 1981; Perez 2015; 
Ramos 1998). 
 This limited literature on industrial development in resource-dependent countries 
reveals a substantial research gap on the role of economic policies in promoting industrial 
development; not only towards manufacturing activities around the resource sector (resource 
based industrialization, (RBI)) but also towards the wider range of manufacturing sectors 
                                                          
2 Alichi and Arezki (2009) provides support for the rent-seeking theory by showing adverse effect of government 
current spending financed by commodity revenues on the private investment in non-resource sectors. 
3  It is important to note that studies supporting this rent-seeking explanation have argued that government 
spending contributes to increasing output volatility and, therefore, further induce the resource curse (Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). 
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and activities. This observation of the literature gap is also shared by Morris et al. (2012) in 
which the authors were “conscious of a major research and associated policy gap on the 
promotion of industrial development in the context of expanded commodities production” 
(p.vii). A major noteworthy limitation of this body of knowledge, which has not been 
considered carefully in previous research, is the role of the financial system in promoting 
industrial diversification in these countries; especially the role of public financial institutions 
and policies. The prominence of this issue can be seen in Kaplinsky et al. (2012) and Felipe 
and Rhee (2015) which show that financing is considered a major constrain facing resource-
dependent countries in their industrial development and diversification4.  
Therefore, by considering the role of industrial and financial system policies as well 
as institutions in promoting manufacturing diversification, the researcher is confident that 
the research and its policy implications make original contributions to the literature on 
industrial development in resource-dependent developing countries. It does so by answering 
the three questions (A, B and C) stated at the outset of this chapter. 
 Chapter 2 studies question A on the impact of financial development on the 
diversification and complexity of exports5. Financial development and liberalization are 
standard recommendations for these countries by international institutions (such as the IMF 
and the World Bank). Based on its ability to allocate resources efficiently and to support 
sectors that depend heavily on external finance (i.e. manufacturing), Beck (2011) argues that 
financial deepening is an essential factor in escaping the resource curse by financing the 
manufacturing sector development and diversification. (Beck and Poelhekke 2017) and the 
IMF (2016) demonstrate that natural resource countries suffer from a financial development 
resource curse (underdeveloped financial sectors) and thus financial deepening and de-
regulation (i.e. reducing the role of state in directing credit) are crucial measures in 
increasing the efficiency of the financial system in absorbing natural resource windfalls and 
in mitigating the resource curse. This chapter highlights that despite the significant growth 
in financial development indicators in these countries over the study period (1995-2013), 
export diversification and complexity have been deteriorating. Statistically, using different 
                                                          
4 This constrain is being highlighted despite the significant increase in resource rents after 2003 that have resulted 
in substantial government revenues. 
5 Export diversification is measured through the widely cited Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (UNCTAD database). 
Export complexity refers to the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) developed by Hausmann et al. (2014), which 
measure the technological intensity of a country through the knowledge intensity in their exported products. 
Machineries, electronics and transportation products are considered the most complex products, while natural 
resource products are considered the least complex in this index. 
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sets of standard panel data econometrics, financial development does not have a positive 
impact on the diversification of exports. Furthermore, the results suggest that financial 
development may hinder industrial complexity; one explanation is that private banks may 
encourage firms in these countries to specialize on producing and exporting raw materials 
and traditional resource-based products and may support already established competitive 
sectors. This outcome provides an important motivation for the content of subsequent 
chapters. 
 Chapter 3 considers research questions B and C and examines the role of the financial 
system and the state in promoting and financing industrial diversification in two countries 
which were both natural resource-dependent but managed to diversify their economies 
following very different strategies: Chile and Malaysia. In Chile, industrialization has been 
based on natural resources, while in Malaysia industrialization has been directed towards 
high-tech and more sophisticated sectors. This chapter focuses more on the role of finance 
in the emergence of what have become major industrial sectors in these countries (i.e. farmed 
salmon in Chile and semiconductors in Malaysia). A key finding of this chapter is that the 
state, in both countries, has played a critical role in directing finance towards the emergence 
of targeted industries. In the form of industrial banks, public venture capital institutions or 
state-directed credit, both governments have supported new industries with long-term, 
developmental and risky finance. In short, the industrial diversification in both countries has 
not occurred through free market and liberalized financial system operations. 
 Chapter 4 is also concerned with research questions B and C on the role of the 
financial system and the state in promoting and financing industrial diversification but 
focuses on a resource-dependent country that has not successfully diversified its industrial 
basket yet: Saudi Arabia. This chapter begins by highlighting the role of industrial policies 
in mitigating the Dutch Disease and in achieving economic diversification. It, then, reviews 
three major industrial diversification approaches for resource-dependent countries: resource-
based industrialization (RBI) (e.g. Perez 2015), the Growth Identification and Facilitation 
Framework (Lin 2011) and the Product Space Theory (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009). These 
frameworks are used in two ways; firstly, to discuss possible diversification strategies in 
Saudi Arabia, and secondly, to assess the diversification strategy (Vision 2030) which was 
launched recently by the Saudi Government. Finally, the chapter examines the role of the 
Saudi financial system in achieving these industrial diversification plans. To evaluate the 
role of the financial sector, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with senior 
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officials in major public financial institutions, i.e. the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, 
the Saudi SMEs Authority, the Saudi Agriculture Development Fund and the Saudi 
Development Fund, in addition to executives in private financial institutions. Finally, the 
research contribution and its policy implications are discussed in Chapter 5 that concludes 
this thesis.  
 Research methodology 
This thesis uses a mixed methods approach that allows the researcher to consider the 
complexity of the research project and to undertake a structural analysis of the research 
question (Creswell et al. 2011; Hartley 2004; Hesse-Biber and Johnson 2013; Olsen 2004). 
 There are two major research methods in economics and management research: 
quantitative and qualitative (Bryman 2016). Generally, the quantitative method allows a 
researcher to analyze empirical facts regarding a certain phenomenon in the real world. “In 
the explanatory phase of an investigation, quantitative methods can identify patterns and 
associations that may otherwise be masked” (McEvoy and Richards 2006, p.71). However, 
quantitative methods on their own may not be capable of explaining the essence and roots 
of a certain phenomenon. In such a circumstance, qualitative methods can allow the 
researcher to observe what is hidden and to investigate the complex structure related to the 
main research problem. Qualitative methods “can help to illuminate complex concepts and 
relationships that are unlikely to be captured by predetermined response categories or 
standardised quantitative measures” (ibid., p.71).  
 Creswell et al. (2011) show that mixed methods help the researcher to overcome 
expected deficiencies in either a quantitative or a qualitative research approach. For instance, 
while quantitative approaches are useful in providing reliable patterns, associations and 
comparisons regarding certain social phenomena, they are less likely to explain why the 
phenomena take place; whereas mixed methods can bridge this limitation and provide a 
deeper explanation and understanding of the social reality (Bryman 2016; Creswell et al. 
2011). 
 In this study, the purpose of employing mixed methods is not to validate the 
quantitative findings using qualitative methods, or vice versa, but to advance the 
understanding of the main research question: How can resource-dependent developing 
countries promote and finance industrial diversification? Chapter 2 employs quantitative 
16 
 
methods using panel econometrics techniques to investigate the following question: Does 
financial development have a positive impact on industrial upgrading? The analysis 
considers thirty-eight resource dependent developing countries and utilizes secondary data 
from different sources such as the World Bank, the IMF and UNCTAD.  
 The qualitative research method is employed as a main method for the two 
subsequent chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 use case studies that allow for qualitative, in-depth 
and contextual investigation of industrial diversification in Chile, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. 
According to Stake (2008), case studies allow for flexible techniques and instruments of data 
collection. Furthermore, Hartley (2004) maintains that case studies are appropriate 
approaches when the research question requires a comprehensive understanding of a 
complex phenomenon, because focusing on a specific case allows the researcher to obtain 
context-rich data.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 have utilized three main data collection methods. First, industrial 
manufacturing added value and export data have been retrieved from the UNIDO database, 
COMTRADE database and relevant domestic public agencies (e.g. central banks’ databases). 
Secondly, data on public financial institutions have been taken either from their published 
annual reports or from unpublished datasheets obtained after official contacts with specific 
agencies. Thirdly, semi-structured interviews with officials of certain institutions (e.g. public 
development banks) were used both to collect data when these were not available in 
published forms and, more importantly, to obtain insights about these institutions. These 
interviews took place after designing an interview guide, constructing interviews questions 
and identifying the interviewees to be targeted. The researcher has contacted these 
candidates through emails, by telephone and by personal visits to their official offices. 
However, in many cases reaching targeted candidates was difficult and not straightforward. 
For instance, in the case of Chile, the researcher was not able to contact targeted agencies 
and candidates until visiting the Chilean Embassy in London, which introduced him 
officially to appropriate officials. Appendix 1 presents further details on the semi-structured 
interview process, which includes the interviews guide, interviews questions, and 
interviewees’ details.  
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 The impact of financial development on export diversification and complexity in 
resource dependent countries 
2.1 Introduction  
Resource-dependent developing countries (RDDCs) have been experiencing a high 
concentration of exports and slow economic development6. Measured by the Herfandhal-
Hirschman index, RDDCs had an average export concentration of 56.7 percent in 2013 
compared to 13.0 and 6.5 percent in developing and developed countries respectively (see 
Figure 2.1). This concentration has been explained by the resource curse theory, through the 
crowding out argument (Dutch Disease) (Corden 1984; Sachs and Warner 2001), rent 
seeking behaviour (Beblawi 1987; Torvik 2002) and resource volatility (Ramey and Ramey 
1991; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). A significantly growing strand of the literature 
argues that the lack of financial sector development, which is known as the “financial 
development curse”, is a major contributor to slow economic development and poor 
industrial diversification (e.g. Beck 2011; Mlachila and Ouedraogo 2017; Nili and Rastad 
2007).  
Figure 2.1: Export concentration (1995-2013) 
 
Source: author calculation based on UNCTAD data. 
                                                          
6 According to Ghura and Pattillo (2012), a country is considered to be resource-dependent if it meets one of the 
two following criteria: (1) the share of its fiscal revenues from hydrocarbons or mineral resources is at least 25 
percent of total fiscal revenue, or (2) the share of hydrocarbons or mineral resources exports is over 25 percent of 
the total exports. This research studies 38 developing countries that meet this definition: Algeria, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Congo Republic, Congo 
Democratic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guyana, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mali, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Trinidad and 
Tobago, the UAE, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia. 
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 Financial development is expected to lead to economic and industrial diversification 
by promoting sectors that rely heavily on external finance (Rajan and Zingales 1996). With 
regard to RDDCs, Beck (2011) highlights that the resource sectors are less dependent on 
external finance, and financial development is expected to stimulate the development of 
other sectors (e.g. more sophisticated manufacturing). As a policy implication, Beck calls 
for “extra effort” in broadening and deepening the financial system in resource-dependent 
countries. 
 The lack of development in the financial sector in these countries is explained by the 
natural resource abundance7 (Beck 2011; Kurronen 2015; Mlachila and Ouedraogo 2017). 
In an IMF publication, Mlachila and Ouedraogo (2017) explain the resource curse in 
financial development by the natural resource sector’s enclave operation (i.e. isolated from 
the domestic economy). In the resource sector, multi-national companies usually finance 
their operations internally. Should they need external finance, they access it through 
international markets. Therefore, they have little reliance on local banks, which contributes 
to the under-development of financial systems. Furthermore, they argue that macro-
economic fluctuations following commodity price shocks hinder the growth in financial 
systems.  
 Beck (2011) explains the financial sector curse by supply and demand factors. On 
the supply side, high investment in the natural resource sector hinders investment in the 
financial system and pushes skilled labour away from the financial system. Furthermore, 
Beck demonstrates that the financial system development requires sound institutional 
infrastructure, which is underdeveloped in most of these countries. On the demand side, he 
shows that there is low external finance demand from the main sector of the economy - the 
natural resource sector - which contributes to a lower financial development8. 
 This view has been shared by Kurronen (2015) who argues that the small financial 
systems in RDDCs are mainly devoted to serve the resource sector’s needs and might not 
serve the other emerging sectors. This underdeveloped financial system, she maintains, can 
hinder economic diversification and strengthen the resource curse’s impact. By studying oil-
exporting countries, Nili and Rastad (2007) also highlights a lower level of financial 
                                                          
7  While the resource curse theory suggests a negative impact of natural resource dependence on economic 
development, this strand of the literature argues that resource-dependence also hinders the financial sector 
development, which has a further adverse impact on economic development. 
8 On the other hand, Beck (2011) shows that the natural resource revenues, which are expected to boost non-
traded goods, can lead to higher demand for financial products. 
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development compared to the rest of the world. They argue that the weakness of the financial 
system is associated with the dominance of governments in total investments and the 
deterioration in private sector activity.  
 Principally, these studies claim that financial system growth will be channelled to 
more productive sectors, and will result in higher industrial development. This view is 
mainly motivated by the mainstream dogma that developed and liberalized financial markets 
are able to remove market frictions, to improve resource allocation and to promote 
productive sectors (Levine 2005; Levine et al. 2000). Market signals, in this framework, are 
considered the main determinant of financial resource allocation. In a seminal study that has 
inspired an extensive amount of literature relating finance to industry, Rajan and Zingales 
(1996) demonstrate that financial development promotes economic development by 
reducing firms’ external finance costs. More precisely, sectors that depend more on external 
finance grow faster in countries that have developed their financial systems9.  
 Nonetheless, if market signals were the main determinant of financial resource 
allocation, supply of finance might not match the demand in crucial sectors (e.g. new 
manufacturing activities). This is because of high investment risk or inadequate collateral 
even in the case of high social value. Indeed, unregulated financial institutions may direct 
their lending to stock markets, real estate markets and other profitable service sectors. 
Lending to these sectors can be at a significantly higher interest rate because the return can 
be extremely high. This makes it even more difficult for industrial entrepreneurs to borrow 
because their potential return from industrial projects is limited, despite their substantially 
higher social returns relative to real estate and stock markets (Ghosh 2008; Khan 2008). 
Furthermore, because of the prevailing market signals, financial markets may direct credit 
towards import-intensive sectors and traditional sectors because of their significantly lower 
risk (Ghosh 2008). 
 Some notable emerging literature that should be highlighted in this context shows no 
significant impact of the financial sectors’ growth on productive investments in developing 
countries. That is to say that the substantial growth of credit to the private sector in 
developing countries did not favour the more productive sectors; instead financial 
                                                          
9 The following section discusses Rajan and Zanales (1996) argument in some length and show criticism of their 
work.   
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institutions have been focusing on household consumption and mortgage loans (Bonizzi 
2013; Dos Santos 2013; Karwowski and Stockhammer 2017; Van Waeyenberge and 
Bargawi 2015). This trend in developing countries can be explained by banks’ profitability 
and risk aversion motives, in addition to neo-liberal policies10 towards de-regulating and 
privatizing the education, healthcare and housing sectors (Dos Santos 2013).    
 Given the significant growth in financial sectors in RDDCs, this study examines the 
impact of this growth on their export diversity and complexity. Financial development and 
the export structure are analysed using descriptive statistics and cross-country panel 
econometrics techniques. This chapter starts in Section 2.2 with the study’s motivation 
before Section 2.3 presents a review of the literature. Sections 2.4 present the empirical 
measures, before and Section 2.5 shows export and finance trends in resource-dependent 
countries. Section 2.6 presents the panel econometrics’ methods and results. Finally, Section 
2.7 presents conclusions.    
2.2 Study motivation 
 The importance of studying the role of developing the financial systems in resource-
dependent countries (RDDCs) is because international institutions, e.g. the IMF and World 
Bank11, continue to advocate that these countries should implement policies towards more 
developed and liberalised financial markets. For instance, a recent IMF report, “Economic 
Diversification in Oil-Exporting Arab Countries” (2016), emphasizes the need to reform and 
expand the financial markets in order to achieve greater economic and industrial 
diversification. The report states that “further efforts to reform financial system, reduce 
directed lending, and develop domestic security markets will be important to support the 
financing of the private sector” (IMF 2016, p.12). 
                                                          
10 Neoliberal policies, in general, refer to the set of policies promoted during the 1980s by the World Bank and 
the IMF. These policies, the so-called Washington Consensus, aim to achieve macro-economic stability, 
deregulate the financial market, liberalize trade, reduce the government’s role in economic activity, reduce 
public expenditure, and privatize state owned assets (Williamson, 1990). 
11 The researcher refers here, mainly, to the IMF and World Bank’s core programmes that are designed to help 
developing countries to achieve greater economic development and more efficient financial systems. However, 
the researcher acknowledges that IMF and World Bank’ economists may have substantially different views 
than those promoted in the core programmes in this regard (i.e. the association between financial sector growth 
and economic development). For instance, in an IMF publication, Sahay et al. (2015) question the positive 
impact of financial deepening on long-term economic growth and stability. They stated that “the effect of 
financial development on economic growth is bell-shaped: it weakens at higher levels of financial development. 
This weakening effect stems from financial deepening, rather than from greater access or higher efficiency” 
(p.5). However, other economists such as Cihak and Demirguc-Kunt (2013) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010), 
continue to maintain that financial development and liberalization are critical for economic development and 
prosperity.  
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This study investigates whether RDDCs are likely to have a more diversified export 
structure following financial development. The study contributes to the literature in two 
major ways. First, it contributes to the growing resource curse literature that relates slow 
economic growth to weak financial systems. It does so by looking at a fundamental channel 
through which finance development can spur growth in RDDCs, namely through export 
upgrading and diversification. Beck (2011), among others, shows that there is a natural 
resource curse in financial development, which hinders economic growth and industrial 
development in RDDCs. Thus, he argues for “intensified efforts in resource based economies 
to deepen and broaden financial systems” (p.1). 
However, Beck also calls for more research in RDDCs. Rather than studying the finance 
and growth relationship, he suggests investigating the impact of finance on disaggregated 
GDP on the resource and non-resource sectors. In other words, he calls for research into the 
relationship between finance and development in non-natural resource sectors. This work is 
unique in this regard because of its careful consideration of the impact of finance on non-
resource sectors through export concentration and complexity. In RDDCs, lower export 
concentration and higher economic complexity implies advancement in the non-natural 
resource industrial activity. However, there appears to be no existing empirical research that 
discusses the impact of finance on the industrial or export structure in RDDCs. 
Secondly, it contributes to the limited amount of research and policy implication on the 
industrial and export diversification in RDDCs (Morris et al., 2012). Kaplinsky et al. (2012) 
and Felipe and Rhee (2015) consider financing to be a major constraint facing the industrial 
diversification plans in RDDCs. If it is established that financial development can promote 
industrial diversification and complexity, then policies to increase the depth of the financial 
system can be an appropriate recommendation for RDDCs as a means to finance their 
industrial upgrading. 
2.3 Literature review 
There are three different strands of the literature that deal with the impact of financial 
development on manufacturing and export development. The first strand shows financial 
development as a source of comparative advantage; the second shows the importance of 
financial markets by incorporating risk into trade markets; and the third strand investigates 
the impact of financial system development, liberalization and financialisation on the 
productive sectors of the economy.  
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The first strand of the literature presents financial development as a source of countries’ 
comparative advantage. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) argue that countries with an identical 
endowment structure and no economies of scale can face different costs of production 
because of credit imperfections. In particular, imperfect information and moral hazard 
considerations can lead some countries to face higher interest rates or scarcity of credit 
compared to other countries. This results in disparities in their comparative advantages for 
goods that require working capital, trade financing or marketing costs. Baldwin (1989) 
developed a model with two countries and two relevant goods. One good is subject to 
demand shocks, while the other is not. He shows that economies with a developed financial 
system are more capable of diversifying their risks resulting from demand shocks and this 
allows firms to produce risky goods with lower risk premiums and at lower cost. While 
Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) stress the role of financial development in channelling finance 
to industries that require it more, Baldwin (1989) focuses on the function of financial 
development in diversifying the risks faced by exporters. It is critical to note that the two 
studies assumed no technology differences across countries, i.e. technology transfer and 
acquisition is not considered in their analysis of the industry and trade development. 
In the theoretical part of his work, Beck (2002) explains that countries with well-
developed financial systems tend to specialise in increasing return sectors. He presents an 
open economy model of two production technologies: the first is manufacturing (increasing 
returns to scale) and the second is food (constant returns to scale). In his model, financial 
development is assumed to lower the search cost, increase external finance and encourage 
the production of goods with increasing returns to scale. The model predicts that economies 
with more developed financial systems are more likely to be net exporters of manufacturing 
products. In other words, he argues that trade patterns can be determined by financial 
intermediation. In his empirical section, Beck finds that countries with higher levels of 
financial development tend to have higher export shares in manufactured goods. In the 
context of resource rich countries, increasing the share of manufacturing relative to primary 
exports should result in greater export diversification and complexity.  
It has been argued that industries that rely heavily on external finance profit from 
financial development more so than other industries. In their seminal study, Rajan and 
Zingales (1996) found that industrial sectors which require greater external finance grow 
faster in countries with higher financial development. They consider the dependence on 
external finance of firms in the US to be a proxy for that in all other countries. Their study 
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assumes the degree of dependence on external finance to be based on technological reasons 
that vary from industry to industry. Hence, the study assumes that the technological reasons 
that are valid for US industry also apply to all other countries. 
 According to Rajan and Zingales (1996) export diversification in RDDCs might 
benefit from financial development if the oil and mineral industries have relatively lower 
external finance dependence. Table 1 shows the external finance dependence for oil and 
mineral sectors according to their index; the higher ratio means greater external financial 
dependence. The oil and mineral sectors show relatively lower external finance dependence 
(compared to others such as the drugs and plastic sectors with 1.49 and 1.19 dependence 
respectively). This means that financial development might help the other manufacturing 
sectors to grow and to reduce export concentration in RDDCs.  
 Indeed, Beck (2011) shows that the non-natural resource sectors have a higher 
external finance dependence than the resource sectors. Beck also provides support for Rajan 
and Zingales (1996) with regard to RDDCs: financial development support sectors that rely 
heavily on external finance. However, in his finance-growth empirical work, Beck states that 
his results are inconclusive calling for more work on disaggregated GDP growth into 
resource and non-resource components. This statement clearly demonstrates the need for 
further research that considers the relationship between finance and growth using indicators 
other than GDP growth, which can emphasize the non-natural resource economic 
development. 
Table 2.1: External finance dependence for oil and mineral sectors 
Industrial sectors External finance dependence 
Non-ferrous metal 0.01 
Petroleum refineries 0.04 
Non-metal products 0.06 
Iron and steel 0.09 
Metal products 0.24 
Petroleum and coal products 0.33 
Source: Rajan and Zingales (1996). 
 It is important to note here that the measure of external finance proposed by Rajan 
and Zingales has been challenged for both theoretical and practical reasons. Kabango and 
Paloni (2011) raise doubts about the universality of the index by showing country-specific 
institutional differences that might affect their need for external finance. For example, some 
industries receive some subsidies for strategic reasons (e.g. food security), which may reduce 
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their reliance on external finance relative to other countries that do not consider them 
strategic. Empirically, Kabango and Paloni study the case of Malawi and construct an 
external finance index that ranks Malawian industrial sectors based on their actual need for 
external finance (rather than using the US industry as a proxy as in Rajan and Zingales). 
After ranking the Malawian industry, Kabango and Paloni demonstrate that their index is 
significantly different from Rajan and Zingales. This finding questions the applicability of 
the external finance dependence proxy proposed by Rajan and Zingales to other countries. 
 Moreover, Von Furstenberg and Von Kalckreuth (2006) also questions Rajan and 
Zingales’ ranking for the US industrial sectors using the same methodology for external 
finance dependence but with more inclusive industrial dataset. The dataset used by Von 
Furstenberg and Von Kalckreuth is an industry-level dataset that is retrieved from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce) which covers every establishment 
in each industrial sector. In the meantime, Rajan and Zingales utilizes data from the 
Compustat database which refers to the median of publicly exchanged firms. In short, Von 
Furstenberg and Von Kalckreuth doubt the applicability of Rajan and Zingales’ ranking 
using different dataset for the same country (the US) and thus, invalidates its application in 
other countries. 
In general, this dominant strand of the literature, which considers financial 
development to be a source of comparative advantage, utilizes abstract and simplified 
modelling that undervalues major industrial development factors. A central factor, that has 
been neglected, is technology transfer. Despite its vital role in industrial upgrading (Amsden 
2001; Khan 2008; Lall 1992; Mansfield 1975), Lall (2000) demonstrates that neoclassical 
trade theories assume fixed and fully diffused technology across countries. Exporters, 
automatically, choose the most fitting technology relative to their endowment structure. 
They, then, start using technology efficiently with no adaptation, transfer or learning costs. 
In this framework, there is no distinction between technological capacity and capability12. 
Given a homogeneous and rational labour force, inefficiency occurs only when governments 
intervene to hinder trade liberalisation. However, in practice, technology transfer is a crucial 
factor in choosing production technology. For developing countries, the real technology 
transfer 13  should include a process of assimilation, adaptation, modification or further 
                                                          
12 Technological capacity means equipment, physical plants, and blueprints, while capability means the producer’s 
ability to use the technology efficiently (Lall, 1998).    
13 In some developing countries, the technology transfer takes place only as an input in the production stage and 
does not add to the existing stock of domestic technology, i.e. the impact on the human capital skills is very limited. 
25 
 
innovation so that it can upgrade the technology base of the domestic economy (Mansfield 
1975).  
 Moreover, mainstream models relating finance to industry (or trade) assume perfect 
capital markets. However, this assumption has been challenged by the existence of 
imperfection problems. For example, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) study firms investing 
in new technologies and found that they face a large financing gap. This gap is explained by 
three main reasons. First, the borrower’s investment returns are highly uncertain, which 
might result in negative expected returns to creditors. Secondly, new technological 
investments entail high information uncertainty between firms and lenders. Thirdly, new 
technology investments have small collateral value. In other words, there might be a large 
financing gap between the supply and demand for funds for new technology projects because 
of the problems of asymmetric expectation and limited collateral. Thus, Dymski (2003) and 
Khan (2008) argue for the importance of government selective intervention in fulfilling this 
financing gap and supporting innovation projects.  
The second strand of the literature relating finance to industrial upgrading is built on 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model of comparative advantage. It argues that the 
HOS model fails to address the problem of uncertainty about the global economic conditions 
faced by primary commodity exporters. Ruffin (1974) shows that the uncertainty in trade 
markets could be classified into two types: uncertainty about general prices and uncertainty 
about foreign trade. The first type refers to uncertainty about the production cost relative to 
the prevailing price when the product becomes available. The second type, foreign trade 
uncertainty, is a result of trading in global markets; through, payments, exchange rates and 
marketing costs uncertainties. After accounting for these types of uncertainty in his trade 
model, Ruffin maintains that risk-averse exporters of primary products will reduce their 
export specialisation according to their comparative advantage. In other words, uncertainty 
will push primary product producers to increase their export diversification.  
DeRosa (1992) supports Ruffin’s theory by incorporating uncertainty into the HOS 
model. DeRosa explains that uncertainty pushes risk-averse exporters away from 
specialising in producing primary products and highlights the important role of the financial 
markets in spreading the risk and directing resources to the country’s most productive use. 
                                                          
This kind of process is not considered as a real technology transfer; rather it is called a “pseudo-transfer” (Skarstein 
and Wangwe, 1986). 
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DeRosa argues that greater economic development and diversification can be achieved by 
liberalizing the financial markets. 
The third strand studies the impact of financial liberalization and development on the 
real sector of the economy in developing countries. It is well documented in the literature 
that the significant increase in financial sector lending, in recent years, was not in favour of 
productive sectors, e.g. the manufacturing sector.  
Across Latin America, Eastern and Central Europe and South and East Asia, credit 
available to households has been growing substantially and exceeding lending to productive 
enterprises  (Dos Santos 2013). As a mixture of banks’ profitability motives and policy 
agendas (i.e. free market access in the healthcare, education and housing sectors) domestic 
and foreign banks have supplied the household sector with significant consumption and 
mortgage financing. By studying the operations of financial institutions and firms in a 
resource rich country, South Africa, Karwowski (2012) claims that financial deepening has 
led to asset price inflation, financial instability and deterioration in long-term economic 
growth. Banks have not been transforming household savings towards real investments; 
instead they have been extending consumer and mortgage loans to the household sector. 
Studies of other developing countries have shown similar trends. These include Karwowski 
and Stockhammer (2017) for emerging economies; Becker et al. (2010) for Chile and 
Slovakia and Serbia; and Painceira (2012) for Brazil and South Korea.   
 This strand of the literature, supported by the events of the 2008 financial crisis, has 
triggered international organizations to generate a set of questions and discussions about the 
purpose of the financial system, its functions and its relationship with economic development 
(Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi 2015). The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
published The Age of Productivity (Pagés 2010) which argues that Latin America has been 
locked in under-development and poverty for such a long time partly because financial 
resources has not been channelled into high productive enterprises; instead a large share of 
resources has been channelled into low productive ventures. Furthermore, the book 
highlights the role of public financial institutions in financing innovation14.   
                                                          
14 This strand also highlights the significant increase of micro-finance credit in developing countries. In Bolivia, for 
instance, the share of micro-finance has reached 37 percent of the total financial credit to private sector (Bateman, 
2013). Bateman shows that the micro-finance model is predicted to channel financial resources profitably and 
efficiently to informal micro-enterprises and self-employment businesses. The problem with this model is that it 
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 Interestingly, economists, such as Beck (2014), have revised their previous 
consensus on the positive relationship between finance and economic growth. As Beck 
points out, finance may have insignificant or negative relationship with growth for three 
main reasons. The first explanation focuses on the credit beneficiary; while most of the 
theoretical finance-growth literature has mainly focused on credit to firms, financial systems 
in recent years have provided a large share of their credit to households rather than firms15. 
Secondly, the growth benefit of financial development is associated with financial fragility 
and crisis. Thirdly, the financial sector in itself has become a source of growth in some 
countries, while the finance-growth literature has focused on the financial sector as a means 
to mobilize funds towards productive investment and, thus, to an efficient resource allocation. 
Thus, some policy makers in recent years have been looking at the financial sector in itself 
as a source of economic growth and employment.  
 Furthermore, other economists have raised concern about financial sectors that have 
become significantly large relative to the real sector. For instance, Rajan (2005) suggested 
that the presence of a large and complicated financial sector increases the probability of 
“catastrophic meltdown”. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) show, empirically, that financial 
development is good for the real economy but only up to a point, and then finance becomes 
a drag on economic growth (i.e. a non-linear effect of financial development and growth). 
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) have explained the possible negative relationship between 
finance and growth by showing that financial system growth is expected to crowd out highly 
productive investments. They explained the crowd out effect by highlighting two main 
factors. First, the high financial system growth is often coupled with strong progress in low 
productivity projects, such as construction. Secondly, financial system growth significantly 
harms R&D-intensive and finance dependent industries. 
2.4 Financial development, export diversification, and complexity’s empirical 
measurements 
 Financial development indicators 
This study utilises four standard financial development indices that have been cited widely 
in the mainstream literature (e.g. Cihak et al. 2012). Private credit to GDP is the most 
common measure of financial development in the literature. This ratio represents the size of 
                                                          
channels scarce resources to the “wrong” enterprises. This is unlike the East Asian model where long-term financial 
support was provided to the “right” enterprisers. 
15 On the impact of household credit on economic growth, Beck maintains that the existing 
literature is ambiguous in this regard.    
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bank loans relative to the output of the economy. In addition, this study uses three additional 
proxies of financial system depth that are available for our sample: financial system deposits 
to GDP, bank deposits to GDP and deposit money banks’ assets to GDP (banking size). The 
four indicators of data were retrieved from the IMF and the Word Bank Databases. 
 Export concentration and complexity 
Looking at the empirical literature on industrial development and international trade, the 
most commonly used indicator for industrial and export diversification is the Herfindhal-
Hirschman index (HI). The index lies between 0 and 1, where lower values indicate more 
diversification. It computes the sum squares of export shares as in the equation: 
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X is the total share of exports by a country i 
xi is the export value of product k from country i,  
ni is the number of products exported by country i.  
 There are two factors that lead to a lower HHI value: a large number of exported 
products (ni) or a fall in the share of each product. A product to be considered in this index 
must have an export value higher than 100,000 US dollars or represent more than 0.3 percent 
of the total exports of a nation (SITC revision3 at a 3-digit level) (UNCTAD database, 2015). 
In this study, the HHI has been utilised for the available period (1995-2013) from the 
UNCTAD dataset.  
This study  uses another indicator to assess export upgrading and complexity, which 
is the economic complexity index (ECI) (Hausmann et al. 2014). The ECI measures the 
‘know-how’ and complexity of countries through their exported products. It does so by 
combining revealed information on the diversification of countries (the number of exported 
products), and the ubiquity of its production structure (the number of countries that export a 
certain product). The reasoning behind this combination is that products’ complexity comes 
from the fact that, typically, sophisticated economies export diverse products that have 
limited ubiquity, i.e. a small number of diverse countries that can make highly sophisticated 
products, while there are many less sophisticated countries that export products with greater 
ubiquity. 
The cornerstone of the ECI construction is the revealed comparative advantage 
proposed by Balassa (1965): when a country is associated with a product where it has a 
comparative advantage in producing, it is important to consider the country’s export volume 
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and share of the world trade in that product. Hausmann et al. (2014) utilise the following RCA 
mathematical formula: 
𝑅𝐶𝐴 =
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Where exportcp is the exported quantity of product (p) by a country (c) in USD. Then, 
Hausmann et al. (2014) use this RCA measure to build a matrix M that connects each single 
country (c) to the products (p) that it exports. Mcp=1 if RCA is greater than one, otherwise 
it is equal to zero. The authors then build Diversity and Ubiquity indexes as follows: 
Diversity= Kc =∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝 𝑝  
Ubiquity index=Kp= ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝 𝑐  
Simultaneously, the Product Complexity Index (PCI) is calculated using a similar 
process. The PCI measures the ‘know-how’ and sophistication of each product by 
considering the exporter’s knowledge intensity. Using computational algorithms, this 
circular process ultimately results in the construction of ECI and PCI indices.  
2.5 Export and finance patterns in resource dependent developing countries 
The inclusion of resource-dependent developing countries in this study is based on the 
definition by Ghura and Pattillo (2012). It considers a country to be rich in natural resources 
if it meets one of the two following criteria: (1) the share of fiscal revenues from hydro-
carbons or mineral resources must have been at least 25 percent of total fiscal revenue in the 
period from 2006 to 2010, or (2) the share of hydro-carbons or mineral resources exports 
must have been over 25 percent of the total exports. The resulting sample is a mixture of 
thirty-eight oil, gas and mineral exporting countries.  
Before looking at financial development, export diversification and complexity trends 
in the sample countries, this section first looks at the nature of their exports and their 
technological intensity in the following sub-section.    
 What do resource-dependent countries export? 
The nature of produced and exported products is critical for long-term growth and industrial 
development. Some products bring more value and greater long-term growth to the economy 
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than others (Hausmann et al. 2007). Technology intensive products promote greater future 
growth because they create new demand and substitute for older products. They also open 
up areas for new knowledge and techniques that can be used in the future. On the other hand, 
simple technologies tend to be correlated with slower economic growth because of their 
limited potential and upgrading capacity, lower entry barrier and higher possibility of 
developing substitutes (Lall 2000). 
This section looks at the nature of exported products in RDDCs using Lall (2000) 
technological intensity classification. This classification has five main categories of 
exported products: primary products, resource based products (it includes simple and 
agriculture based manufacturing), low technology products, medium technology products 
and high technology products. More details on these five classifications are provided in 
Appendix 2. 
 Figure 2.2 shows RDDCs’ exports compared to the rest of the world. The high share 
of primary products is a significant trend in RDDCs; they make up 61 percent of their total 
exports compared to 24 percent and 11 percent for developing and developed countries. The 
lack of technology-based exports is another important trend in resource-rich developing 
countries; their shares of low technology (LT), medium technology (MT), and high 
technology (HT) exports are 2.1, 5.5, and 2.2 percent respectively. The low share of 
technology intensive manufacturing backs up the point made earlier about the importance of 
technology transfer in these countries. 
 While RDDCs have, on average, a large share of primary products, some countries 
have different patterns (see Table 2.2). Botswana, for example, has a primary exports share 
of only 4.5 percent, while primary manufacturing represents 83.4 percent of its total exports. 
Other countries have different patterns for technology-based manufacture. For instance, 
Mexico and Malaysia have significantly high shares of LT, MT and HT products relative to 
the other countries. 
31 
 
Figure 2.2 Export nature based on technological intensity (average 2009-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD data. 
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Table 2.2 Exports nature in resource-dependent developing countries (Average 2009-2013) 
 Primary 
products 
Agro-based 
manufacture 
Primary 
products 
manufactures  
Low tech 
manufacture 
Medium tech 
manufacture 
High tech 
manufacture 
Algeria 84.3% 0.4% 15.0% 0.10% 0.13% 0.01% 
Angola 96.8% 0.0% 2.2% 0.06% 0.80% 0.06% 
Azerbaijan 90.3% 1.5% 4.9% 0.60% 1.42% 0.21% 
Bahrain 24.6% 3.7% 46.3% 10.15% 11.86% 1.83% 
Bolivia 64.7% 5.9% 20.5% 2.63% 1.32% 0.13% 
Botswana 4.5% 1.4% 83.4% 3.20% 4.22% 1.59% 
Brunei Darussalam 96.8% 0.1% 0.5% 0.81% 1.07% 0.31% 
Cameroon 64.5% 15.0% 11.0% 2.83% 4.99% 0.85% 
Chad 91.8% 0.2% 6.5% 0.34% 0.32% 0.66% 
Chile 49.9% 12.4% 27.6% 2.48% 5.09% 0.74% 
Congo 85.0% 2.8% 4.3% 0.12% 7.24% 0.26% 
Dem. Congo 50.4% 2.7% 43.9% 0.21% 0.86% 0.20% 
Ecuador 78.1% 9.0% 5.1% 2.49% 3.62% 0.54% 
Equatorial Guinea 94.5% 0.9% 0.6% 0.01% 3.06% 0.26% 
Gabon 75.9% 12.1% 9.2% 0.10% 2.04% 0.53% 
Guinea 39.6% 1.5% 51.5% 0.27% 0.59% 0.39% 
Guyana 19.2% 20.6% 13.2% 0.95% 2.39% 0.55% 
Iran 73.1% 0.6% 9.7% 1.78% 7.93% 0.33% 
Kazakhstan 77.3% 1.2% 9.3% 2.59% 4.62% 3.67% 
Kuwait 74.3% 0.4% 17.0% 0.62% 6.83% 0.48% 
Libya 89.2% 0.0% 7.9% 0.55% 1.33% 0.04% 
Malaysia 17.8% 13.7% 7.7% 9.47% 16.40% 34.07% 
Mali 32.7% 1.0% 4.8% 2.12% 6.51% 0.86% 
Mexico 17.7% 3.6% 4.3% 9.07% 38.41% 23.99% 
Mongolia 27.7% 0.4% 57.7% 2.25% 0.82% 0.27% 
Nigeria 93.0% 0.3% 4.6% 0.83% 0.74% 0.10% 
Oman 69.9% 1.6% 10.6% 1.40% 9.55% 0.67% 
Papua New Guinea 28.6% 18.7% 24.5% 0.17% 0.76% 0.60% 
Qatar 81.5% 0.0% 8.6% 0.89% 4.38% 0.09% 
Russian Federation 54.6% 3.6% 21.8% 2.69% 7.89% 1.42% 
Saudi Arabia 79.0% 0.8% 8.6% 1.34% 9.60% 0.27% 
Suriname 6.1% 2.4% 19.7% 1.36% 1.41% 0.36% 
Trinidad and Tobago 43.5% 2.3% 37.6% 2.35% 13.62% 0.23% 
United Arab Emirates 50.0% 3.1% 17.2% 6.15% 11.63% 4.16% 
Venezuela 71.5% 1.2% 18.7% 2.06% 5.82% 0.21% 
Yemen 84.7% 1.9% 8.5% 0.43% 1.34% 0.23% 
Zambia 74.7% 4.4% 10.6% 3.32% 3.97% 0.46% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD data 
 Trends in financial development, export concentration and complexity    
There has been a significant development in the financial sectors of RDDCs throughout the 
study period for this chapter (1995-2013). By looking at credit to private sector as a share of 
GDP, the sample average has grown from 19.8 in 1995 to 33.2 in 2013. This growth can also 
be seen in other financial development indicators: bank deposits to GDP, deposit money 
banks’ assets to GDP (banking size) and financial system deposits to GDP (see Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: descriptive statistics of financial development indicators 
Year Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
Credit to private sector to GDP 
1995 19.762 10.706 22.560 1.063 124.415 
2005 25.013 18.274 22.510 1.201 106.524 
2013 33.166 26.864 26.364 5.243 123.994 
Bank assets to GDP 
1995 25.738 13.989 25.952 0.501 116.073 
2005 26.515 20.857 22.355 2.074 109.353 
2013 39.090 35.122 27.156 6.669 132.215 
Bank deposits to GDP 
1995 22.970 14.027 22.355 1.159 94.994 
2005 26.217 19.258 21.550 2.927 105.942 
2013 37.840 32.872 23.174 5.861 130.257 
Financial system deposits to GDP 
1995 23.473 14.027 22.635 1.159 94.994 
2005 26.538 19.258 21.643 2.927 105.942 
2013 38.025 32.872 23.020 5.861 130.257 
Source: IMF database. 
This section also looks at the two major export structure indicators that are 
considered in this empirical study: export concentration and complexity. The sample has, on 
average, increased its export concentration from 52.5 percent in 1995 to 57.3 in 2013. On 
the other hand, the average economic complexity16 has declined from -0.67 in 1995 to -0.84 
in 2013. Table 2.4 shows some further descriptive statistics for these two variables. 
Furthermore, a closer look at the above variables shows that in countries that have developed 
their financial systems the most17, export concentration has increased by 12.5 percent and 
economic complexity has declined by 33.3 percent.  
In short, this section shows that resource-dependent developing countries have 
extremely concentrated export baskets of raw materials and primary products’ 
manufacturing. Furthermore, while financial sector indicators have grown significantly 
during the study period (1995-2013), export concentration has increased and export 
complexity has declined. 
 
                                                          
16 The economic complexity index is available for 28 RDDCs out of 38 countries in the sample used. 
17 These include countries that have higher growth, than average, in private sector credit. These countries are 
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Congo Democratic, Russia, Kazakhstan, Suriname, Sudan, and Mongolia. 
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Table 2.4: descriptive statistics for export concentration and economic complexity 
Year Mean Median SD Min Max 
Concentration  
1995 0.525 0.544 0.211 0.122 0.895 
2005 0.572 0.585 0.203 0.144 0.944 
2013 0.573 0.566 0.196 0.158 0.968 
Complexity 
1995 -0.672 -0.785 0.677 -2.088 0.785 
2005 -0.667 -0.790 0.788 -2.322 0.987 
2013 -0.842 -0.935 0.763 -2.082 0.847 
Source: own calculation based on UNCTAD database and Hausmann et al. (2014) 
2.6 Empirical Framework    
This section investigates the impact of financial development on export diversification and 
complexity in resource-dependent developing countries using two econometrics techniques: 
panel fixed effect and panel cointegration estimations. 
 Fixed effect estimation 
A panel approach is used in this section because of the three main advantages it offers. 
First, a panel approach has the ability to benefit from the time-series and cross-section 
variation of the data. Secondly, panel-data provide a greater degree of freedom and more 
efficiency. Thirdly, it has the ability to control the presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
(Baltagi 2008). The model can be written in the following form: 
   Yit = β1FDit + β2CVit +εit    (1) 
Where Yit is the export concentration index in the country i at time period t, or economic 
complexity index in country i at time period t. 
FDit: measures for financial development, and 
CVit: set of control variables. 
However, the literature suggests that when a large number of individuals are 
observed over time, specifying the nature of the disturbance term (εit) becomes difficult. For 
example, country specific omitted factors might affect the observations. If these unobserved 
factors are not considered in the estimation, the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
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applied to equation (1) might be both biased and inefficient. Therefore, the model has been 
transformed to the following form:     
Yit = β1FDit  + β2CVit  +   µi +εit    (2) 
µi : is the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity (while the remaining disturbance εit varies 
across both time and countries).     
where,  
E[µi] =E[εit]= E[µi +εit]= 0         (3) 
which further assumes that εit and µi are independent for each country i over time period t.  
Then, the Hausman test is utilized to help in deciding whether the unobserved 
heterogeneity should be dealt with by using random (RE) or fixed effect (FE). The test 
outcome does not support the use of the random effect. Therefore, the fixed effect estimator 
has been used for the panel dataset. The Stata “robust” option has been employed to estimate 
the standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimators. The robust standard errors 
option is able to deal with the concerns over the failure to meet the assumption of 
homoscedasticity (i.e. the presence of heteroskedastisity). 
 Panel cointegration approach 
In addition to the fixed effect estimation, this study also utilizes panel cointegration 
techniques to control for the issue of non-stationarity that can exist in macroeconomic 
variables (e.g. private credit to GDP, GDP per capita and export concentration). Not 
controlling this issue may result in biased estimates (Mark and Sul 2003). In this estimation 
method, the time series dimension characteristics have been carefully considered. 
 It begins by investigating the presence of unit roots in the panel dataset. The test devised 
by Im et al. (2003), commonly known as the IPS test, for panels that contain a time dimension 
in addition to the cross-sectional dimension. A crucial advantage of using the IPS test is its 
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ability to deal with unbalanced data18. The test begins by identifying the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) regression for the N cross-sections:   
Δ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜌𝑖 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝜌𝑖
𝑗=1 + ℇ𝑖𝑡    (4) 
where Yit: is the variable under consideration 
𝛼𝑖 : is the individual fixed effect  
pi: is the auto-regressive parameter which is estimated for each cross-section separately. 
The null hypothesis is that the auto-regressive parameter is equal to zero ( pi =0) for 
all i against the alternative hypothesis that it is less than zero (p <0) for some i. After 
estimating N separate ADF regressions, the average t statistics for pi is calculated as follows: 
    (5) 
Once the variables are confirmed to be stationary, the existence of long run 
cointegration among the dependent and explanatory variables can then be tested. This study  
implements Kao (1999) test that uses both DF and ADF to test for cointegation in panels. 
There are several panel estimation frameworks proposed in the presence of 
cointegration for static panels: Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) and Dynamic OLS (DOLS). 
Pedroni (1996) proposed the FMOLS which is capable of fixing the pooled OLS for the 
endogeneity of regressors and correcting the serial correlation that is usually present in long-
term estimations. The other estimator proposed by Kao and Chiang (2001) for non-stationary 
panels is the DOLS. Kao and Chiang use Monte Carlo experiments to show that the FMOLS 
do not improve over the bias-corrected OLS estimator in general, and that the DOLS 
outperforms them in estimating panel cointegration regressions. The starting equation for 
the DOLS is as follows: 
                                                          
18 Only Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) and Fisher-type (Choi 2001) allow for unbalance panels, while the rest of the 
panel unit root tests (such as Levin– Lin–Chu (2002), Harris–Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000; Breitung and Das 
2005) allow only for balanced panels. 
∑ )βp(t
N
1
=t
N
1=i
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   (6) 
To correct any serial correlation and endogeneity, the DOLS uses parametric 
adjustment to the errors of the static regression by including past and future values of the 
regressors in difference I(1): 
yit =αi + x’it β+ ∑  
𝑗=𝑞2
𝑗=−𝑞1  cij ∆ xi,t+j + vit      (7) 
where cij: is the coefficient of either lead or lag of the explanatory variable at difference I(1).  
ΒDOLS= ∑  𝑁𝑖=1 ( ∑  
𝑇
𝑡=1 Zit Z’it)
-1 (∑  𝑇𝑖=1 Zit yit)   (8) 
Where Zit= [ xit -x̅, ∆xi,t-q, …, ∆xi,t+q]  
Given the expected presence of endogeneity in the sample, Mark and Sul (2003) show that 
the DOLS is capable of dealing with it through its inclusion of leads and lags of the 
regressors.  
 Control variables 
As the export structure variables, concentration and complexity, in addition to financial 
development indicators have already been introduced, this subsection describes the set of 
control variables that have been cited in the literature on export upgrading and the rationale 
behind using them in this empirical work. 
The Dutch-Disease literature shows that natural resource revenue increases the 
demand for non-tradable goods. This increase in demand escalates their prices and 
contributes to the real exchange appreciation, and then reduces the competitiveness of non-
resource tradable goods (Corden 1984; Sachs and Warner 2001). Following the Dutch-
Disease theory, the real exchange rate appreciation is expected to encourage the 
concentration of exports on primary products and to hinder their complexity. To control this 
phenomenon, the real effective exchange rate (REER) has been utilised in this study using 
Darvas (2012) database. 
Wealth and economic development have always been coupled with export and 
economic diversification (Reinert 2007). While this negative correlation can be observed 
itMitMiitiitiiit exxxy   2211
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between export concentration and GDP per capita in general (Imbs and Wacziarg 2003)19, 
this negative relationship might not exist in resource-dependent countries (Lederman and 
Maloney 2003). This is because growth in GDP per capita can represent high commodity 
prices without notable economic development (Carrère et al. 2007; Felipe and Rhee 2015). 
To account for this relationship, this study utilises GDP per capita data from the World 
Bank database. 
Trade openness and liberalization have been a controversial issue in the literature. 
Reinert (2007) highlights that trade openness through free trade policies (e.g. liberalisation) 
may lead some resource-dependent developing countries to specialise more on exporting 
primary products. Trade liberalization should not take place before developing domestic 
industrial capabilities (Reinert, 2007). Trade liberalization can contribute to specialization 
in exporting raw material and simple resource-based manufacturing at the expense of 
sophisticated products (Khan and Blankenburg 2009; Lall 1995b). However, Amsden (2001) 
argues that trade openness, if coupled with selective trade and industrial policies, can enable 
firms to access foreign technologies and increase their competitiveness through exploiting 
economies of scale. In this study, the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP is utilized 
as a proxy for trade openness.  
In resource-dependent developing countries, basic and industrial infrastructures are 
crucial for processing natural resources in addition to establishing and upgrading other 
manufacturing activities (Morris et al., 2012). The industrial infrastructure development is 
essential for increasing and sustaining competitiveness in the manufacturing sector, in 
general, and high technology manufacturing in particular (Lall, 1992; Lin, 2012). 
Furthermore, Amsden (2001) explains that countries’ investment in plants and machinery is 
expected to promote manufacturing exports. To control for this issue, this study utilizes gross 
fixed capital formation as a proxy for industrial infrastructure development. This is expected 
to reduce export concentration and encourage export complexity. 
 Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) demonstrates that discovering new activities is a major 
determinant of economic diversification. Larger population size is expected to be coupled 
with discovering new economic activities and, thus, producing wider range of industrial 
products (Klinger and Lederman 2004). With regards to economic complexity, in the 
context of natural resource countries, the process of discovery pushes the production basket 
                                                          
19 Imbs and Waziarg (2003) show that sectoral and export concentration follows a U-shape: countries diversity 
during their early stages of development, but ultimately they start specializing on a relatively narrower set of 
activities at later stages of economic development.   
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away from raw materials (which are ranked the lowest in the ECI) and thus it may have a 
positive impact on the export complexity.    
 Data specification 
The dataset used in this research covers the period between 1995 and 2013 for thirty-eight 
RDDCs. A summary of the statistics of the variables employed in this study is shown in 
Table 2.5. The export concentration has an overall mean of 55.4 percent with a significant 
variation between the sample countries; Mexico has the most diversified exports basket with 
an average HHI of 13.9 percent while Angola on the other hand has the least diversified 
export basket with an average HHI of 96.7 percent.  
 The Economic Complexity Index (ECI), on the other hand, is available for twenty-
eight countries in this sample (i.e. 522 observations). ECI has an overall mean of -0.698 with 
substantial variations among the panel countries. In 2013, Mexico had the highest 
complexity score followed by Malaysia with 0.85 and 0.81 respectively. On the other hand, 
Algeria had the lowest score of -2.08.  
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Table 2.5 Summary of statistics for the used variables annually (1995-2013) 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Export concentration (HHI) 
Overall 0.554 0.203 0.113 0.968 N =     720 
Between   0.190 0.139 0.924 n =      38 
Within   0.078 0.242 0.903 T-bar = 18.9 
Economic complexity (ECI) 
 
Overall -0.698 0.762 -2.791 1.103 N =     522 
Between  0.718 -2.116 0.925 
n =      28 
Within   0.279 -1.769 0.348 T-bar = 18.6 
Ln credit to private sector 
 
Overall 2.846 1.012 -1.618 5.066 N =     710 
Between   0.938 0.545 4.800 n =      38 
Within   0.440 0.683 4.063 T-bar = 18.6 
Ln bank deposits 
 
Overall 3.081 0.821 0.148 4.870 N =     647 
Between   0.766 1.412 4.718 n =      38 
Within   0.329 1.646 4.232 T-bar = 17.02 
Ln bank assets 
 
Overall 3.047 0.953 -0.691 5.101 N =     647 
Between   0.898 0.978 4.823 n =      38 
Within   0.402 1.313 4.528 T-bar = 17.02 
Ln financial system deposits 
 
Overall 3.092 0.825 0.148 4.870 N =     647 
Between   0.771 1.412 4.718 n =      38 
Within   0.325 1.657 4.240 T-bar = 17.02 
Ln GDP per capita 
 
Overall 8.007 1.466 4.631 11.448 N =     722 
Between   1.356 5.431 10.646 n =      38 
Within   0.597 5.280 9.585 T-bar =      19 
Ln trade openness 
 
Overall 4.377 0.477 2.693 6.276 N =     666 
Between   0.451 3.400 5.506 n =      38 
Within   0.181 3.630 5.146 T-bar = 17.5 
Ln fixed capital accumulation 
 
Overall 22.285 1.790 18.478 26.833 N =     629 
Between   1.646 19.120 25.769 n =      37 
Within   0.751 19.871 24.398 T-bar =      17 
Ln population 
 
Overall 15.843 1.603 12.595 18.972 N =     722 
Between   1.614 12.786 18.792 n =      38 
Within   0.171 15.210 16.722 T-bar =      19 
Ln REER 
 
Overall 4.638 0.257 3.492 6.110 N =     722 
Between   0.153 4.351 5.204 n =      38 
Within   0.209 3.779 5.595 T-bar =      19 
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 Empirical results 
2.6.5.1 Fixed effect estimation 
The fixed effect estimations show the impact of financial development (FD) on export 
concentration and economic complexity using four different financial depth indicators. Table 
2.6 shows the impact of FD on export concentration. It indicates that FD has no significant 
impact on export concentration across all the FD indicators used in the study. This is to say 
that FD is not suggested to be a determinant of export concentration. 
 The first explanatory variable is GDP per capita that has a positive and significant 
coefficient. This result is explained by the fact that GDP per capita for RDDCs does not only 
represent economic development taking place, but also shows fluctuations in commodity 
prices. For example, the average GDP per capita for the sample has risen from 2255 dollars 
in 2003 to 7563 dollars in 2013 following increases in commodity prices. An important 
control variable for RDDCs is the real effective exchange rate (REER) which has a positive 
and significant sign. This predicts that REER appreciation induces export concentration by 
reducing the competitiveness of the industrial sector. 
 The positive and significant trade openness coefficient suggests that trade openness 
promotes export concentration. This is in line with Reinert’s (2007) view: in countries 
characterised by an undiversified production structure based on the exploitation of natural 
resource, a greater trade openness may encourage these countries to specialize according to 
their comparative advantage. The negative and significant coefficient of fixed capital to GDP 
suggests that fixed capital formation reduces export concentration. Finally, the results 
suggest that countries with a higher population size tend to have less concentrated exports. 
 Table 2.7 demonstrates the fixed effect estimation using economic complexity as a 
dependent variable. Three models out of four suggest that greater financial development 
results in lower economic complexity. In other words, financial system growth may hinder 
export complexity in RDDCs. The negative and significant coefficient of GDP per capita 
mainly reflects the increase in commodity prices; the increase in commodity prices reduces 
the export complexity because it is reflected in a larger share of raw material products in the 
export basket. Trade openness has a negative and significant coefficient, which suggests that 
greater trade openness may induce these countries to export less complex products. Finally, 
a higher population has a positive and significant sign, which suggests that larger population 
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nations are expected to discover new activities. In this context, producing new activities 
(non-resource products) can increase the ECI. 
Table 2.6 Financial development and export concentration using FE estimator 
Dependent variable: 
Export concentration 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ln private credit to GDP  -0.010 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ln bank deposits to GDP  
 
  -0.038 
 (0.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ln banks assets to GDP  
 
 
 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
 
 
 
Ln financial system deposits to 
GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.039 
(0.033) 
Ln GDP per capita 
 
0.089 *** 
(0.012) 
0.098*** 
(0.015) 
0.092*** 
(0.015) 
0.098*** 
(0.015) 
Ln trade openness 
 
0.156 *** 
(0.052) 
0.158*** 
(0.055) 
0.158*** 
(0.055) 
0.158*** 
(0.055) 
Ln fixed capital accumulation -0.055** 
(0.033) 
-0.047** 
(0.022) 
-0.050** 
(0.0217) 
-0.047** 
(0.023) 
Ln REER 
 
0.059* 
(0.032) 
0.060 
(0.039) 
0.063* 
(0.0370) 
0.059 
(0.039) 
Ln population 
 
-0.156*** 
(0.050) 
-0.152** 
(0.071) 
-0.154** 
(0.072) 
-0.152** 
(0.071) 
Constant 
 
1.33 
(1.86) 
1.275 
(1.195) 
1.301 
(1.194) 
1.281 
(1.192) 
The robust standard errors are presented in parentheses under the coefficients 
***, **, * show 1% 5% 10% significant levels respectively 
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Table 2.7: Financial development and economic complexity using FE estimator 
Dependent variable: 
Economic complexity 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ln private credit to GDP -0.194*** 
(0.0591) 
 
   
Ln bank deposits to GDP  -0.161* 
(0.0895) 
 
  
Ln banks assets to GDP   -0.097 
(0.0609) 
 
 
Ln financial system deposits to 
GDP 
   -0.153* 
(0.0877) 
 
Ln GDP per capita 
 
-0.317** 
(0.154) 
-0.380** 
(0.175) 
-0.381** 
(0.181) 
-0.382** 
(0.175) 
Ln trade openness 
 
-0.196 
(0.126) 
-0.317** 
(0.150) 
-0.319** 
(0.138) 
-0.318** 
(0.150) 
Ln fixed capital accumulation 0.139 
(0.123) 
0.108 
(0.120) 
0.0884 
(0.123) 
0.107 
(0.120) 
Ln REER 
 
-0.143 
(0.0871) 
-0.150 
(0.100) 
-0.128 
(0.0868) 
-0.154 
(0.101) 
Ln population 
 
0.581** 
(0.249) 
0.964** 
(0.380) 
0.987** 
(0.366) 
0.964** 
(0.379) 
Constant 
 
-8.846** 
(3.631) 
-13.51** 
(6.036) 
-13.72** 
(5.660) 
-13.47** 
(6.021) 
The robust standard errors are presented in parentheses under the coefficients 
***, **, * show 1% 5% 10% significant levels respectively 
2.6.5.2 Panel cointegration estimation 
Table 2.8 reports the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) panel unit root test for the variables at both 
level and first difference. The results clearly show that the null hypothesis of a unit root 
cannot be rejected at the level for the majority of the variables. However, the table reveals 
that the hypothesis is rejected when the variables are in first difference 20 . The non-
stationarity of the majority of the variables suggests the need for considering panel 
cointegration estimations.  
 Then, the existence of a long-term relationship using the Kao residual cointegration 
test is checked. Table 2.9 reports eight test outcomes. Each financial depth indicator is tested 
with export concentration as a dependent variable (for the first four rows) and then with 
economic complexity (for the last four rows). The low p-values for the eight tests give strong 
                                                          
20 Fisher-type test (Choi, 2001) is also implemented for robustness. The test outcomes are very consistent with the 
IPS reported test. All the variables are stationary at first difference. The exception was the population size variable, 
which is not stationary in first difference. Thus, it should be eliminated from the estimation model. 
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evidence of long-term relationships between the dependent variables and the right-hand side 
variables21.  
 Having found that there are cointegrating links, Table 2.10 shows the panel 
cointegration estimation using the DOLS estimator for export concentration. The coefficient 
of the four FD variables are positive but not significant. This means the FD is not expected 
to have an impact on export concentration. It is also important to note that the control 
variables are robust across the four regressions and all the control variables have significant 
coefficients with the expected sign (as discussed in Section 2.6.5.1). 
 Table 2.11 reveals the four models using the DOLS estimator with economic 
complexity as a dependent variable. The results strongly suggest (at the one percent level) a 
negative relationship between FD and economic complexity. In other words, FD can hinder 
export complexity. The other control variables have significant coefficients with the 
expected signs. 
 
Table 2.8: Im, Pesaran and Shin panel unit root test 
IPS unit root test *  Level 1st difference 
Variable statistics P-value statistics P-value 
Export concentration -0.99 0.18 -12.36 0.00 
Export complexity 1.81 0.96 -9.41 0.00 
Ln credit to private 0.54 0.70 -14.05 0.00 
Ln bank deposits 1.69 0.95 -12.85 0.00 
Ln bank assets 0.04 0.52 -11.43 0.00 
Ln financial system deposits 1.13 0.87 -12.81 0.00 
 Ln GDP per capita 6.70 1.00 -13.03 0.00 
Ln REER -0.22 0.41 -13.71 0.00 
Ln Trade openness -1.87 0.03 -15.58 0.00 
Ln Fixed Capital to GDP -3.41 0.00 -20.57 0.00 
Ln population 5.01 1.00 2.37 0.99 
* Null hypothesis: the existence of unit root 
 
 
                                                          
21 For robustness, Pedroni (1999) cointegration test was implemented, and suggested a long-term relationship. 
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Table 2.9: Kao Residual co-integration test 
Series t-statistics P-value 
Series 1: Ln credit to private and concentration -3.60 0.00 
Series 2: Ln bank deposits and concentration -3.21 0.00 
Series 3: Ln bank assets and concentration -3.16 0.00 
Series 4: Ln financial system deposits and 
concentration 
-3.20 0.00 
Series 5: Ln credit to private and complexity -2.11 0.02 
Series 6: Ln bank deposits and complexity -1.86 0.03 
Series 7: Ln bank assets and complexity -1.87 0.03 
Series 8: Ln financial system deposits and 
complexity 
-1.85 0.03 
* Null hypothesis: no cointegration 
Table 2.10 Export concentration models using panel cointegration estimation (DOLS) 
Dependent variable: 
Export concentration 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ln sector private credit to 
GDP 
 
0.005 
   
(0.008) 
 
Ln bank deposits to GDP  0.007   
(0.013) 
Ln banks assets to GDP   0.001  
(0.01) 
Ln financial system deposits 
to GDP 
   0.007 
(0.012) 
Ln fixed capital to GDP -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.073*** 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Ln GDP per capita 
 
0.053*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.050*** 
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
Ln trade openness 0.193*** 0.219*** 0.244*** 0.220** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
Ln REER 0.065** 0.074*** 0.087*** 0.074*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
The robust standard errors are presented in parentheses under the coefficients 
***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels respectively 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table 2.11 Economic complexity (ECI) models using panel cointegration estimation 
(DOLS) 
Dependent variable: 
Export concentration 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ln private credit to GDP 
-0.234*** 
   
(0.049) 
Ln bank deposits to GDP  
-0.286*** 
 
 
(0.077) 
Ln banks assets to GDP   
-0.173*** 
 (0.051) 
Ln financial system deposits to 
GDP 
   
-0.273*** 
(0.170) 
Ln GDP per capita 
-0.094*** -0.103***  -0.154*** -0.108** 
(0.033) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042) 
Ln trade openness 
-0.306*** -0.290*** -0.354*** -0.290*** 
(0.097) (0.109) (0.103) (0.109) 
Ln fixed capital to GDP 
0.379*** 0.253*** 0.173* 0.242** 
(0.079) (0.091) (0.102) (0.093) 
Ln REER 
-0.221*** -0.209*** -0.195** -0.206** 
(0.071) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) 
The robust standard errors are presented in parentheses under the coefficients 
***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels respectively 
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2.7 Conclusion 
Financial systems have grown significantly in resource-dependent developing countries 
(RDDC) in recent years. This chapter has investigated the impact of this growth on export 
concentration and complexity for the period from 1995 to 2013. 
The descriptive analysis and econometric results have challenged the mainstream 
view about financial development in RDDC. This mainstream view states that developing 
the financial sector in these countries contributes to greater economic and industrial 
development. It suggests that FD promotes industrial development and diversification 
through supporting sectors that rely more on external finance. 
Contrary to this mainstream argument, the statistical models fail to find any 
significant impact of financial development on export concentration. Furthermore, the 
models suggest a negative impact of financial development on export complexity.  
These findings can be explained by the banks’ risk aversion motives, which may 
result in funding traditional and non-risky projects. In other words, private banks (if left 
unregulated) look for short-term and higher profit investments, yet fear the fundamental risks 
associated with investing in new activities (Ghosh 2008). In an empirical study, Jaud et al. 
(2017) find that the financial sector development helps countries in promoting certain type 
of products - products that conform to the country’s comparative advantage. A developed 
domestic financial system, they argue, “can push the country’s exports toward products 
congruent with its comparative advantage” (Jaud et al. 2017, p.1013). 
The negative impact of finance on the export complexity is in line with Ebireri and 
Paloni (2016) study in which they demonstrate that developing the banking sector has a 
negative impact on export sophistication in a sample of heterogeneous developing countries. 
They maintain that the process of financialisation is a potential explanation for their finding. 
Mazzucato (2013) explains that financialisation has changed the role of banks fundamentally 
from institutions that fund long-term investment and innovation to ones that profit from 
lending to the household sector and for speculation activities. She further argues that while 
technological upgrading requires committed, risky and patient finance, private financial 
institutions are increasingly characterized by risk-aversion and short-term motives. As a 
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result, private financial institutions are becoming unable to distinguish between the bad risk 
associated with unproductive firms and the good risk that is associated with innovation22.  
 In conclusion, this study has argued that developing the financial sector might not be 
an appropriate policy recommendation for upgrading the manufacturing industry in RDDCs. 
In order for financial development to have a major impact on innovation in the developing 
world, government intervention in the financial sector may be required (see Dymski 2003). 
Drawing further policy implications from this issue leads to a main limitation of this work: 
its cross-country analysis does not account for key country-specific characteristics that allow 
the researcher to suggest further policy recommendations. Thus, a deeper understanding of 
the relationship between financial development and the industrial structure in RDDCs 
requires country-specific case studies that consider the role of institutions and history. 
  
                                                          
22 Bottazzi et al. (2011) shows that the probability of obtaining a bad credit score for a productive firm is as high 
as it is for an unproductive one. This is because of the risk calculation method which does not account for the 
source of the risk; e.g. a firm that is developing a novel innovative product is likely to have a high risk score. Thus, 
Mazzucato (2013) urges policy makers to establish a new credit score mechanism that support innovators rather 
than penalizing them. Furthermore, recent studies show that innovative enterprises face a greater financing gap 
relative to traditional ones. In the UK, firms that have recently developed novel innovations face greater financing 
difficulties relative to non-innovative firms (Cosh et al., 2009). 
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 Financing industrial upgrading and diversification in resource-dependent 
developing countries: Chile and Malaysia as case studies  
3.1 Introduction  
Motivated by the previous chapter’s findings, which show no significant positive impact of 
financial development on export upgrading in resource-dependent developing countries, this 
chapter studies two resource-dependent countries that have successfully diversified their 
production and industrial baskets: Chile and Malaysia. The former has diversified its 
industry towards resource-based sectors (i.e. close to its comparative advantage), while the 
latter has diversified its economy towards a wider range of activities that are dominated by 
electronics and semiconductors (i.e. significantly far from its comparative advantage). The 
main objective of this chapter is to answer the following questions: How did Chile and 
Malaysia finance their industrial diversification and upgrading? What was the role of the 
state in supporting and financing industrial diversification?  
 The states in these countries have followed different strategies. In Chile, the state 
finances the manufacturing industry through public financial institutions, such as the 
Production Development Corporation (CORFO) and Fundacion Chile (a public venture 
capital fund). While their assistance was meant to develop the manufacturing sector in 
general, their support since 1973 has been mainly focused on resource based sectors; namely, 
fruit, forestry, salmon, wine and other processed food. In Malaysia, on the other hand, in 
addition to attracting foreign investment to specific manufacturing sectors, the Malaysian 
government channels funds to targeted sectors using the Development Financial Institutions 
(DFIs), public venture capital institutions and priority sectors lending. Unlike Chile, 
Malaysian public finance was not only focused on natural resource sectors (e.g. rubber, oil 
and tin), but also on electronics, automobiles and other new manufacturing sectors. In order 
to investigate the role of public finance in the emergence of new industries, this chapter 
offers greater focus on a new major industry in each country: farmed salmon in Chile and 
semiconductors in Malaysia.  
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides motives for the study, 
before Section 3 discusses its conceptual framework. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 investigate, 
respectively, the cases of Chile and Malaysia, by analysing their industrial upgrading and 
diversification and how state finance plays a role in stimulating these changes. Section 3.6 
provides a comparison between the roles of public financial institutions in the two countries. 
Finally, section 3.7 offers a conclusion. 
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3.2 Study motives and contribution 
Resource-dependent countries are advised to de-regulate their financial systems and to 
reduce state-directed credit in order to achieve greater economic diversification (Beck and 
Poelhekke 2017; IMF 2016). The main contribution of this study is to investigate this 
argument in two resource-dependent countries that have successfully diversified their 
economies, by examining the role of the state in financing industrial development. Secondly, 
this paper contributes to the heterodox literature that highlights the role of industrial policies 
in mitigating the Dutch-Disease (e.g. Chang and Andreoni 2016). This study does so by 
highlighting the role of public institutions in financing and subsidizing the emergence of 
non-resource industrial sectors in these resource-dependent developing counties (RDDCs). 
Thirdly, it contributes to the  limited literature on the role of development banks in 
economic development (Cozzi and Griffith-Jones 2016). This paper adds to this literature by 
highlighting the role of development banks and other public financial institutions in 
promoting structural transformation and industrial diversification. These institutions can be 
particularly important for RDDCs because financing is considered as a major constraint for 
their industrial development process (Felipe and Rhee 2015; Kaplinsky et al. 2012).  
Fourthly, this study provides a case study in each country thus following Nelson 
(2008) who shows that studying the role of institutional change in technological upgrading 
is sector- and location-specific. These case studies provide evidence of the role of public 
financial institutions in the emergence of the farmed salmon industry in Chile and the 
semiconductors industry in Malaysia.  
Fifthly, because some insights and information about public financial institutions are 
not available in their annual reports or other published forms, this study also uses some 
unpublished data in addition to semi-structured interviews with some officials and economic 
advisors in the two countries to carry out this investigation (Appendix 1 provides details 
about the semi-structured interviews and the rationale for using them). 
Chile and Malaysia have been chosen for an important reason. Relative to the average 
resource-dependent developing countries, Chile and Malaysia have achieved higher 
industrial GDP, greater export diversification (i.e. number of products exported with 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA)), and lower export concentration measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (See Figure 3.1). Figure 3.2 presents the composition of 
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exports for the two countries compared to the other RRDCs in terms of technological 
intensity, which shows that both countries have lower than  average RDDCs in primary 
products exports23. 
Figure 3.1 Chile and Malaysia’s performance in selected indicators (average 2009-2013).  
 
 Source: Own calculations based on the UNCTAD and the World Bank databases. 
Figure 3.2 Chile and Malaysia’s export composition (2009-2013) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the UNCTAD database.  
 
                                                          
23 The figure uses Lall’s (2002) definition of technological intensity. In terms of primary product exports, Malaysia 
is far lower than Chile and the RDDCs’ average. This gives Malaysia an advantage over the others because of the 
high volatility of their primary products’ prices. Regarding resource-based manufacturing, Chile’s share is larger 
than that of Malaysia and the other RRDCs. The final three columns show the technology-intensive exports in 
which Malaysia has a substantial share of technology-intensive exports relative to the other countries (including 
Chile). 
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3.3 Conceptual Framework 
A properly functioning financial system should provide the private sector with finance that 
can promote manufacturing sector growth, diversification and upgrading. To achieve these 
goals, the financial system needs to provide risky and patient finance. In the context of 
structural transformation, the financial system should also fund targeted (strategic) sectors 
in line with the national industrial strategy. Nonetheless, it is argued that private finance 
might not fulfil the industrial development financing needs. There are three main reasons.  
 Firstly, private finance tends to avoid financing uncertain industrial projects. This 
uncertainty is underlined throughout the process of technological change that can result in 
industrial upgrading. Nonetheless, this does not mean that technological change is a result 
of luck; instead it is an outcome of patient, and committed efforts. This commitment requires 
certain types of financial institutions (Mazzucato 2013). Furthermore, Establishing a new 
industrial project is highly uncertain and private banks are unlikely to finance it; they tend 
not to risk their assets in long-term investments because of the fear that their investments 
might not be financially profitable (Dymski 2014)24. This is also the case in new technology 
investments. Khan (2009) argues that banks are unlikely to support novel technologies 
because of the high possibility of project failure in addition to the long period required in 
learning a new technology.  
 Secondly, private finance may have no incentive in financing high social value 
projects. In RDDCs, for instance, there is a definite need to fund projects with positive 
externalities that can encourage industrial diversification in society (Rodrik 2004). In their 
“self-discovery” theory, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) show that information externality is 
seen as a fundamental hurdle to industrial diversification in developing countries. They 
indicate that a pioneer who enters a new industry, before others, generates an important 
information externality about the new industry, and if successful, he can be easily imitated. 
This process does not compensate the entrepreneur and may result in lower incentives for 
innovation. While private financial institutions evaluate such projects based on financial 
profitability with no consideration of social and developmental impacts, public financial 
institutions can be crucial in funding these projects. By highlighting the importance of 
industrial policies in this framework, Hausmann and Rordik (2003) show that “government 
                                                          
24 Firms may need external finance for business creation, relocation, expansion or working capital. However, 
Dymski (2014) shows that banks are more likely to finance the working capital only because of the less uncertainty 
involved. 
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loans and guarantees” are key tools because of their ability to discriminate between pioneers 
and imitators, in addition to the flexibility to cut financing (i.e. subsidizing) when an activity 
is well demonstrated. 
 Thirdly, capital markets around the world are increasingly characterised by short-
termism (UNCTAD 2016). Following the process of financial liberalization, there is 
growing evidence of commercial banks withdrawing from funding long-term projects and 
gravitating towards easier profits to be earned through lending non-productive sectors and 
fuelling speculation activities (Ghosh 2005). This change is also coupled with a reduction in 
state-investment banking. Both factors have reduced the availability of long-term financing 
(Kregel 2014). Kregel states that “the recent dominance of private financial institutions and 
the presumption of their efficiency advantage have reduced the availability of long-term 
finance for development.” (p.1)  
 Public financial institutions, on the other hand, are regarded as a major contributor 
to industrial development in developed (Diamond 1957; Kregel 2014) and developing 
nations (Amsden 2001) because of their commitment to providing developmental, high-risk 
and patient finance. This theoretical framework focuses on two main types of public finance, 
namely, development banks and public venture capital funds. 
 Development banks25 
“Development banks are government-sponsored financial institutions concerned primarily 
with the provision of long-term capital to industry” (De Aghion 1999, p.83). During the 
Industrial Revolution, development banks contributed enormously to the rapid 
industrialization of Europe and Japan. National governments sponsored industrial banks to 
provide long-term developmental finance because private financial institutions did not have 
the capabilities and the incentive to provide finance for industry (Diamond 1957; Kregel 
2014; Yasuda 1993). 
The literature suggests that the oldest industrial financial institution was the Societe 
General pour Favouriser l’Industrie National which was established in the Netherlands in 
1822. Substantially more important industrial and developmental institutions, such as the 
Credit Mobilier, were created in France in the 1840s and 1850s and they contributed 
                                                          
25 There is no common name for development banks around the world; their names include state investment banks, 
industrial banks, development financial institutions, development funds and public credit programmes. 
Nonetheless, they share a common mission of promoting the state’s developmental strategies (Kollatz-Ahen, 2015). 
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significantly to infrastructure and industrial development (De Aghion 1999). Credit Mobilier 
became a model for public financial institutions in other parts of Europe and Asia. DeLong 
(1991)  shows that large German banks were founded in “deliberate imitation of the French 
Credit Mobilier” (cited in Yasuda, 1993, p.10). The existing commercial banks were not able 
to provide manufacturing industry with the required long-term loans. Firstly, they were not 
interested in bearing the risks associated with financing new enterprises, and secondly, they 
lacked the expertise and skills to allow them to work with long-term risky investment (De 
Aghion 1999).  
The need for large infrastructure and industrial investment after World Wars I and II 
resulted in the establishment of new development banks, such as the Japan Development 
Bank (JDB) and the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW means a ‘reconstruction 
credit institute’). Diamond (1957) maintains that the main role of these institutions was the 
provision of long-term finance to relatively new manufacturing sectors. This support was in 
the form of equity investment, loans at low interest rates or guarantees for bonds issued by 
companies in targeted sectors. 
Developing countries, such as South Korea, India, Chile and Brazil, have also made use 
of development banks to finance their rapid industrial upgrading needs. Amsden (2001) 
claims that the developmental state is predicted to participate in developmental banking; “the 
state’s agent for financing investment was the development bank. From the viewpoint of 
long-term capital supply for public and private investment, development banks throughout 
‘the rest’ were of overwhelming importance”26 (p.127). 
Based on the nation’s stage of development, a development bank can play different roles 
and certain roles might be more crucial at one stage than at another. The literature has 
documented six major roles for development banks in developing countries. First, they play 
a developmental role by providing long-term finance for projects according to the national 
development strategy. Promoting strategic investments and structural transformation are 
considered to be the main roles for the majority of development banks (Amsden 2001). For 
instance, following the Brazilian Government’s goal of making the country an efficient steel 
                                                          
26 The ‘rest’ according to Amsden (2001) refers to the following nations: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Taiwan, India, Turkey, Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. While South Korea was already a developed nation, it 
was added to her “rest” countries because of its late industrialization experience.  
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producer in the late 1950s, one half of the Brazilian Development Bank’s (BNDES) funds 
targeted the steel industry between 1958 and 1967 (ibid.). 
 Secondly, development banks support high-risk innovations and projects that are 
unlikely to be financed by commercial banks. Investors in new activities tend to face 
difficulties in accessing external finance. This is explained mainly by the lack of collateral 
and the lack of a record of profitable investments in addition to the uncertainty that tends to 
be associated with the innovation process itself (Dymski, 2014; Mazzucato, 2013). Some 
development banks have established programmes that are designed to support high-risk 
innovation projects. In Brazil, for instance, since the 1990s the government has decided to 
promote high-tech firms and innovation. Accordingly, BNDES started several programmes 
to finance innovations such as Prosoft which focused on financing firms in the software 
industry; Profarms programme which directs finance for innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry; FUNTEC which specialises in funding IT firms; and Criatec which targets firms in 
the ICT industry and biotechnology sectors. Table 3.1 shows major programmes established 
by BNDES to finance innovation. 
Table 3.1: BNDES selected innovation programmes  
Year Established Programs Targeted sector 
1997 New innovation programs, such as Prosoft Software industry 
2004 Profarma   Pharmaceutical industry  
2005 FUNTEC IT industry 
2006 Prodtv and Pro-aeronautics Digital TV industry 
2007 Criatec Fund ICT and biotechnology sectors 
2009 Pro-engineering  Automotive, aerospace, defence, and 
nuclear energy indsutries 
2010 Proplastico  Plastic sector 
2011 Pro-P&G  Oil and gas sectors 
Source: Mazzucato and Penna (2016). 
 Thirdly, they tend to be challenge-led institutions. Challenge-led (or mission-oriented) 
policies are those that target the development of a particular technology or the prevention of 
certain social problems. One example of this is the generous support of development banks 
around the world for projects aiming to anticipate climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 
2016). Fourthly, they have an ability to direct funds towards targeted industrial sectors and, 
thus, to mitigate the Dutch-Disease. For instance, Chang and Anderioni (2016) argue that 
the Brazilian Government has used certain industrial policies, e.g. BNDES lending, to 
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support certain industrial sectors and mitigate the Dutch-Disease that has resulted from 
significant influxes of foreign exchange to the Brazilian economy. 
Fifthly, they support greater social and geographical inclusion. Projects located in rural 
areas that lack infrastructure development face larger risks in their operations and, thus, may 
face financing difficulties and slower economic development as a consequence (Dymski 
2014). Sixthly, they can invest in a counter-cyclical fashion and promote industrial 
investments in periods of downturn. Because of low interest rates during economic 
recessions, it is argued that commercial banks may disrupt expansionary monetary policy 
because of their lack of incentive to lend. State banks, on the other hand, have a higher 
incentive to push the economy out of a downturn through increasing their lending despite 
the low interest rates (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2004). An example of this is the significant increase 
in BNDES disbursement from 118 billion in 2007 to 209 billion riyal in 2009 (BNDES, 
2015).  
 Amsden (2001) highlights additional unique features of development banks in recently 
industrialized countries; high industrial financing capabilities; unique mechanisms to select 
good projects27; the ability to evaluate investment execution and progress; the provision of 
economic and technical advice; the development of technological and managerial expertise; 
the means of ensuring financial soundness; the establishment of efficient distribution and 
marketing practices; and supporting the transfer of foreign technologies28.  
 Public venture capital 
Venture capital is considered as an important source of finance that can boost start-up firms 
in new technologies. Lerner (2013) explains the importance of venture capital funds for start-
ups by showing that an entrepreneur may not have adequate capital to finance a project on 
his own. Because such projects are characterized by uncertainty and intangible assets, banks 
are not likely to finance them. In the meantime, Lerner (2002) shows that private venture 
                                                          
27  The “picking winner” is an argument that has dominated the industrial development debate. Some argue that 
selective government policies hinder the economic development process by distorting market competition. Easterly 
(2009) shows that history tells us that the outcome of picking winners has been very poor. On the other hand, 
Wade (2012) has argued that successful experiences in developed and developing countries show that governments 
have been “making” winners through their vertically-targeting industrial policy. 
28 For example, in order to insure that a borrowing firm is not overpaying for foreign technology, BNDES requires 
firms to register the technology contracts with another government agent that had greater experience in this regard. 
Furthermore, it asks some borrowers to cut the production costs significantly in order to maintain its 
competitiveness. In some cases, some borrowing firms were required to modernize their management and 
marketing systems to enter international markets. As far as financial soundness is concerned, BNDES forced some 
clients to maintain a certain debt to equity ratio to insure their financial strength (Amsden, 2001). 
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capital might not solve this financing problem efficiently, and thus he demonstrates the need 
for public venture capital for two  reasons. First, public funds are more capable to certify 
firms for other investors. Lerner highlights that when a public programme that specializes in 
financing small firms in specific sectors supports a certain project, it could thereby certify 
its excellence and potential growth. As an example Lerner (2002) explains that “specialists 
at the National Institute of Health or Department of Defence may have considerable insight 
into which biotechnology or advanced materials companies are the most promising, while 
the traditional financial statement analysis undertaken by bankers would be of little value” 
(p.78). 
 The second reason for the importance of public venture capital is its role in 
encouraging a technological spill-over and thus creating positive information externalities 
for other producers. In those developing countries that lack industrial diversification, Rodrik 
(2004) shows that information externalities can be a key. Entrepreneurs try out new products 
and adapt their technologies from existing markets abroad and then invest in them 
domestically. Because this process can benefit the society as a whole, public venture capital 
can play a major role in creating positive information externalities by investing in new 
activities (ibid.). 
 The challenge for policy-makers is, therefore, not to provide support for all small 
firms, but instead to fund and support the development of firms with high potential growth 
(Mazzucato 2011). By distinguishing between average firms and those with a higher 
propensity for growth (‘gazelles’), Nightingale and Coad (2013) argue that the policy makers 
must focus on gazelles by boosting their growth rather than promoting horizontal policies to 
facilitate market entry.  
 While there is an increase in the availability of venture capital financing, it is argued 
to be scarce during the early stages of firms’ development in new technology activities 
because of the high uncertainty about the used technology and its demands (Murray 1999). 
Mazzucato (2011) demonstrates that private venture capital is more likely to be available in 
the second and third stages rather than in the early stages, because of the significant drop in 
the associated risk of loss (see Table 3.2). By looking at the behaviour of private venture 
capital funds, Mazzucato argues that private funds tend to be more speculative and seek 
short-term profit through exiting in three to five years and benefiting from buy-out or IPOs.  
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 Keller and Block (2012) studied a public venture programme, Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR), in the United States and compared its performance with private 
venture funds29. The study shows that SBIR’s funding is significantly higher than private 
venture capital in early stage technology projects; its funding on average is five to six times 
higher, with the exception of the Internet bubble in between 1999 and 2000. In addition, 
private funds tend to be concentrated on a small number of industries. In 2000, for instance, 
46 percent of private venture capital targeted firms related to the Internet. In the meantime, 
promising projects in other industries did not attract these venture capitalists.  
 Finally, it is important to note that public venture capital funds should accept the high 
failure rates that result from their developmental effort (Mazucatto and Perez 2014). In the 
meantime, they should also benefit from the upside in order to cover potential losses in future 
rounds (e.g. a revolving fund). This is unlike many examples around the world where public 
funds are socializing the risk but privatizing the reward (Mazzucato 2011). 
Table 3.2: The risks associated with the various stages of technology innovation 
Innovation stage Risk of loss 
Seed stage 66.2 % 
Start-up stage 53 % 
Second stage 33.7 % 
Third stage 20.1 % 
Pre-public stage 20.9 % 
Source: Pierrakis (2010) (cited in Mazzucato 2011, p.40). 
3.4 The Case of Chile 
State directed credit is a major contributor to the development of the Chilean manufacturing 
sector. Before the wave of neo-liberal policies  in 1973, credit allocation was the primary 
policy tool used to develop the industrial sector following import substitution principles 
(Hastings 1993). Since 1973, this section shows that state directed credit has been devoted 
to developing resource-based manufacturing sectors. The section begins with a brief 
overview of the Chilean economy, including a description of its industrial and export 
structure. Then, it discusses public financing in terms of public industrial banking and public 
venture capital. Finally, it investigates the role of public finance in the development of the 
farmed-salmon industry. 
                                                          
29 The SBIR programme was established in 1982 and provides on average 2 billion dollars that targets technological 
innovation projects (Keller and Block, 2012). Their study also considers another programme, the Small Business 
Technology Transfer (STTR), which collaborates between federal laboratories, universities and small firms.   
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 A brief overview of the Chilean economy 
Chile has experienced a structural transformation change since Pinochet’s military coup in 
1973. This experience is considered by some mainstream economists as a ‘miracle’ 
following the neo-liberal reforms (see Ostry et al. 2016). On the other hand, other economists, 
such as Stiglitz (2005), argue that Chile “did not simply succumb to following the dictates 
of the Washington consensus willy-nilly. Like the success cases of East Asia, it was selective, 
adding and subtracting to the standard recipes in ways that allowed it to shape globalization 
for its purposes” (p2).  
 Prior to 1973 the country was identified by the active role of the government in the 
growth of the industrial sector following import substitution principles. However, Chile has 
implemented some neo-liberal polices immediately after the Pinochet coup. These policies 
started by liberalizing foreign trade, privatizing the domestic economy and then liberalizing 
the financial sector. In the meantime, the government continued to support resource based 
industrial sectors, e.g. mining, forestry, fisheries, vegetables and fruit (Agosin and Bravo-
Ortega 2009; Amsden 2001; Pietrobelli 1998). 
 A crucial government decision that needs to be highlighted here is the non-
privatisation of the national copper company (CODELCO). This non-neoliberal reform of 
development (i.e. public ownership) has been crucial in Chile’s industrial development 
experience in two ways. First, CODELCO has a substantial commitment to local 
development through supporting small domestic suppliers as well as mining processing 
activities. In the meantime, foreign companies working in the Chilean mining sector (mainly 
BHP-Billiton) have been sending raw minerals to China and Australia for processing, with 
limited support for local suppliers. Second, CODELCO’s revenues have been a substantial 
source of income for the state and its development agencies. While it has been transferring 
its profits to the Chilean government since its creation in 1955, the foreign mining companies 
in Chile contribute to government revenues only thorough taxes that are not high relative to 
other mineral rich countries (interview with industrial economist at CEPAL, April 2018). 
 In 1982, the Chilean economy hit a wall when the domestic economy entered a deep 
recession. Chile had accrued an extremely high level of international debt which led to a 
severe economic and financial crisis. After the financial crisis of 1982, the Chilean 
government considered a change in its macro-economic policy. The state imposed some 
import barriers, introduced some export subsidies and increased regulation of the financial 
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sector. By 1989 the Chilean economy had almost recovered and, in 1990, a democratic 
government was elected. Since then, the democratic governments have been intervening 
selectively to promote specific manufacturing sectors, especially the resource based sectors 
(Moguillansky et al. 2001; Pietrobelli 1998). 
The role of the state in financing industrial upgrading and export diversification 
cannot be investigated comprehensively without a brief description of the Chilean 
manufacturing and export patterns. Figure 3.3 shows that  industrial GDP has been 
increasing steadily since the late 1930s. However, it fell substantially after 1973 following 
the political and economic policy change. Manufacturing added value to GDP has fallen 
from 23.5 in 1972 to 18.4 in 1982.  
Disaggregated industrial data show an increase in the share of resource based 
manufacturing relative to the other sectors (see Table 3.3). For example, the share of the food 
and beverages sector rose from 17.9 percent in the period (1963-72) to 24.3 percent in (2002-
08). On the other hand, the share of the motor vehicle sector deteriorated from 6.1 to 0.6 
percent in the same periods. Indeed, the machinery and equipment retired in 1973, and since 
then, Chile’s growth relied on minerals and niche resource-based industries (Amsden 2001). 
Figure 3.3. Manufacturing added value to GDP (1970=100) 
 
Source: MOxLAD Database.  
Table 3.4 presents the evolution of the main Chilean export groups. The Chilean 
export basket has significantly diversified away from copper. The copper share has declined 
from 71 percent between 1963 and 1972 to 36 percent between 1993 and 2002. However, 
after the sharp increase in copper prices in 2003, its share increased until it reached fifty 
percent of the total exports value in the period between 2013 and 2015. The table also shows 
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that the increased diversity was towards resource based manufacturing, e.g. salmon, wine, 
wood and paper products. 
Table 3.3: Share of the industry added value by sector (annual average) 
 1963-72 1973-82 1983-92 1993-02 2002-08 
1. Food and beverages 17.90% 20.60% 22.10% 25.00% 24.30% 
2. Wood products (excl. furniture) 1.80% 2.40% 2.90% 4.30% 4.30% 
3. Basic metals 19.90% 21.10% 24.70% NA N.A. 
4. Paper and paper products 3.00% 4.30% 6.80% 6.70% N.A. 
5. Coke, refined petroleum products, 
nuclear fuel 
1.90% 6.10% 6.40% 7.90% N.A 
6. Non-metallic mineral products 3.80% 3.30% 3.40% 4.20% 3.40% 
7. Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 6.10% 4.50% 1.30% 1.00% 0.60% 
8. Electrical machinery and apparatus 3.40% 2.90% 1.40% 0.80% 0.40% 
9. Machinery and equipment  3.00% 2.50% 1.60% 1.90% 2.10% 
10. Textiles 10.60% 5.60% 3.80% 1.90% 0.90% 
11. Wearing apparel 5.20% 4.10% 3.40% 3.30% N.A. 
12. Chemicals and chemical products 7.10% 8.60% 9.00% 12.80% N.A. 
13. Rubber and plastics products 3.60% 2.20% 2.50% 3.00% 2.80% 
14. Tobacco products 3.40% 3.90% 4.20% 3.70% N.A. 
15. Printing and publishing 3.20% 3.10% 2.50% 2.00% N.A. 
16. Furniture manufacturing  1.00% 0.80% 0.70% 1.20% 0.90% 
17. Medical, precision and optical 
instruments 
0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.20% 0.10% 
Source: UNIDO Database 
Table 3.4: Export patterns for the main Chilean categories (annual average)  
Industry 1963-72 1973-82 1983-92 1993-02 2002-13 2013-15 
Mining 85% 65% 54% 42% 56% 54% 
     Copper 71% 56% 45% 36% 51% 50% 
Agriculture 3% 6% 13% 10% 6% 8% 
Manufacturing 12% 27% 32% 42% 37% 37% 
     Food and beverages 4% 7% 14% 16% 11% 12% 
               Salmon 0% 0% 1% 4% 4% 6% 
               Wine 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 
     Wood 0% 3% 4% 5% 4% 3% 
     Paper, wood and pulp products 2% 6% 6% 7% 4% 5% 
     Chemical and petroleum 
      Derivatives 
1% 3% 3% 5% 9% 7% 
     Base metal products 3% 7% 3% 1% 2% 1% 
     Metal products, machinery and 
     electrical goods 
1% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 
Source: Chile Central Bank (2016) 
 Financing the industrial upgrading  
This section discusses the role of state finance in Chilean manufacturing diversification by 
looking at two sources of finance; state industrial banking and state venture capital. Then, 
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the impact of these two public financing sources is further examined in the farmed-salmon 
industry. 
3.4.2.1 State industrial banking 
The collapse of the Chilean economy following the great depression of the 1930s justified 
the government participation in the credit allocation process. In 1935 the central bank started 
controlling the interest rate for favoured borrowers. First, a preferential rate was applied to 
wheat credits. Then, in 1937 the policy was applied to all the agricultural credits. Until 1939 
the manufacturing sector did not receive preferential treatment. In the meantime, the 
majority of commercial banks were offering short-term and low risk loans, and thus the 
government established a state development agency (CORFO) to provide long-term finance 
for identified strategic and emerging industries. CORFO was the first of its kind in Latin 
America (Faúndez 1988). 
It began its long-term credit using very limited financial resources. At the outset it 
received five to six percent of the national budget. However, this share dropped when 
government revenue declined following copper revenue fluctuations. After an increase in 
international support for Chilean development agencies, CORFO started receiving foreign 
credit. These foreign credit sources accounted for twenty-five per cent of the agency’s total 
loans between 1950 and 1964 (Hastings 1993). 
CORFO became the basic and central tool for directing credits to preferential 
industries. Its general investment strategy was based on import substitution principles. The 
supported products were ranked according to their import value and the expected foreign 
exchange savings. A product that appears at the top of the list is given priority in industrial 
policy and in CORFO’s agendas. Approved projects fall into one of three categories. First, 
projects contribute to the import substitution strategy during the final stages of the value 
adding process (e.g. consumer goods’ manufacturing). Secondly, projects contribute to the 
domestic production of raw materials, oil and steel. Thirdly, projects contribute to the 
production of capital goods. Normally, this step is considered to be the ultimate stage of an 
import substitution strategy and a vertical integration of the entire industrial domestic 
production (Hastings 1993; Mamalakis 1969). 
During the 1960s, CORFO substantially expanded its working and capital 
investments. Its fixed investments in the industrial sector were estimated to amount to fifty-
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five percent of the total of fixed investment in the industry. It is also projected that CORFO 
controlled approximately thirty percent of the total investment in the equipment and 
machinery sectors during this period (Amsden 2001). In terms of the number of supported 
firms, CORFO became an investor in 136 firms. Among these firms, it held majority 
ownership of forty-six firms (Hastings 1993). 
The agro-industry received a generous portion of CORFO’s direct loans during the 
late 1950s and 1960s. For example, in the period between 1959 and 1963 the agro-industry 
received 31.8 billion pesos equating to 45 percent of total direct loans; the manufacturing 
industry received 23.9 billion pesos accounting for approximately 35 percent of CORFO’s 
total direct loans and the mining sector received 14.2 billion pesos totalling around twenty 
percent of total direct loans (Mamalakis, 1969).  
CORFO has also participated in the chemicals manufacturing development. In an 
interview with two directors of Dow Chemicals in Latin America around 1970, these 
directors said CORFO “sets Chile apart from some of the other countries that have engaged 
in similar activities” (Amsden 2001, p.147). The developmental role of CORFO can also be 
seen in its establishment and development of giant enterprises in the Chilean economic 
system. These include the national sugar production company (IANSA), the national 
petroleum company (ENAP), the steel production company (CAP) and the electricity utility 
company (ENDESA) (Mamalakis 1969). 
State industrial financing remained crucial even after the economic transformation 
of 1973. Its role was mainly dedicated to resource based industries. A clear example of this 
is the government’s vertical policies targeting the support of the forestry sector. Because 
some parts of Chile were considered very suitable for growing  the radiate pine, the state 
made a great effort to expand  this sector  by providing loans, subsidies and labour training30. 
Toro and Gessel (1999) emphasize the role of Decree Number 701 (in 1974) regarding forest 
promotion in Chile. It guaranteed seventy-five percent of the plantation expenses in addition 
to providing financial support for firms wanting to establish new plants. The central bank 
participated in this support by channelling subsidized credit; between 1974 and 1979 it 
                                                          
30 The Radiate pine in some parts of Chile grows faster than in any other place in the world (Torro and Gessel, 
1999). 
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directed credit lines through private commercial banks and the state bank (Bacno Estado) to 
firms and farmers in the forestry sector31.  
In 1975, CORFO established the National Agency for Export Promotion (ProChile). 
The purpose of the programme was to facilitate exporting firms’ access to international 
markets, market research, marketing and feasibility studies, in addition to improving Chilean 
exports’ image abroad and attracting foreign investors to Chile. Regarding the nature of its 
targeted products and sectors, ProChile gives higher importance to diversifying the Chilean 
exports basket away from copper to resource-based industries. For instance, in co-operation 
with the Chilean Wine Association, it organizes annual exhibitions abroad to promote wine 
exports. Through its international offices, ProChile co-operates with CORFO to attract FDI 
and strategic entrepreneurs to the Chilean economy (interview with ProChile trade advisor, 
March 2018). 
After electing the first democratic government in 1990 32 , several financial 
instruments were introduced for the purpose of funding and promoting innovation in specific 
sectors. These instruments included the Scientific and Technological Development Fund 
(FONDEF), the National Fund for Technological and Productive Development (FONTEC), 
and the Fisheries Research Fund (FIP), CORFO’s Group Development Project (PROFO) 
and CORFO’s Development and Innovation Fund (FDI). All these funds were established in 
the period from 1991 to 199533.  
A crucial council for the identification and articulation of the industrial sectors is the 
National Council on Innovation for Competitiveness (CNIC), which since 2005 has been 
                                                          
31  Although Chile’s exports in forestry were non-existent in 1975, wood and paper products account for 
approximately 8 percent of its total exports in 2015 (Central Bank of Chile, 2016). 
32 It is important to note here that since 1990, the promotion of industrial policy has been subject to changes in 
Chilean politics. Conservative governments have been minimizing the role of state in supporting the manufacturing 
sector, while socialist democratic governments, on the other hand, have been promoting greater support for 
industrial diversification policies and programmes (interview with industrial economist at CEPAL, May 2018). 
33 Among these funds, PROFO and FONTEC have a larger role and contribution than the others (Tan, 2009). 
FONTEC is a fund that provides several financing tools to support the development of new products and 
production techniques. During the first decade of its establishment from 1991 onwards, it supported more than 
1700 innovation projects with a value amounting to 250 million dollars. Eighty-five percent of the participating 
firms were small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The manufacturing sector accounted for almost 41 percent of 
the targeted sectors, followed by the agricultural and fisheries sector with 29 percent and the information and 
communication sector (ICT) with 8 percent (Benavente et al., 2007).  PROFO, on the other hand, was established 
by CORFO. It works by generating groups of eight to fifteen firms from the same sector and geographical area 
that produce similar or complementary products. The main objective is to develop firms’ competitiveness by 
providing loans, facilitating technology access (or adaptation) and overcoming marketing and management 
problems. Furthermore, PROFO hires a group manager in order to support firms in developing, executing and 
monitoring their plans. During the preparatory phase, PROFO covers 70 percent of the operation costs for three 
years (up to a maximum of 100,000 US dollars) and in the project phase, the agency finances at least 50 percent of 
the total cost of the project (Perez-Aleman, 2000).    
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playing a major role in the credit allocation process. Its mandate is to help the government 
promote innovation through selective intervention policies in specific sectors. One of its 
goals was to repeat the significant increase in GDP per capita that had occurred during the 
previous two decades (OECD 2009; Pietrobelli and Puppato 2016). The CNIC recommends 
targeting the following industrial clusters: copper mining, aquaculture, fruit production, beef, 
pork and poultry; offshore services, tourism and processed food34. It argues that foreign 
direct investments (FDI), in addition to CORFO and CONICYT’s direct credit, are crucial 
instruments in financing the targeted clusters (OECD 2009). 
Agosin et al. (2010) claim that  the CNIC’s mandate expresses two fundamental 
issues. First, the Chilean Government has moved away from the idea that horizontal policies 
are the best way to promote long-term growth. Secondly, the CNIC’s ideas represent the 
‘doomed to choose’ view of Hausmann and Rodrik (2006). In this paper, Hausmann and 
Rodrik show that developing an industry requires the investment of a substantial amount of 
resources. Given the large market failure in developing countries, in addition to their limited 
number of resources, they argue that governments are doomed to choose a particular set of 
sectors that can be targeted. Their argument is in contrast to the “free-market” hypothesis, 
in which market mechanisms allocate resources efficiently and targeting specific sectors is 
considered a distortion of market forces. 
It is also important to highlight the role of CORFO in promoting linkages from the 
mining sector. In the context of resource-dependent countries, Hirschman (1981) argues that 
the production linkages from the resource sectors, in the upstream and downstream, are 
critical channels for economic development and industrial diversification. In Chile, in 
addition to the national copper company (CODELCO), CORFO is considered as a main tool 
in supporting small suppliers for the large mining companies, and thus, in the development 
of the Chilean mining cluster35. 
 CORFO has also been a channel for promoting fiscal linkages from the mining 
sector36. A major channel for this linkages is the Innovation and Competitiveness Fund (ICF) 
which is funded by the mining sector’s royalties. Because of CORFO’s expertise in 
                                                          
34 Because of CORFO’s advanced industrial expertise, it plays a major part in designing the CNIC’s industrial plans 
and targeted sectors (interview with high official in CORFO, May 2018).   
35  For instance, in 1997, CORFO contributed to establishing a programme to assist SMEs in meeting the 
qualification requirements of the mining industry. The programme provides lines of credit, technical, management 
and marketing assistance. Furthermore, in 2011, the Ministry of Mining, in co-operation with the National Copper 
Corporation of Chile, promoted a strategy called The Development of World Class Mining Suppliers. The aim of 
this strategy was to transform 250 Chilean firms into global suppliers by 2014. CORFO has committed to providing 
45 million US dollars (USD) for this programme over three years (McMahon and Moreira, 2014). 
36 In addition to production linkages (that is related to developing resource-related manufacturing activities around 
the resource sector), fiscal linkages refer to government revenue generated from the resource sector that are used 
to promote non-resource manufacturing sectors (Hirschman, 1981).  
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supporting innovation, ICF channels large part of its resources to CORFO programs, i.e. 
copper prices boom is usually reflected in higher support capacity of CORFO (interview 
with high official in CORFO, April 2018). For instance, following the increase in copper 
prices in 2003, CORFO’s total lending rose from 279 million USD in 2003 to around 5 
billion USD in 2013. However, its total lending declined to 2.8 billion USD after the 
significant decline in copper prices (see Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: CORFO total support relative to copper prices 
Year CORFO support in thousand USD Copper price  
(USD per metric ton) 
2003 278,977 1779.4 
2004 339,922 2863.5 
2005 439,915 3676.5 
2006 21,994 6731.4 
2007 189,194 7131.6 
2008 481,292 6963.5 
2009 1,310,503 5165.3 
2010 1,053,975 7538.4 
2011 2,364,029 8823.5 
2012 4,626,351 7958.9 
2013 5,027,993 7331.5 
2014 2,812,824 6863.4 
2015 2,532,087 5510.5 
2016 2,867,015 4867.9 
Source: CORFO unpublished data, and FRED database  
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3.4.2.2 Public venture capital 
In Chile, a major constraint facing innovation firms is inadequate seed and venture capital 
financing (Benavente et al. 2005). Thus, CORFO participates in the venture capital industry 
with the aim of fostering innovation within the Chilean SMEs. This participation is either 
through investing directly in risk capital, e.g. the acquisition of small firms’ equities, or 
indirectly by offering credit to venture capital fund managers. CORFO targets SMEs with 
high growth potential, insufficient capital and high management skills. Between 1997 and 
2014, CORFO approved credit lines standing at 637 million USD (OECD 2016). Table 3.6 
shows the major credit lines provided by CORFO and the number of beneficiary funds.  
Table 3.6 Major CORFO credit lines for the venture capital industry  
Name of credit line F1 F2 F3 K1 Fenix FT FC 
Targeted firms 
Venture 
capital 
Venture 
capital 
Venture 
capital 
Emerging 
firms 
Mining 
exploration 
Early 
stage 
Growth and 
Development 
Year of creation of 
the credit line 
1997 2005 2006 2008 2011 2012 2012 
Number of 
beneficiary fund 
managers 
5 funds,    3 
closed 
5 funds   1 
closed 
17 funds        
2 closed 
1 fund 6 funds 6 funds 3 funds 
Source: OECD database 
 An important beneficiary fund from CORFO credit lines has been Fundacion Chile 
(FCh). FCh was created in August 1976 with the purpose of upgrading the manufacturing 
sector. It is a semi-public investment institution that was funded by the Chilean government 
and ITT – an American corporation37. The agency has two major mandates: to provide seed 
capital and to transfer technologies by bringing in potentially profitable opportunities in 
projects, products and technologies which do not exist in Chile. FCh describes itself as: “a 
‘do tank’, creating more than 65 companies in diverse productive areas in the country, 
promoting new industries and innovative products within the main natural resource areas of 
the country” (Fundacion Chile 2016). 
 FCh’s working model includes three main phases (see Figure 3.4). First, it identifies 
opportunities of adding value through innovation. This phase may suggest one of the 
following: the creation of a new product or service, modification in the production process, 
or business model modification. Secondly, it obtains a suitable technology, which can be 
done by three methods: (i) transferring and adapting a technology that has been developed 
by a foreign entity; (ii) developing it through FCh’s own R&D; or (iii) developing it through 
                                                          
37 FCh’s establishment came a few years after the agreement between Allende’s government and ITT regarding the 
nationalization of the Chilean telecommunication company. 
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collaboration with R&D institutions. Nonetheless, in FCh, the innovation is rarely absolute, 
i.e. the technology is new for the global market. Instead, FCh introduces relative innovation, 
which enables the first use of the technology within the Chilean economy. Fourthly, it uses 
technology scale-up and dissemination (Fundacion Chile 2008). The four stages are carried 
out by FCh’s 350 professionals and over 200 international consultants (Foundacion Chile 
2016).  
 In this way FCh can be seen as a critical tool in spurring industrial diversification 
through the production of information externalities (Rodrik 2004). FCh produces 
information and diffuses technology through the use of two main tools: supporting strategic 
private producers or establishing new ventures that can demonstrate the profitability and 
reduce the uncertainty around the new technology. Establishing a new firm in a new 
technology is not only risky because of its existence in what is commonly called, in the 
entrepreneurial literature, the “valley of death” that faces new start-ups in general (Cardullo 
1999), but also because it faces the risk of failure in transferring a new technology to Chile.  
Figure 3.4: Fundacion Chile’s working model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fundacion Chile (2008) 
With regards to the sources of finance, FCh initially finances projects using its own 
resources. However, over time it could not meet the industry’s demands with its limited 
resources and so it later depended on resources provided by CORFO and the Chilean 
National Science Foundation (CONICYT)38. With regard to its targeted investments, FCh is 
                                                          
38 CORFO and CONICYT are members of FCh’s Board of Directors (Fundacion Chile, 2008). 
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more focused on seven sectors: agri-business39, marine resources, environment and chemical 
metrology, forestry, mining, human capital and information technology. From its creation in 
1974 until 2008, aqua-culture industriess have accounted for thirty-seven percent of its total 
investments, followed by  forestry with twenty-nine percent and agri-business with twenty-
two percent (see Figure 3.5). Table 3.7 shows major FCh’s establishments for the purpose 
of technology transfer.  
Figure 3.5 : Fundacion Chile investments by major sector 
 
Source: Fundacion Chile (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 In its explanation for its substantial support for agri-business and food sectors, FCh (2008) argues that Chile can 
become can become “worldwide food power”.  
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Table 3.7: Selected projects established by Fundacion Chile  
Year Event 
1979 
The establishment of the ‘Asparagus Cultivation’ programme. The programme supported the 
adaptation of cultivation techniques to improve the quality of production. Thus, its asparagus exports 
increased from 6.2 tons that year to 7,550 tons in the 1990s.    
1980 
The investment in salmon farming companies led to a boom in the industry. Chile’s salmon exports 
have grown from almost nothing in 1980 to being the second largest salmon-farmed exporter in the 
world. 
1982 
The establishment of “Cultivos Marinos Tongoy” which led to the growth of oyster production and 
exports. 
1982 
The creation of the ‘Boxed Beef’ project which aims to export beef using livestock production 
methods and new methods of packaging it. The project created a pioneer firm in this industry called 
Procrane which has been successful in producing beef using the vacuum packing methods and 
‘deboning at origin’ technique. Both techniques were critical for the value added production. 
1983 
The establishment of Caprilac S.A. which is an agro-business firm specializing in the production of 
high-quality goats’ milk and cheese. 
1985 
The ‘Berries La Union’ programme was founded in order to bring specific berries’ production 
techniques 'in order to expand the industry. 
1987 
The creation of Tenagro Cautin (in the berries’ industry), Salmon Hullinco (first producer of Atlantic 
salmon in Latin America). 
1988 The establishment of Salmontec (Salmon industry) and Technofrio Cautin (fruit production).  
1989 The creation of Granjamar, a company which specializes in producing the turbot fish. 
1992 The establishment of the first abalone production company (Campos Marinos S.A.). 
1994 
In a joint venture with a French firm (Lescure Bougon) it established Chevrita, a company which 
produces and sells gourmet goat and cow’s milk cheeses. 
1996 
The Establishment of another company (SPASA) specialized in producing abalone to meet the 
specific demand by the Japanese and US markets.  
2002 
The establishment of Compania Chilena de Esterilizacion (CCE) in co-operation with the Brazilian 
Sterilization company. The company uses ionizing energy technologies to increase the safety, 
quality and competitiveness of the food production processes.  
2003 
The creation of Vitro Chile (flower producer) in co-operation with the Viollier family. The company 
was established after an increase in the global demand for flowers and flower bulbs. The company 
uses bio-technological techniques which are used to export flowers to Europe. 
2004 
The Foundation of Oloetop, in partnership with three other companies, to produce canola oil that is 
used as a feed for the farmed-salmon industry. 
2005 
The creation of AQUAGESTION to meet the high demand for production, control and sanitation 
services for the aquaculture sector. 
Source:  Fundacion Chile (2008), Andreoni and Chang (2014) and Flores-Aguilar et al. (2007)  
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 The farmed-salmon industry 
This section investigates the impact of public financial institutions on the emergence of the 
Chilean farmed-salmon industry. This industry has been chosen as a case study for three 
reasons. First, among the resource based sectors that emerged after 1973, the salmon industry 
is the largest sector in the Chilean export basket. Secondly, the sector was established in a 
period which is considered in some of the existing mainstream literature as an era where the 
‘free market’ mechanism was at the heart of the resource allocation process in Chile. Thirdly, 
the development of the farmed-salmon sector resulted from technological upgrading in 
Chile’s natural advantages and shows the success in taking advantage of a niche market. 
Chile’s farmed-salmon exports went from almost nothing in 1985 to 3.1 billion 
dollars in 2013 (See Figure 3.6). Salmon now accounts for almost six percent of the total 
exports basket. In 2013, Chile’s share of the world’s production was around one quarter, 
making it the second largest farmed-salmon producer after Norway (see Figure 3.7). In 2004, 
the industry employed 38,400 direct jobs and 15,000 indirect jobs (Iizuka et al. 2016). 
Figure 3.6: Chile’s salmon export evolution (per thousand US dollars) 
 
Source: FAO (2016) 
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Figure 3.7 : The global share of Chile’s salmon exports (2013) 
 
Source: FAO (2016) 
 In 1974, Lago llanquihue Ltd established the first salmon farm in Chile for 
commercial purposes. The financial loan for this project was awarded by CORFO. A few 
years later the firm started exporting small quantities of salmon and trout to France. At 
approximately the same time another firm, called Domesa Farms Chile, started to produce 
salmon. Both companies faced many difficulties which arose as a result of the  lack of 
expertise and the disease crises of the 1970s (Iizuka 2007). 
In 1981 Foundación Chile (FCh) bought Domesa Farms and established a new 
company called Salmones Antartica. The purpose was to demonstrate the commercial and 
technical feasibility of farmed salmon production in Chile (Iizuka 2007). The firm adopted 
Norwegian and Scottish technologies that were suitable for the conditions of the Chilean 
Lake District (where the farm is located).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, FCh demonstrated a unique role of public venture capital 
which was identified by Lerner (2002): certifying the industry (or the producer) for investors 
and financiers and encouraging technological spill-over for other producers in the field. The 
success of Salmon Antartica has reduced the uncertainty about the profitability of farmed 
salmon and thus made it easier for entrepreneurs to get loans from private banks. For 
entrepreneurs to invest, and for financial institutions to lend them, it was crucial to prove the 
profitability of farmed salmon, and FCh has demonstrated that evidently (Hosono et al. 2016). 
The great social value created by the successful experience of Salmones Antartica in 
the Chilean economy made it easier for other entrepreneurs in the economy to imitate them. 
Thus, a large number of small and medium firms began to appear from the 1980s onwards. 
It is important to note that this growth was also triggered by the high price of salmon during 
the early 1980s (Agosin and Bravo-Ortega 2009; Iizuka 2007). 
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FCh has also established new firms in the upstream and downstream of the farmed 
salmon cluster. Within the additive value chains (mainly located in the natural resource 
industries), an important element of industrial upgrading takes place through promoting the 
upstream and downstream industries (Kaplinsky 2015). FCh established and supported firms 
supplying material for the farmed-salmon producers (upstream) in addition to firms 
processing the farmed-salmon (downstream). For example, between 1985 and 1987, FCh 
established three firms: Salmones Huillinco S.A. which specializes in producing  Atlantic 
smotls (young salmon); Finamar S.A. which specializes in producing smoked salmon; and 
Salmontec S.A. which is specialized in hatchery and ranching activities (Iizuka 2007). 
Furthermore, FCh and CORFO supported the growth of a wide range of activities 
related to the salmon industry, such as fishmeal production facilities, fishing nets, net pens 
and fish feed. While acquiring the production technology of these products followed the 
imitation process rather than Research and Development (R&D), some of these activities are 
extremely knowledge extensive. 
The government structure relating to the fishing industry has experienced structural 
change in order to maintain the industry’s growth needs. In its effort to strengthen the 
industry, the Chilean government created the Office of Fisheries and National Fisheries 
Services (SERNAPESCA) within the Ministry of Economy. In addition, the state established 
the Local Government Planning Office (SERPLAC) which took a major role in supporting 
the development of aqua-farming. Furthermore, CORFO supported the establishment of 
quality certification for salmon producers, both financially and technically which enabled 
them to access international markets (Hosono et al. 2016; UNCTAD 2006). 
During the 1990s, the salmon-farming industry dramatically increased its volume of 
production. The government recognized this great progress in the industry and it, therefore, 
introduced a new policy agenda. The state’s financial support started to focus on upgrading 
the production capabilities. One example of this is the state’s support of local producers who 
produce salmon eggs domestically. 
Salmon farming production takes place in three stages: hatchery, cultivation and 
processing. During the hatchery stage, salmon eggs, alevins and smolts are cultivated and 
produced. This stage requires certain natural resources (such as pure and uncontaminated 
water) as well as highly skilled labour, engineers and scientists capable of applying quality 
control routines and environmental protection. In 1991 approximately 51 million salmon 
eggs were imported from Ireland, Scotland, the United States, Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark. The number of salmon eggs rose to 114 million in 1994. In order to reduce the 
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production cost and the rate of disease infection, approximately 74 million were produced 
locally in 1995 (Katz 2006).  
 CORFO, along with other public institutions, has participated significantly in 
promoting and improving the production of domestic eggs. In order to keep the industry in 
line with international standards, CORFO, Fundacion Chile and some local companies 
jointly organized and financed local producers’ visits to Norwegian and Scottish production 
facilities and experimentations. They also organized regular seminars in order to spread the 
knowledge of egg production among domestic producers (Katz, 2006).  
Another example is the joint effort between CORFO and other government 
institutions to control the Piscirickettsia salmonis bacterium. The bacterium seriously affects 
the production of salmon in Chile and results in a catastrophic disease called Salmon 
Rickettsial Syndrome (SRS). This disease results in an annual estimated loss of 
approximately 100 million dollars to the Chilean salmon industry. In a joint project by 
CORFO, universities and salmon producers, they have developed a vaccine against this kind 
of disease (UNCTAD, 2006).   
It is important to note that several government agencies took part in financing the 
innovation of the salmon-farming industry in addition to CORFO and FCh. These agencies 
included the Bureau of Fisheries (under the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture), 
ProChile, the Institute for the Promotion of Fisheries (IFOP), INTESAL, public universities 
and the National Science and Technology Commission (CONICYT). Table 3.8 shows the 
innovation projects in the salmon-farming industry financed by public agencies in the period 
(1987-2008). Examples of these projects are the prevention of disease caused by imported 
salmon eggs, salmon-feeding technologies, remote sensing for cleaning the sea bottom and 
the creation of value added products for local firms (Hosono et al. 2016). Figure 3.8 
represents the financial support provided for these innovations by the source finding40.  
As shown above, the role played by the Chilean government in the establishment of the 
salmon industry, mainly through Fundacion Chile and CORFO, was indeed a catalyst. Their 
early investments made it possible for new entrepreneurs to enter the industry and to gain 
access to knowledge without taking the risk of learning and adapting a new activity and its 
corresponding technology. Furthermore, they both funded and coached the salmon farming 
industry start-ups and provided them with the required technology and knowledge. Katz 
                                                          
40 It is important to note that, while CORFO accounts for twenty-nine percent of the total public innovation 
funding, more than eighty percent of its funds came only after 2005 after the establishment of Innova Chile. This 
clearly shows the substantial increase in CORFO’s support and funding for innovation in more recent years. 
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(2006) states that the Chilean salmon-farming industry teaches us lessons regarding policy 
planning and implementation: 
“Reaching international competitiveness appears to be the result not just of 
adequate macroeconomic fundamentals, but also of an extensive set of sector-
specific policies that trigger interactions among firms, government agencies, 
financial institutions, research and development (R&D) laboratories, 
universities, municipalities and so forth... Both CORFO and Foundación Chile 
had a proactive strategy of building up production capacity and disseminating 
knowhow and technology” (pp.193-197). 
 
Table 3.8: Publicly funded innovation projects in the salmon industry (1987-2008) 
Area No of 
projects 
% Amount          
(in thousands) 
% 
Pathology and sanitary management 77 26.8 12,140,701 28.9 
Genetics and reproduction 38 13.2 7,752,516 18.4 
Nutrition and food 29 10.1 6,327,948 15.1 
Environment and clean production 33 11.5 3,842,839 9.1 
Technology centres 5 1.7 3,736,752 8.9 
Engineering and technology 44 15.3 3,489,769 8.3 
Cultivation and production 14 4.9 1,573,375 3.7 
Training and transfer of technology 18 6.3 1,026,484 2.4 
Processing and quality control 13 4.5 877,022 2.1 
Recreational fishery 10 3.5 829,549 2 
Administration and regulation 4 1.4 346,458 0.8 
Small-scale aquaculture 1 0.3 46,874 0.1 
Biology and ecology 1 0.3 43,043 0.1 
Total 287 100 420,333,300 100 
Source: Bravo (2009) 
Figure 3.8: Sources of public support for innovation in the salmon industry  
 
Source: Hosono et al. (2016) 
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3.5 The Case of Malaysia 
The performance of the Malaysian economy is considered amongst the best in the 
developing world since the 1970s. This performance has generated wide academic interest. 
On the one hand, Salleh and Meyanathan (1993) and the World Bank (1993) argue that the 
rapid economic development can be explained by the economic liberalization policies that 
took place in the 1980s. On the other hand, Lall (1995a), Rasiah and Shari (2001), Jomo 
(2007) and  Khan and Blankenburg (2009) argue that the state selective intervention was a 
key in developing the Malaysian manufacturing sector.  
This section looks at the role of the state in financing the manufacturing sector 
development and diversification. After a brief economic review, the section presents the 
main public financing tools in Malaysia: Development Financial Institutions (DFIs), public 
venture capital funds and priority sectors lending. To investigate the impact of these tools, 
their role in the largest manufacturing industry, namely, the semiconductors industry, is 
discussed extensively. 
 Brief economic overview 
After its independence in 1957, Malaysia started to support the manufacturing sector 
following import-substitution principles. However, this period was dominated by first-stage 
(light) assembly and packaging tasks (Lall 1995a).The second industrial policy (1971-1985), 
known by the New Economic Policy (NEP), targeted poverty reduction and wealth 
distribution among the various Malaysian ethnic groups. The state goal was to reduce the 
poverty rate from 49.3 percent in 1970 by two thirds (to 16.7 percent) in two decades. At 
that time, the Malay ethnic group’s poverty rate was about seventy-four percent compared 
to thirty-seven percent for the Indians and twenty-six percent for the Chinese. The NEP 
considered the manufacturing sector development as the main instrument for accomplishing 
rapid growth coupled with poverty reduction among all the ethnic groups. Thus, it offered 
generous fiscal incentives to attract foreign investors to specific industrial sectors.  
 In the early 1980s, Mahathir’s government started stronger state participation in the 
manufacturing sector. The purpose was to diversify the industrial and export baskets, lead 
the development in the heavy machinery industry and create more linkages to the local 
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domestic economic activity41. In 1983, the state established the Heavy Industry Corporation 
of Malaysia (HICOM) (Rasiah and Shari 2001).  
In 1986, the state promoted the Pioneer Investment Act (PIA), which is considered as the 
start of the fourth wave of industrial policy that has been characterised by aggressive state 
participation in promoting manufacturing and export activities. Indeed, Dr Mahathir’s 
government decided to implement “Looking East” policies (i.e. to use Japan and South 
Korea as examples). The New Economic Policy (promoted in 1970) was replaced by 
Industrial Master Plans (IMPs), which are similar to the industrial policies followed by the 
NIEs. It emphasised the use of selective intervention policies to upgrade the industrial 
sectors (Lall, 1995). In 1990, the Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development put 
the electronics industry at the centre of Malaysian economic development. The plan 
emphasised that the industry was a means to transform Malaysia into a developed country 
by 2020. Table 3.9 shows the main industrial policy phases and their policy instruments. 
Table 3.9: The main industrial policy phases 
Phase Trade 
orientation 
Period Policy instrument 
1 Import 
substitution 
1958-72 Pioneer Industry Ordinance, 1958 
2 Export 
orientation 
1972-80 Investment Incentive Act, 1968.  
Free Trade Zone Act, 1971 
3 Import 
substitution 
1981-85 Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), 1980 
4 Export 
orientation 
Sine 1986 Industrial Master Plans (IMPs), 1986. 
Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development, 1990 
Source: Rasiah (2006) 
It is important to note that Malaysia has successfully achieved the NEP goals of poverty 
reduction through, mainly, development in the manufacturing sector. While manufacturing 
added value increased from 13.7 percent in 1970 to twenty-four percent in 1990, the poverty 
rate fell from over forty-nine percent in 1970 to 15.6 percent in 1990 (lower than the NEP 
target). The manufacturing added value continued increasing until it reached its peak in 2000 
(approximately 31 percent). However it declined significantly after 2003 because of the oil 
prices boom (see Figure 3.9). In the meantime, the poverty rate continued to decrease until 
it reached 0.6 percent in 2015 (Asian Development Bank 2016).  
                                                          
41 It is argued that the industrial policies in the 1960s and 1970s failed to promote inclusive growth and create 
linkages with the domestic economy (Rasiah, 1995; Lall, 1995).  
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Figure 3.9: Manufacturing added value as a share of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank database  
Before investigating the role of the state in financing the manufacturing sector 
development and diversification, it is important to look at the manufacturing added value by 
sector and export disaggregated data. Table 3.10 shows the manufacturing added value 
sector by sector since 1968. The table shows that electrical machinery and apparatus has 
been the largest industrial segment since the late 1980s; it has grown from 5.8 percent in the 
period (1968-1976) to 30.0 percent in the period (1997-2006). However, following the 
increase in of oil prices in 2003, its share declined to 22.7 percent. This decline has been 
matched with a substantial growth in Coke and refined petroleum products in the last two 
periods (1997- 2012). 
Malaysian exports have grown significantly since the promotion of the NEP policy 
in 1970. Table 3.11 shows that the export growth was fuelled by the development of 
machinery and transport equipment, which has become the largest export segment since the 
late 1980s. It increased considerably from 2.8 percent between 1967 and 1976 to forty-two 
percent between 2007 and 2014. In the meantime, the share of crude materials and inedible 
segment has dropped considerably from 49.5 percent to 2.8 percent in the same periods.    
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Table 3.10: The manufacturing added value by sector 
Sector 1968-76 1977-86 1987-96 1997-06 2007-12 
Electrical machinery and apparatus* 5.8% 13.6% 23.1% 30.0% 22.7% 
Coke, refined petroleum products, 
nuclear fuel 
3.9% 2.9% 2.6% 9.0% 17.5% 
Chemicals and chemical products 7.5% 8.9% 11.2% 10.5% 11.6% 
Food and beverages 18.6% 19.9% 11.5% 8.2% 10.9% 
Tobacco products 5.3% 3.2% 1.9% 0.5% 0.4% 
Rubber and plastics products 14.7% 9.3% 8.6% 7.1% 6.5% 
Textile 3.6% 4.5% 3.3% 1.8% 0.9% 
Wearing apparel, fur 1.5% 2.0% 2.6% 1.5% 0.8% 
Wood products (excl. furniture) 12.8% 8.8% 6.2% 3.7% 2.5% 
Paper and paper products 0.8% 1.0% 1.6% 1.7% 1.4% 
Printing and publishing 5.4% 4.1% 2.9% 2.1% 1.6% 
Non-metallic mineral products 5.8% 6.0% 5.8% 4.4% 3.8% 
Basic metals 3.0% 3.3% 3.4% 3.1% 4.1% 
Fabricated metal products 4.0% 3.6% 3.7% 3.4% 3.6% 
Machinery and equipment  2.7% 2.8% 4.0% 3.8% 3.2% 
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments 
0.5% 0.6% 1.1% 1.1% 0.5% 
Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 2.9% 4.1% 4.6% 4.2% 3.4% 
Furniture manufacturing  1.3% 1.5% 2.0% 2.6% 2.5% 
The UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database-ISIC Revision2  
* “Radio, television and communication equipment” and “Office, accounting and computing machinery” segments were 
added to “Electrical machinery and apparatus” segment because the three segments were aggregated in some periods and 
disaggregated in others.  
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Table 3.11: Malaysian export patterns 
Sector 1967-76 1977-86 1987-96 1997-06 2007-14 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 2.8% 14.3% 42.0% 57.9% 42.0% 
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants 8.5% 23.9% 13.1% 9.8% 18.2% 
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 2.3% 3.2% 9.1% 8.5% 9.2% 
Manufactured Goods 20.6% 11.2% 8.6% 7.6% 9.0% 
Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fat 8.2% 12.3% 7.5% 5.2% 8.0% 
Chemicals 0.8% 0.9% 2.2% 4.5% 6.5% 
Food 5.8% 4.5% 3.8% 2.0% 2.9% 
Crude Materials, Inedible 49.5% 29.1% 13.0% 2.9% 2.8% 
Miscellaneous Transactions and 
Commodities 
1.1% 0.6% 0.6% 1.2% 0.8% 
Beverages and tobacco 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 
 
Total export value 
(period average in million RM) 6,817.0 28,386.2 110,328.0 389,860.8 668,070.7 
Source: Malaysia Department of Statistics (SITC Rev.4)  
 Financing the manufacturing industry 
This section begins by looking at the main public financing tools in Malaysia: Development 
Financial Institutions (DFIs), public venture capital, and the Central Bank’s priority sectors. 
Then, the impact of these public financing mechanisms is investigated by looking at the 
semiconductor sector as a case study. 
3.5.2.1 The Development Financial Institutions 
The establishment of the Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) is considered as a 
strategic decision to provide long-term and high-risk finance for economic and social 
development projects  (Fay 2001). According to the Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia), 
in 2016, the DFIs’ assets stood at 286.1 billion RM, accounting for 23.2 percent of total GDP 
(Bank Negara Malaysia 2017a). With regard to their targeted sectors, DFIs used to allocate 
the majority of their credit towards manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishery and mining 
projects. These sectors accounted for 60.3 of total DFIs’ financing in 1993. However, their 
share declined to 23.3 percent in 2002, and 10.7 percent in 2016. The rest of the lending 
share goes to infrastructure projects, social programmes, exports and imports, the property 
sector, maritime, transportation and financial services (Bank Negara Malaysia annual 
reports).  
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Their existence is also explained by the commercial banks’ unwillingness to take the risk 
of providing long-term finance for development projects, i.e. private banks tend to provide 
short-term finance with the purpose of maximizing their profits at low risk. Abdul Ghani, 
who is the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, expressed the importance of 
the DFIs for the Malaysian economy: 
“The commercially-driven and profit-maximising banking institutions would often 
tend to take a short-term view and consider solely the private benefit of a project, at 
the expense of the potential long-term social benefit that could be derived from 
financing a particular project…These are clearly instances of market failure, and 
the establishment of the DFIs is indeed an attempt to rectify this shortcoming” (Abdul 
Ghani 2005, p.1). 
In his argument Abdul Ghani shows the social benefit of financing development 
projects in the sense that some projects have great social value for the overall economic 
development. However, these projects are not expected to be promoted by the private sector 
because of the high prevailing risk. Abdul Ghani further shows that the DFIs’ mandates are 
closely linked to the country’s development plans. Thus, their roles are not expected to take 
place only during nation building or transformation period, but also to continue upgrading 
the manufacturing sector following Malaysian development plans (ibid.).  
Currently in Malaysia, there are eleven DFIs owned by the Government: Malaysian 
Industrial Development Finance Berhad (MIDF), Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Berhad 
(EXIM Bank), Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad, Bank Pembangunan Malaysia 
Berhad, Bank Perusahaan Kecil dan Sederhana Malaysia Berhad (SME Bank), and Bank 
Simpanan Nasional, Bank Industri and Teknology Malaysia Berhad, Credit Guarantee 
Corporation Malaysia Berhad (CGC), Sabah Development Bank, Lembaga Tabung Haji, 
and Sabah Credit Corporation Berhad (Bank Negara Malaysia 2017b). In an interview with 
a high official at MIDF (June 2018), he states that “each DFI is mandated to develop and 
support its niche targeted sectors”. He also mentions that a major objective of the DFIs is to 
support SMEs and provide “companies with medium and long-term financing especially for 
those companies that cannot seek funding from commercial banks”42.  
                                                          
42 In 2015, public financial institutions (mainly DFIs) accounted for more than twenty percent of total SMEs’ 
financing in Malaysia (SMEs Corp. Malaysia, 2016). 
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The oldest DFI is the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad (MIDF) which 
was established in 1960. It was considered the state’s main development finance institution. 
The main motive for its creation was to catalyse the development of the manufacturing sector 
by providing medium and long-term loans, in addition to reducing Malaysia’s dependence 
on natural resources (MIDF 2016). 
The MIDF focused on financing projects that are totally new to the country. It supported 
the establishment of the first automobile tyres firm in the country, the first flour mill 
manufacturing, the first automobile assembly firm in the country, the first integrated steel 
and iron manufacturing firm. Following the strategy of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 
the1970s, the MIDF started to promote the manufacturing sector in new regions of the 
country with the purpose of achieving inclusive growth coupled with poverty reduction. 
Therefore, besides its headquarter in the capital, Kuala Lumpur, it opened several branches 
in Johor, Penang, Kota, Kuching, Bharu, and Kinabalu (MIDF 2016). The MIDF’s focus on 
promoting inclusive growth in new geographical regions is highlighted a central role of 
public banks around the world (UNCTAD 2016). Among a large number of MIDF 
successful beneficiaries, Table 3.12 presents publicly listed companies that were financed 
by the MIDF in their early stages. 
In synchronization with the Government’s efforts to increase the technological intensity 
of domestic production and to reduce dependency on labour-intensive activities (e.g. 
activities that rely on cheaper foreign labour cost), the MIDF is currently supporting local 
companies to improve the automation of their production facilities. Thus, the MIDF is 
managing a government fund of 750 million RM for modernizing production lines for the 
period from 2016 to 2020. Furthermore, the MIDF is currently managing 2.4 billion RM that 
are allocated from different government programmes towards encouraging the export of 
services, SME manufacturing and services, SMEs’ relocation towards industrial parks, 
modernization of machinery and equipment and the automotive sector (interview with high 
official in MIDF, June 2018). 
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Table 3.12: Some publicly listed companies that were financed by MIDF  
Company Sector Market capitalization No. Employees 
Khind Holdings Bhd Electrical manufacturing, 
services and trading. 
98.1 million RM 530 
Prestar Resources Bhd Steel manufacturing 227.5 million RM 811 
Malayan Flour Mill Bhd Food production 1.06 billion RM 2250 
Hwa Tai Industries Bhd Food production 37.4 million RM 1750 
Kawan Food Bhd Food production 1.26 billion RM 173 
Source: MIDF and Bloomberg (2017) 
Another important DFI is the Bank of Industri and Teknology (BIT) which was 
established in 1979. The main objective of the bank was to fund high technology and capital 
intensive industries in strategic sectors (Bank Negara Malaysia 2017b). A major scheme that 
is administered by the BIT Bank is the Export Credit Refinancing scheme (ECR), which 
attracted the attention of the World Trade Organization (WTO)43. The ECR scheme offers 
exporters two types of loans: pre-shipment finance that is incurred in the production stages 
(i.e. the purchases of raw materials) and post-shipment finance that is provided to the 
overseas importer. Another scheme offered by the BIT Bank is the export insurance scheme 
which protects the exporter from non-payments. 
ECR financing has increased from 140 million USD in the late 1970s covering three 
percent of the total manufacturing exports to 9.6 billion USD covering 22.5 percent of the 
manufacturing exports in 1989 (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993). While the Malaysian 
authorities insist that the ECR is not an export subsidy, the WTO continued to argue that the 
ECR interest rate is below the commercial banks’ rate which creates distortion in the market. 
In 2005 the Government suspended the activities of the Bank of Industri and Technology, 
and it was, then,  replaced by the SME Bank (Gustafsson 2007). 
3.5.2.2 Central bank priority lending 
After promoting the Malaysian New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970, the Central Bank 
started commanding private banks to provide the NEP’s targeted sectors with sufficient 
credit at a lower cost. For instance, in 1975, the Central Bank required commercial banks to 
allocate at least half of their net lending increase to identified priority sectors. This is in 
addition to government direct loans that accounted approximately for twenty-two percent of 
the total banking credit in 1975 (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993). In 1979, Central Bank 
                                                          
43  The WTO argues that the ECR creates distortion in the international market (Gustafson, 2007). 
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introduced the annual Priority Lending Guidelines to insure that priority sectors have 
adequate access to finance44 (Fay and Jomo 2000). 
 After the government launch of heavy industries in 1982, the government insured the 
steel and automobile industries’ access to cheap finance. Furthermore, the Central Bank has 
urged commercial banks to lengthen their average maturity of credit to support the rapid 
industrialization needs45 (Fay 2001). This support is a potential explanation for the growth 
in the manufacturing sector’s share of total credit from nineteen percent in 1970 to twenty-
three percent in 1990 making it the largest recipient of credit in the Malaysian economy (see 
Table 3.13). 
 Another mechanism for priority sectors’ lending is the Bilateral Payment 
Arrangements (BPA). BPA are arrangements by the Malaysian Central Bank which 
guarantee payment for exported goods and facilitate credit for the importing country if it 
suffers from foreign exchange shortages. While the first BPA was signed in 1988 with the 
Government of Iran, the most important arrangement is called the Palm Oil Credit and 
Payment Arrangement (POCPA) which was promoted in 1992. 
 The POCPA is used in two ways. First, it can assists developing countries that lack 
the hard currency to purchase Malaysian palm oil. In exchange, Malaysia can get a needed 
commodity (e.g. coal, iron, cement or ore) from the other country. Secondly, through 
POCPA the importing country can postpone the payment for two years at an interest rate 
determined by the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) in US dollars dominated 
payment or other standard rates for loans paid in other currencies such as the 
yen46(Gustafsson 2007). Until 2009, there were twenty-two countries that have benefited 
from the POCPA’s 500 million USD allocated by the Malaysia Central Bank 47 . This 
arrangement is among a bundle of policies designed to support palm oil production which 
are meant to contribute to the diversification of the agricultural industry away from rubber 
                                                          
44 It is important to note here that while the Central Bank used to penalize commercial banks that do not meet the 
Priority Lending Guidelines, this regulation has been relaxed dramatically in recent years (Fay and Jomo, 2000). 
45 The share of short-term financing to total domestic credit has declined from 37.2 percent in 1978 to 29.7 percent 
in 1990 (Fay, 2001).  
46 In 1994, the IMF argued that POCPA was a violation of its three months’ rule for official payment arrangement, 
because POCPA was an arrangement over two years. However, the Malaysian government have assured that 
POCPA is valid and will not be affected (Gustaffson, 2007). 
47 For instance, POCPA played an important role in protecting the local palm oil industry when the domestic 
fertilizer prices escalated by approximately 200 percent in 2008. The Central Bank, through POCPA, approved an 
exchange of 70 million USD worth of palm oil in exchange for palm oil fertilizer (The Star 2009).  
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(Kjöllerström and Dallto 2007; Rasiah 2006; UNECA 2016). Figure 3.10 shows the growth 
of the palm oil share in total agriculture exports.  
The implementation of such financing mechanisms shows clearly how developing 
countries can find a way to support their industries without violating the WTO legal 
framework. It is an example of the argument by Chang (2011)  which shows that, while the 
space for industrial policy has become smaller in recent years, there is still room for 
supporting priority sectors. 
Table 3.13: Total credit to private sector by economic activity (in millions RM) 
 1970 1980 1990 
Sector Value Share Value Share Value Share 
Agriculture 240 10% 1648 8% 4238 5% 
Mining 51 2% 211 1% 833 1% 
Manufacturing 466 19% 4694 22% 18742 23% 
Electricity - - 279 1% 202 0.25% 
General Commerce 756 32% 4644 22% 11642 14% 
Real estate and construction 207 9% 3117 15% 14599 18% 
Housing - - 2323 11% 9587 12% 
Transport and storage 17 1% 400 2% 1342 2% 
Financing, Insurance and business 
services 80 3% 1297 6% 9105 11% 
Others 543 23% 2509 12% 10473 13% 
Total 2360 100% 21122 100% 80763 100% 
Source: Salleh and Meyanathan (1993) 
Figure 3.10: Shares of Malaysia agricultural exports (1962-2016) 
 
Source: based on Hausmann et al. (2014). 
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3.5.2.3 Public venture capital  
After announcing “Vision 2020” in 1991 which promoted innovation policies, the 
Government promoted a number of venture capital (VC) funds/programmes that support 
innovative firms (Wonglimpiyarat 2011). These public VC funds include the Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), the Sovereign Wealth Fund (Khazanah) 
and the Malaysia Venture Capital Management Berhad (MAVCAP). In 2015, public funds 
contributed with eighty-nine percent (6.2 billion RM) of the total VC committed funds (7.1 
billion RM). With regard to the targeted sectors in 2014, the life science sector48 accounted 
for 34.2 percent, followed by the manufacturing sector with 30.3 percent and the IT and the 
communication sector with thirty percent. Figure 3.11 shows the sources of VC and its 
targeted sectors. 
Figure 3.11: Venture capital investment by source of financing and by industry  
  
Sources: The Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Malaysian Venture Capital 
Development Council     
 The largest institution in the Malaysian venture capital industry is Khazanah - the 
sovereign wealth fund (SWF)- which was established in 1994. It is totally owned by the 
Ministry of Finance and manages total assets of 40 billion RM. Besides managing the 
commercial assets of the government, since 2004, Khazanah has been giving greater 
importance to domestic economic development. Khazanah invests in sectors such as 
infrastructure, transportation, tourism, ICT, life sciences and manufacturing (interview with 
Khazanah official, June 2018). An example of Khazanah’s role in supporting economic 
                                                          
48 The life science sector includes chemistry, health care, agriculture, biotechnology projects. 
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diversification is the establishment of a company called Blue Archipelago Berhad with the 
purpose of promoting farmed shrimp production49 (Kharas et al. 2010).  
 In its overseas activities, Khzanah invests mainly for three motives: financial 
rewards, accessing new technologies or accessing new markets for Malaysian companies. In 
the evaluation process of any new investment, a major question to be addressed by Khazanah 
staff is: how can the Malaysian economy benefit from investing in the targeted company? In 
the electronics sector, for instance, investee companies are introduced to the Malaysian 
electronics cluster in Penang to learn about outsourcing and collaboration opportunities 
(interview with official in Khazanah, May 2018).  
 Another important public venture capital institution that should be highlighted in the 
context of industrial diversification is the Malaysian Technology Development Corporation 
(MTDC). The main motive for its establishment and development is the lack of funding for 
entrepreneurs in unproven activities 50 . At the outset, MTDC had two funds: the 
commercialisation of local R&D fund (CRDF) and the technology acquisition fund (TAF). 
The main purpose of such funds is to finance the development of high-technology seed 
projects, which are often neglected by private finance because of the high risks involved 
(Mazzucato 2011). This area is also called “the valley of death” in the venture capital 
literature (Cardullo 1999). 
 CRDF is a fund that is concerned with the commercialisation of products and 
processes developed by local universities and research centres. Since the establishment of 
CRDF in the late 1990s, it has funded 271 projects (445.6 million RM) in various industrial 
sectors, including 153 recipients who have successfully commercialized their research and 
which attracted private investment of 418 million RM. Between 2006 and 2011, these 
products generated 1.27 billion RM in sales, including 261 million RM of exports51. 
                                                          
49 In co-operation with the Malaysian Department of Fisheries, the Blue Archipelago acquired a poor performing 
farm (Kerpan Farm) and transformed it into a fully integrated aqua-culture operation. Kerpan Farm is currently 
running the largest shrimp farm in North Malaysia spanning 420 hectares, which contains all the elements of the 
shrimp production value chain (from hatchery to processed shrimp) and exports to Japan, Europe and the U.S. In 
addition to Kerpan, Blue Archipelago Berhad started constructing a larger farm in 2010 that spans 1,000 hectares. 
The new farm is called iSHARP (integrated shrimp aquaculture park) and started its operations in 2015 (Blue 
Archipelago, 2018; Kharas et al. 2010). 
 
50 Bank Negara Malaysia (2016) maintains that Malaysian commercial banks have limited knowledge in supporting 
innovation and new growth areas. Accordingly, the report highlights the need for alternative financing tools to 
bridge this gap. 
51 An example of CRDF successful supported projects is a telematics system developed to observe fleet movements. 
The developer was Bsmart in co-operation with Univesrity Teknologi Malaysia (UTM). The project created 
approximately 83 million RM of sales between 2007 and 2011, and the product was exported to countries in East 
Asia, South Africa and the Middle East. Another beneficiary company is Henh Hiap Industries which created a 
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 While R&D is considered a major factor in promoting innovation, developing 
countries need also to invest in learning production techniques that already exist in 
technologically more advanced countries. This broader view of innovation is crucial in 
understanding the technological change and industrial development in the developing world 
(UNCTAD 2007). The MTDC explained its promotion for the technology acquisition fund 
(TAF) by showing that acquiring foreign technology is expensive and complicated process. 
Since its establishment in 1997, it has approved 117 funds for technologies new to the 
Malaysian economy, and has resulted in 153 million RM worth of sales and forty-nine 
intellectual property (IP) registrations (MTDC 2013) 52. Encouraged by accomplishments of 
the above two funds, the MTDC founded the Business Growth Fund (BGF) in 2011 to 
support projects at later stages of development (i.e. beyond the seed capital stage). 
  
                                                          
unique recycling system for plastic products. Between 2009 and 2012, it recorded sales of approximately 145 million 
RM, and exported the system to countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan and Europe (MTDC, 
2013; Tngau 2017). 
52 An example of the success of TAF is the Hi-Essance Cable Company, which is a manufacturer of cables and 
wires for the oil, gas and chemical industries. Through the support of TAF, the company has acquired a Taiwanese 
technology which has resulted in the production of different types of heat and fire resistance cables. Currently, the 
company supplies these products to companies such as Petronas, Exxon Mobile and Shell. Another example is 
Rakannusa Corporation, which is a manufacturing company in the chemicals industry. Through TAF support, the 
company has acquired a Japanese technology that is suitable to produce ceramic balls for applications in the oil 
refining industry. The company now produces its own products for the domestic market and exports to oil 
companies in the Middle East (MTDC 2013). 
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 The semiconductors industry 
During the 1970s, when a large number of MNCs were looking for cheap production 
facilities for assembly and packaging activities, the Malaysian authorities played a big role 
in attracting investors to the semiconductors industry (and electronics in general) through 
offering generous fiscal incentives, establishing special economic zones (SEZs) and 
developing human resources (Appendix 3 provides greater details on the government role in 
attracting foreign investors to   the semiconductors sectors). Accordingly, a large number of 
semiconductors firms relocated their facilities to Malaysia. First, National Semiconductors 
opened a plan in Penang in 1971, which was followed by other foreign firms such as Intel, 
Hitachi, Siemens, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), Hewlett Packard (HP), Texas 
Instruments and Motorola (Hobday 1999). By the 1980s, Malaysia became the largest 
developing country in semiconductors production (Chen 1999). Currently Malaysia is the 
third largest semiconductors producer after South Korea and China. Semiconductors exports 
stood at 61.9 billion USD, accounting for more than twenty-three percent of the total exports 
and forty-nine percent of the total machinery and equipment exports53 (see Figure 3.12). In 
2014, the semiconductors sector employed 150,673 people (Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry 2017).  
Figure 3.12: The Malaysian export basket (2015) 
 
Source: based on Hausmann et al. (2014). 
                                                          
53 Semiconductors exports include integrated circuits in addition to semiconductors devices.  
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The semiconductors value chain can be divided into four stages: research and 
development, wafer manufacturing, assembly and testing (see Figure 3.13). The first two 
stages are located in the upstream, while the later stages are in the downstream of the 
semiconductors value chain. The four stages involve substantially different levels of capital, 
skills and technology. First, the R&D stage, which involves circuits design, is considered 
the highest technology intensive stage and requires highly qualified scientists and engineers. 
Next, the new circuit designs have to be integrated onto silicon wafers in the wafer 
fabrication stage. This stage requires the use of oxygen and pure water in a dust-free 
operating facility. Through the use of photographic techniques (photomask), engineers and 
scientists print the designed circuit on the silicon wafer. The difficulty at this stage comes 
when a new generation of integrated circuits is introduced. This requires a significant change 
in the production process because of the need for thinner circuits, and thus it needs an 
additional capital investment (Chen 1999).  
The assembly stage is where the wafer is cut and attached to frames and wires are 
attached to the printed circuit board. Finally, the testing stage entails the inspection of the 
products to ensure their reliability and performance and this is followed by packaging and 
delivery. The assembly and testing are labour-intensive and relatively low added value stages 
(Chen 1999). According to the global value chains’ (GVCs) literature, semiconductors 
production is a vertically specialized value chain, which means that each stage can be 
produced independently in different geographical areas following their relative production 
cost (Kaplinsky 2015).  
Figure 3.13: The semiconductors’ value chain 
 
 
Source: Chen (1999). 
From the 1970s until the early 2000s, the semiconductors production was located 
mainly in the assembly and testing stages (downstream). During this period, Malaysian 
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public finance played a big role in the development of domestic suppliers and producers, 
such as Globetronics and Waftech. Globetronics is a wholly owned Malaysian company that 
was established in 1991. It specializes in the assembly, testing and packaging of 
semiconductors. Because of the founders’ expansion plans and their need for additional 
capital, the Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) has financed the 
company in return for a thirty percent equity stake (MTDC 2013). This investment helped 
the company to grow and expand its production portfolio significantly towards LED devices, 
quartz crystal oscillator timing devices and optical and sensor devices (Globetronics 2017).  
In 1997, Globetronics was listed on the Malaysian Secondary Stock Exchange, and 
in 2001, the company was promoted to the main Stock Market of Malaysia. Currently, its 
market capitalization is 1.63 billion dollars and it employs 2,900 workers in six factories 
(Bloomberg, 2017). Another example is Waftech which was financed by the 
Commercialization of R&D Fund (part of MTDC) in 2008 to produce a wafer testing and 
assembling systems. Later, the Business Growth Fund (also part of MTDC) financed its 
production facility expansion (MTDC, 2014). Waftech currently exports to Singapore, China 
and the Philippines (Waftech Sdn Bhd, 2017). 
Until the 1990s, the majority of semiconductors firms in Malaysian were not seeking 
to upgrade towards wafer fabrication and R&D stages. However, the government during 
Mahathir first precedency (1981-2003) did not offer grants for integrated circuits design; 
instead it acquired a technology company from California called VLSI in 1995 to establish 
wafer fabrication domestically (Rasiah et al. 2017). Furthermore, following the experience 
of Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), which created two pioneer 
companies in the semiconductors industry54, the Malaysian Institute of Micro-electronics 
Malaysia (MIMOS) has been established to promote innovation and high added value 
manufacturing in the Malaysian electronics sector (Ting 2016). This institute operates under 
the umbrella of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI). In 1997, 
MIMOS opened the first wafer fabrication facility in Malaysia (MIMOS Wafer Fab) with 
the mandate of contributing to the upgrading of the semiconductors industry from assembly 
                                                          
54 ITRI has created the United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Company (TSMC). Both companies now are at pioneers in the semiconductors industry (Ting, 2016). 
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and testing towards fabrication and innovation (MIMOS, 2017). However, MIMOS and 
VLSI did not have a great success (Rasiah, 2006). 
In 2000, the state of Sarawak financed the establishment of another wafer fabrication 
plant 1st Silicon55. In 2001, Khazanah Holdings (the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund) 
invested in a wafer fabrication plant (Silterra) which operates in the Kulim Technology Park 
in Kedah state56. This developmental and risky investment by the Malaysian sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF) had a crucial implication for other developing countries. While the 
majority of SWFs in resource-dependent developing counties are investing in financial 
securities, real estate or hedge funds in the global markets (Bahgat 2011), Khazanah invests 
in strategic infrastructure, services and manufacturing projects. 
In 2003, when Badawi became Prime Minister, he was convinced by Peneng’s Chief 
Minister to offer grants for foreign and domestic firms which were willing to upgrade their 
manufacturing towards wafer fabrication and integrated circuits design57. Since then three 
domestic firms opened wafer fabrication facilities (i.e. Globetronics, Carasem and Unisem). 
In addition, foreign firms have followed suit benefitting from the federal government 
approval of grants. These firms include Infineon, Osram (a subsidiary of Siemens), Onn and 
AMD. In 2008, Intel announced its intention to transfer its ordinary Penang production 
facility to Kulim in order to dedicate its Penang facility to integrated circuits design 
operations and benefit from the recently promoted government support (Rasiah et al. 2017).  
Accordingly, the number of firms in wafer fabrication has increased from none in 
1997 to eleven firms in 2014. While none of these firms participates in R&D related to 
miniaturization of the wafer diameter, which is the most important dimension of frontier 
technology development in semiconductors, there has been a significant increase in the 
number of patents registered in the US by Malaysian semiconductors firms from seven 
patents in the period from 1980 to-2005 to 309 patents in the period from 2006 to 2011 
(ibid.). Furthermore, because of the sector’ upgrading towards wafer fabrication and design, 
                                                          
55 1st Silicon is now called X-FAB Sarawak, after it has been acquired by a German company (X-FAB Silicon 
Foundries). 
56 Kulim Technology park is a subsidised industrial park that was established in 1996 to accommodate high-tech 
firms.  
57 Dr Mahathir’s government was reluctant to offer grants to support wafer fabrication and R&D activities for 
foreign firms. This restricted the upgrading of the semiconductors sector before 2003 (Rasiah et al., 2017).  
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the semiconductors trade deficit has turned into surplus since 2002. This surplus exceeded 
35.3 billion RM in 2015 compared to a deficit of 4.7 billion RM in 2000 (see Figure 3.14). 
 In conclusion, the state has financed the semiconductors sector development in two 
ways. First, public financial institutions have been crucial in supporting entrepreneurship 
among domestic suppliers and producers (e.g. Globetronics). Second, government R&D 
grants in addition to public investment and financing have contributed to the sector’s 
upgrading from assembly and testing phases towards high added value activities such as 
wafer fabrication and circuit design. This upgrading has reduced reliance on imported 
fabricated silicon and increased the domestic added value. 
Figure 3.14 Semiconductors exports and imports*  
 
*The export and import graphs are aggregated using 8541 (Integrated circuits) and 8542 
(Semiconductor devices) in the four-digit harmonized system (HS4).  Source: COMTRADE data. 
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3.6 Comparison between the role of public financial institutions in Chile and 
Malaysia 
This section compares and contrasts key roles of public financial institutions in the context 
of resource-dependent countries; namely, innovation supporters, developmental agents, 
technology change enablers and challenge-led institutions  (Amsden 2001; Mazzucato and 
Penna 2016). 
- Innovation support role 
Innovation has always been promoted by public financial institutions in Chile and Malaysia. 
According to “Start-up Chile”, Chile is ranked first in Latin America and fourth worldwide 
in its support for start-ups 58. The OECD (2016) argues that CORFO is the main tool for 
Chile’s support for entrepreneurs and innovation. In an interview with a high official in 
CORFO, he explained that their support for entrepreneurship takes place through four main 
programmes: seed capital (Capital Semilla), flexible seed grants (SSAF), regional 
entrepreneurship and innovation (PRAE), and Start-up Chile. These programmes have 
supported a total of 2,898 projects between 2014 and 2017, with 98.5 million USD (see 
Table 3.14). A survey by CPRFO shows that, in 2016 alone, 1710 entrepreneurs supported 
by CORFO have generated around 457 million USD in sales (see Table 3.15).  
 In the venture capital industry, the OECD (2016) also argues that CORFO is the 
single most important entity in supporting innovation firms in Chile. It finances them directly 
or indirectly, through venture capital funds, i.e. Fundacion Chile (FCh) or private funds. In 
the period (2005-2015), CORFO has utilised more than 600 million USD for venture capital 
investment targeting innovative firms (OECD, 2017). Furthermore, CORFO continues to 
work closely with FCh, ProChile and other agencies to attract foreign venture capital to Chile 
in specific targeted innovation activities (interviews with officials in CORFO and ProChile, 
February and May 2018 respectively). 
 The Malaysian government supports innovation mainly through R&D grants, 
innovation commercialization and technology acquisition. Public venture funds are 
considered an important tool in channelling the government support for innovative firms 
(Rasiah and Yap 2015). These funds include the Malaysia Technology Development 
Corporation (MTDC), Khazanah and Malaysia Venture Capital Management Berhad 
                                                          
58 Start-up Chile has cited the Global Accelerator Report (2015) which is concerned with global start-ups and 
entrepreneurship. 
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(MAVCAP). In 2015, these public institutions accounted for eighty-nine percent of the total 
committed finance in the venture capital industry (Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry, 2016). 
Table 3.14: CORFO innovation support (2014-2017) 
Programme No. of projects Amounts in USD  
Capital Semilla (Seed Capital) 506 20,314,384 
PRAE (regional programme for enterpreneurship support) 676 22,809,956 
SSAF(seed fund for incubators) 1596 27,978,812 
Start Up Chile 791 25,267,257 
The S Factorr (female start-ups) 135 2,214,713 
Total general 2989 98,585.122 
Source: unpublished data from CORFO 
Table 3.15: Sales of the projects supported by CORFO in 2016 (in USD) 
Programme  No. of 
projects 
Total Sales in Chile 2016 
Capital Semilla (Seed Capital) 586  292,182,048  
PRAE (regional programme for entrepreneurship  
support) 
344  26,580,893  
SSAF(seed fund for incubators) 511 78,590,396 
Start Up Chile 263   59,964,969  
The S Factorr (female start-ups) 6 11,927  
Total 1710   457,330,231  
Source: unpublished data from CORFO 
- Developmental agents 
Public financial institutions in the two countries are indeed developmental and policy guided. 
In Chile, CORFO was established in 1939 to restructure the country after a devastating 
earthquake and to implement the government development programmes (Mamalakis 1969). 
CORFO “has acted as a financier, entrepreneur, investor, innovator and researcher, and 
frontiersman” (p.118). With regard to the targeted sectors and products, CORFO currently 
targets sectors and products identified by the National Council on Innovation for 
Competitiveness (NCIC) (OECD 2009).  
 Similarly, in Malaysia, the Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) and public 
venture funds finance sectors and products following the guidelines of the national strategy. 
Since the establishment of DFIs in the 1960s, for instance, their mandate has been to promote 
and develop specific sectors that are strategic to the economic and social development of 
Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia 2017b). Their involvement  is not expected  only during 
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nation building or transformation periods, but also to continue to upgrade the manufacturing 
sector following the appropriate Malaysian development plans (Abdul Ghani 2005).  
 Accordingly, the public financial intuitions in both countries have supported 
different set of sectors. In Chile, they target resource-based sectors such as salmon, wine, 
vegetables, fruits, forestry and minerals. On the other hand, in Malaysia they target wider 
range of sectors such as palm oil, aquaculture, biotechnologies, machineries, electrical 
devices and semiconductors.  
- Technology change enablers  
Technological change requires committed and long-term finance (Mazzucato 2013). In Chile, 
FCh and CORFO have been instrumental in acquiring foreign technologies. The farmed 
salmon industry, for instance, has been established in Chile after FCh’s investment and 
support in acquiring Norwegian and Scottish farmed-salmon production techniques. 
Furthermore, FCh does not only support the acquisition of foreign technology, but also 
demonstrates its profitability, and then diffuses the associated know-how (Katz 2007).  
 In Malaysia, similarly, public financial institutions have been financing industrial 
projects that had never previously existed. Some of these institutions, e.g. MTDC and 
Khazanah, have an explicit mandate of bringing in foreign technologies. MTDC utilises the 
Technology and Acquisition Fund (TAF) which specializes in financing the process of 
transfer and adaptation of technologies that exist overseas. On the other hand, for Khazanah, 
which invests in foreign markets, the issue of technology acquisition has always been an 
important consideration in their investment decision analysis (interview with Khazanah 
officials, March-May 2018).    
- Challenge-led institutions 
Mazzucato and Penna (2016) refer to this role as ‘mission-oriented’, an expression which 
describes institutions that tackle certain challenging issues pre-identified by national 
strategies. A clear example of this role is the public financial institutions’ support for the 
establishment of the first wafer fabrication plants in Malaysia following the national strategy 
of upgrading the electronics sector to higher value-added activities. Another example is the 
role of CORFO and Fundacion Chile in establishing the niche resource based industries 
through the financing of new firms and adapting foreign technologies that suit the Chilean 
environment.  
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 Yet another example of the challenge-led role is the public banks’ support for climate 
change adaptation projects (ibid). While it is beyond the scope of this study, public banks’ 
role in the environmental challenge shows their commitment in supporting projects with a 
high social value. Public financial institutions in both countries are taking the lead in 
supporting green technologies. In Chile, Violic (2015) highlights that CORFO in 2008 
launched a programme for Non-Conventional Renewable Energy (NCRE) which has kick-
started financing renewable energy in the country. The programme’s budget was 138.8 
million USD providing cheap and long-term finance for green projects, in co-operation with 
commercial banks. In Malaysia, similarly, a DFI, the Credit Guarantees Corporation (CGC), 
is taking the lead in green projects’ funding. In 2010, it introduced the Green Technology 
Financing Scheme (GTFS) programme to promote production and investments in green 
technologies. Until June 2017, the programme had approved 2.63 billion RM worth of 
projects (CGC, 2017).  Table 3.16 summarizes the comparison between the roles of public 
financial institutions in Chile and Malaysia. 
Table 3.16: Summary comparison between the role of public financial institutions  
 Chile Malaysia 
Structure - CORFO is the main government tool 
to finance industrial diversification.  
- It coordinates with other public 
agencies (e.g. FCh) regarding 
financing. 
- While attracting foreign investment 
has been the main tool to finance the 
manufacturing development, public 
financial institutions has been an 
important instrument in directing 
financial resources to targeted 
industrial sectors. 
Innovation 
investors 
- CORFO has several programmes 
that target innovation projects (e.g. 
Start-up Chile). 
- CORFO is the most important player 
in the VC industry. 
-  It supports directly or indirectly (in 
co-operation with agencies like FCh)  
- DFIs are major financiers for industrial 
entrepreneurs 
- The VC industry is dominated by 
publicly specialized venture capital 
funds, e.g. MTDC 
Developmental - Currently, public finance targets 
sectors identified by the National 
Council on Innovation for 
Competitiveness (CNIC) 
- Since the 1970s, their support has 
been  more focused on natural 
resource industries 
- Currently, public finances target 
industrial sectors identified by the 
Industrial Master Plans 
- They target the development of a wide 
range of industries, e.g. electronics, 
machinery, and natural resource 
manufacturing 
Technology 
change 
enablers 
- FCh is a unique institution in 
acquiring technologies for certain 
domestic challenges and potential 
industrial opportunities   
 
- MTDC has established a programme 
called the Technology Acquisition 
Fund (TAF) which is devoted to 
finance technology transfer 
 
Challenge led - Public finance was crucial in 
establishing industries that did not 
exist in the country, e.g. farmed-
salmon 
- The main financier for green projects 
is a programme run by CORFO and 
some commercial banks 
- Public finance was crucial in the 
upgrading of the electronics sector, 
e.g. funding the first two wafer 
fabrication firms in Malaysia 
- The main financier for green projects 
is the Credit Guarantees Corporation 
(a DFI). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
The chapter investigates the role of the state in financing industrial diversification and 
upgrading in two resource-dependent developing countries that have successfully diversified 
their economies. This study questions a major mainstream argument concerning resource-
dependent counties which states that liberalizing the financial system and reducing state-
directed credit are key factors in promoting economic and industrial development (Beck and 
Poelhekke 2017; IMF 2016). Contrary to this belief, this study provides evidence that the 
governments of Chile and Malaysia have played a significant role in financing the 
manufacturing sector’s upgrading and diversification. In both countries, industrial 
diversification did not take place in a “free financial market” setting. 
 The state-directed credit in these two countries has supported the industrial 
diversification following two different strategies. In Chile, the state has contributed to 
financing the development of resource based manufacturing through its development agency 
(i.e. CORFO) and venture capital institutions (mainly Fundacion Chile). The main targeted 
sectors are mining, forestry, fruit, aqua-culture and wine. In Malaysia, on the other hand, 
while this study acknowledges the prominence of attracting foreign investments to finance 
industrial diversification, this narrative is incomplete without considering the role of the state 
in directing financial resources towards new activities and strategic sectors. Malaysia has 
targeted the development of a wider variety of sectors ranging from palm oil and rubber to 
electronics and semiconductors. 
 This study also provides two sector-specific sections which examine the role of state 
finance in the development of two different value chains. In Chile, the role of Fundacion 
Chile and CORFO was not only crucial in establishing farmed-salmon production, but also 
in “thickening” the value chain through its support of firms in the upstream and downstream 
of the salmon cluster. In the Malaysian semiconductors cluster, which had been dominated 
by FDI since the 1970s, the state has played a significant role in financing the upgrading of 
the semiconductors cluster from one that was solely dependent on assembly and testing 
towards original brands manufacturing (i.e. fabricating the integrated circuits domestically). 
 Finally, the chapter has compared the roles of public financial institutions in both 
countries, and argued that they share important features for resource-dependent countries; 
explicitly they are developmental agents, innovation promoters, challenge-led and 
technology transfer enablers.  
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 Promoting and financing industrial diversification in resource-dependent 
developing countries: the case of Saudi Arabia 
4.1 Introduction 
Following an investigation of the important role of the state in promoting and financing 
industrial diversification in Chile and Malaysia (in Chapter 3), this chapter extends this 
investigation to a country that has not diversified its industrial sector yet: Saudi Arabia. This 
chapter does so by looking at two main questions. First, what are the sectors that could be 
targeted by Saudi Arabia? This chapter tries to answer this question by discussing and 
contrasting three different patterns of industrial diversification from the context of resource-
dependent countries. Secondly, how is finance in Saudi Arabia meant to support the intended 
diversification effort? This chapter tries to answer this question by looking at the structure 
and role of the existing Saudi financial system, and the potential role of the state in financing 
the proposed industrial development.  
 Saudi Arabia is a large, sparsely populated, and resource-dependent developing 
country. It accounts for 21.9 percent of the world oil reserves, produces around 10.1 million 
barrels of crude oil a day, and is considered the second largest oil producer in the world after 
the United States (EIA, 2017). The oil sector is the main driver of the Saudi economy 
accounting for 22.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and seventy-four percent of 
total exports (SAMA 2017). 
Despite its steady economic growth over the last two decades, Saudi Arabia was hard hit 
by the crash in oil prices in 2014-1559, which resulted in a significant decline in total exports 
and balance of payment deterioration. In 2015, the total export value dropped by 46.2 percent 
compared to 2014, and the surplus in the balance of payments (276.6 billion SR in 2014) 
turned into a significant deficit (212.7 billion SR in 2015). This shock was a major reason 
for the government to promote its Vision 2030 which aims to reduce the country’s reliance 
on oil revenues and to promote sustainable economic development.  
This chapter outlines the importance of industrial diversification as a main pillar for the 
Saudi long-term growth and development, then proposes three industrial diversification 
strategies and applies them to the Saudi context in addition to comparing them to the recently 
                                                          
59 Oil prices (for Brent crude) dropped from 114 US dollars a barrel in June 2014 to 45 US dollars in January 2015, 
before it reached its lowest- since 2003- in in February 2016 when the price stood at 28 US dollars. However, oil 
price has been increasing since then; the average oil price in 2017 was 54.2 US dollars (EIA, 2018).  
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promoted Vision 2030. Finally, it investigates the role of the financial system in supporting 
the industrial development. 
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it contributes to the scarce 
literature on industrial diversification in oil-dependent countries in general, and Saudi Arabia 
in particular. This chapter is a pioneer work in the extent and nature of its utilization of three 
major industrial strategies that have been highlighted in the context of resource-dependent 
countries. The outcome of this study can shed light on the linkages from the oil sector to 
other manufacturing activities in Saudi Arabia, and can also serve as a reference for other 
oil-dependent developing countries. 
Secondly, investigating the relevant literature carefully indicates that there is no existing 
research on the role of Saudi public financial institutions (such as the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund) in promoting industrial development and diversification. However, 
analysing their role requires data and information that are not available in published forms. 
Thus, this chapter conducts semi-structured interviews with high-ranking officials at public 
and private financial institutions that allow the researcher to investigate their role extensively 
(Appendix 1 provides more details about the semi-structured interviews process).   
The study starts with a conceptual framework. Then, it applies three industrial upgrading 
strategies to the Saudi context: resource based industrialization (e.g. Hirschman 1981; Perez 
2015; Ramos 1998), the product space analysis (Hidalgo et al. 2007) and the growth 
identification and facilitation framework (Lin and Monga 2011). Finally, it looks at the 
capacity and capabilities of public financial institutions in financing these strategies.  
4.2 Conceptual framework 
This section begins by reviewing the resource curse theory, i.e. natural resource exploitation 
undermines manufacturing sector development and thus hinders economic growth. Then, the 
section outlines four main challenges facing the resource curse theory. Finally, it contrasts 
three industrial development and diversification strategies for natural resource-dependent 
countries. 
 Influential and widely cited studies by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999) argue that 
resource abundance, measured by the share of primary exports to GDP, is negatively 
correlated with economic growth. Using a cross-country analysis for ninety-seven countries 
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for the period 1970-1990, Sachs and Warner estimated that doubling the primary products 
share in total exports led to a reduction of 0.62 to 1.51 of annual GDP growth.  
 In a later study, Sachs and Warner (2001) show that the Dutch Disease is a main 
explanation for the resource curse; namely that natural resources crowd out the 
manufacturing production. They show that the wealth accumulation resulting from natural 
resources increases the demand for non-traded products and drives their prices up, and more 
specifically it drives up non-traded inputs, costs and wages. This process squeezes countries’ 
profit in traded products (such as manufacturing products), and makes it harder to compete 
in the international markets.  
 Another mechanism through which the Dutch Disease works is exchange rate 
appreciation. Commodity revenues may force upward pressure on the prevailing real 
exchange rate, which reduces the competitiveness of non-resource exports (Corden 1984). 
The decline in British industrial exports during the 1970s, after the discovery of oil, in 
addition to the Dutch manufacturing decline after the discovery of natural gas in 1959 are 
recent examples. However, in both countries this negative impact did not last for long (Beck 
2011).  
 There are four major problems with the natural resource curse theory. First, there is 
strong evidence of the correlation between resource endowment and manufacturing 
development in several developed nations. Indeed, industrial experiences show that “natural 
resources are by no means a curse.” Ramos maintains that “the good or bad performance of 
natural-resource rich countries depends on the suitability of their economic policy, and not 
the mere fact of having natural resources” (Ramos 1998, p.106-7). Historical studies have 
shown that richness in minerals (including oil) played a crucial role in developing the 
manufacturing sector and promoting economic growth (Perez 2015). Wright (1990) and 
Wright and Czelusta (2004) have argued that resource richness in the United States in the 
19th Century was a major factor in making it the world’s manufacturing leader.  
“Resource abundance was a significant factor in shaping if not propelling the U.S. 
path to world leadership in manufacturing. The coefficient of relative mineral 
intensity in U.S. manufacturing exports actually increased sharply between 1879 and 
1914, the very period in which the country became the manufacturing leader… the 
timing of increases in production of a range of minerals in the United States is 
striking. Leadership or near-leadership in coal, lead, copper, iron ore, antimony, 
magnesite, mercury, nickel, silver, and zinc all occurred between 1870 and 1910. 
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Surely this correspondence in timing cannot have been coincidental” (Wright and 
Czelusta 2004, p.9-11). 
Wright and Czelusta have also shown that the oil sector was not an exception. Indeed, oil 
discoveries have been correlated with a significant growth in the manufacturing sector. 
According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) data, US oil production 
increased from twelve thousand barrel a day in the late 1860s to more than seven million 
barrels a day in 1960 (see Figure 4.1). In the meantime, its share of industrial GDP increased 
from approximately twenty-one percent in 1840 to approximately forty percent in the period 
between 1910 and 1960 (Johnston 2012). Furthermore, the oil sector has contributed 
substantially to the development of the chemicals industry throughout the US. This 
development is an example of linkages and innovation that are fuelled by natural resource 
abundance (Wright and Czelusta 2004). 
 Furthermore, the discovery of oil in Southern California was followed by rapid 
economic development. According to Wright and Czelusta (2004): 
“Before 1900, California was a remote, peripheral economy. Between 1900 and 
1930, California (not Texas) became the leading oil state in the nation, and the result 
was a ‘sudden awakening’ of the regional economy. Spurred not just by jobs in oil 
but also by the dramatic fall in the cost of energy, California’s share of national 
income nearly doubled. Contrary to Dutch disease models, the size of the state’s 
manufacturing sector quadrupled.” (p.20). 
Although California’s industrial performance lagged behind the national level during the late 
19th Century, the sector grew dramatically in the 20th Century after the oil boom (see Figure 
4.2 and Table 4.1). Between 1899 and 190460, the number of industrial establishments 
increased by thirty-seven percent, and the number of industrial workers rose by twenty-six 
percent. In comparison, the national number of industrial establishments increased by only 
four percent and the number of production workers rose by fifteen percent (ibid.) 
                                                          
60 This period is crucial in this regard, because in 1903, California became the largest oil producing state in the US 
(Rhode, 2001).  
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Figure 4.1: The US crude oil production (in thousand barrel per day) 
 
Source: The US Energy Information Administration (EIA)   
Figure 4.2: California oil production (in million barrels a year) 
 
Source: Andreano (1970) and Adamson (2010) 
Table 4.1: California manufacturing sector (1859-1997) 
Year No. of establishments No. of production 
workers 
Wages Value added 
1859 1,218 6,052 5,047 10,792 
1879 4,231 39,525 18,427 38,510 
1899 4,925 71,976 35,954 86,940 
1904 6,755 90,404 57,267 114,739 
1919 10,155 217,312 286,033 705,859 
1939 11,558 271,290 358,734 1,122,545 
1958 28,735 838,671 4,107,200 12,048,000 
1977 45,289 2,224,200 13,150,500 45,862,400 
1997 49,079 1,193,550 - 204,119,356 
Note: wages and value added are in current thousands USD.  
Source: Rhode (2001). 
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 In Los Angeles, oil production has “literally fuelled” different manufacturing sector 
activities. By the mid-1920s, Los Angeles became a leading industrial centre; it became the 
leading US state in producing oil machineries and oil-related services (Schmitt et al. 2002). 
Cooke (2014) maintains that in addition to technological and industrial progress, oil 
production in Los Angeles has promoted considerable infrastructure development.  
 It has also been documented that linkages from mineral resources were important 
factors in the Canadian economic development process (Watkins 1963). Similarly, studies 
on Sweden (Venables et al. 2007), Norway (Andersen 1993), Australia (Wright and Czelusta 
2004) and Finland (CCSI 2016; Ramos 1998) show the  importance of the natural resource 
linkages in developing their manufacturing sectors and the overall economic activity.  
Secondly, there are studies that have empirically challenged Sachs and Warner’s 
findings. By avoiding having GDP in the denominator of the resource dependence indicator 
(as used by Sachs and Warner), Lederman and Maloney (2007) use natural resources exports 
per capita (instead of natural resources exports to GDP), and they do not find a negative 
correlation between natural resource dependence and economic growth. They further show 
that Australia, Canada, Norway and New Zealand are more dependent on natural resources 
than Papua New Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In other words, they argue 
that the resource curse theory explicitly claims that a country like Norway is not considered 
resource-dependent because it has diversified its export basket. 
Thirdly, Sachs and Warner (2001) do not explain an interesting trend showing 
countries with poor resource endowment at the beginning of their study period (1970) and 
how, as they increased their dependence on natural resources, they grew rapidly in GDP (this 
trend is shown in Figure 1 of their paper on page no. 829). These countries are Malaysia, 
Iceland and Mauritius. A potential explanation for this trend, the researcher argues, is that 
these countries were able to achieve economic diversification and manufacturing 
development. Throughout Sachs and Warner’s study period (1970-1990), Iceland’s 
manufacturing sector exports grew from 3.3 percent to 8.1; Malaysia’s has grown from 6.5 
percent to 53.7 percent; and Mauritius’s has grown from 1.8 percent to 65.8 percent (World 
Bank database). In Malaysia, for instance, oil production increased from one thousand 
barrels a day in 1965 until it reached its peak of 776 thousand barrels a day in 2004. During 
the same period, manufacturing added value to GDP increased from ten percent to 30.3 
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percent. These trends clearly questions Sachs and Warner’s main argument which states that 
the natural resource accumulation crowds out manufacturing sector activity. 
Figure 4.3: Oil production and the industrial development in Malaysia 
 
 
Source: British Petroleum statistical review (2017), and the World Bank database. 
 Fourthly, it is argued that the reliance on the resource fiscal linkages and neglect of 
the production linkage explains the weak manufacturing performance in some resource-
dependent states (Karl 1997). The pioneer development economist Hirschman (1981) argues 
that resource abundance provides linkages and opportunities for developing and diversifying 
the industrial sector. These linkages are classified into fiscal, consumption and production 
linkages. The first shows rents generated by the government from the natural resource in the 
forms of direct income, royalties or taxes. These rents could be invested in other independent 
activities within the economy. The second linkage describes the demand for output of 
unrelated sectors as a result of income generated through the natural resource. The third, 
production linkages, describes forward and backward linkages from the resource sector. 
Hirschman considers it to be the major driver for industrial development (as will be 
discussed later in this section). However, this channel has not emerged effectively in many 
oil and mineral producing countries because of their reliance on fiscal linkages financed by 
high commodity revenues (Karl 1997).  
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A major conclusion emerging from the review of the resource curse literature is that 
the high resource dependence in many developing countries can be explained in terms of 
underdeveloped manufacturing sectors. Having abundance in a natural resource should not 
be considered “a curse”. The poor industrial performance in many natural resource countries 
is mainly explained by public policy failure (Kaplinsky et al. 2012; Ramos 1998; Wright and 
Czelusta 2004).  
 Because of the importance of targeting suitable sectors in any industrial policy61, the 
industrial development literature suggests different strategies for this purpose. Kaplinsky et 
al. (2012) have reviewed the following strategies in the context of resource-dependent 
developing countries: Hirschman’s production linkages which is known as resource based 
industrialization (RBI); “the monkeys in trees” using the product space theory (PST), and 
the “flying geese” theory using the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework 
(GIFF)62. 
 There is a growing literature focusing on the above strategies in the developing world 
in general. In resource-dependent countries, in particular, Lin and Treichel (2011) and Lin 
and Xu (2015) have applied the GIFF to Nigeria and Uganda (respectively); Felipe and Rhee 
(2015) have suggested the use of the GIFF and PST for Kazakhstan; Hausmann and Chauvin 
(2015) have applied the PST to Rwanda. This paper, therefore, follows this strand of the 
literature and applies the three main suggested industrial strategies to the Saudi context: the 
RBI, the GIFF and the PST.   
 Resource based industrialization  
Rather than looking at natural resources’ abundance as an obstacle, resource based 
industrialization (RBI), through technological change, can be seen as a window of 
opportunities for generating employment, creating wealth and ensuring well-being for 
resource-dependent countries (Morris et al. 2012; Perez 2015; Ramos 1998). According to 
Hirschman (1981), RBI is explained by production linkages, which refers to the forward 
linkages and backward linkages from the resource sector. The former is located downstream 
and describes the processing of natural resource and its transformation into manufacturing 
                                                          
61 Targeting suitable sectors is considered a fundamental factor in the success of any industrial policy. For example, 
Khan and Blankenburg (2009) show that the failure to choose suitable industrial sectors can result in the failure of 
the whole industrial policy. 
62 Kaplinsky et al. (2012) also highlights a fourth theory: the capabilities theory (i.e. Lall, 1992). However, they argue 
that it has a large overlap with the other three theories. Thus, the researcher in this study has focused on the other 
theories, with some reference to the capabilities theory throughout the analysis.  
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products, while the latter is located upstream and refers to the production of input material, 
equipment and services utilized in the resource exploration and production.  
The abundance of resources in developing countries has encouraged the exploitation 
and exporting of raw materials. Nonetheless, industrialization in these countries depends on 
the pace of mastering their  processing techniques for natural resources in addition to 
manufacturing the input material and equipment necessary for the resource extraction 
(Ramos 1998). 
 What these countries need to consider in their development strategies is more emphasis 
on policies to strengthen activities upstream, such as supplying inputs, machinery and 
engineering in addition to policies to strengthen raw material processing. The targeted 
sectors in this development strategy are different from those adopted by newly industrialized 
economies in East Asia (which are relatively poor in natural resources). By contrast, the 
strategy should be similar to those used by developed countries with rich natural resources 
such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Scandinavians (Ramos, 1998). 
 The development of industrial clusters around the natural resource could 
significantly foster the linkages from the resource63. In his analysis, Ramos uses the mining 
cluster as an example in order to show the importance of both forward and backward linkages 
from the resource sector (see Figure 4.1). He further proposes an RBI strategy that goes over 
four major phases (see Table 4.2). In the first phase, developing countries extract resources 
and export them with very limited local input. Machinery and engineering services are likely 
to be imported at this stage. In the second stage, exports may include first level processing. 
The main input materials are targeted in the import substitution strategy in addition to 
engineering services. In the third stage, the country starts exporting more specialized and 
sophisticated products, while inputs materials and basic machinery (that are already targeted 
in import substitutions strategy) begin to be exported. In the fourth stage, all types of 
products and services are exported. This includes inputs and machinery, design and 
maintenance services, and specialized consultation services. 
                                                          
63 The existence of industrial sectors creates greater spillover inter- and intra-sector. The success of firms within 
industrial clusters is very dependent on the success of other firms existing in the same cluster (Porter, 1998).   
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Figure 4.4: The forward and backward linkages in the mining cluster  
 
 
Source: Ramos (1998) 
 Building on Hirschman’s theory, Morris et al. (2012) developed a model of linkages 
with an additional linkage dimension: a horizontal dimension64. This dimension refers to 
capabilities developed in the resource cluster and could be utilized in the advancement of 
unrelated industrial and service sectors. For instance, developing manufacturing capabilities 
in producing drilling equipment for oil fields can be used in the production of other kinds of 
drilling equipment and machineries in non-oil activities.  
Table 4.2: The development of a production cluster 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
1. Downstream 
exports 
Unprocessed 
natural 
resource 
First level of 
processing 
More specialized first level 
processing, in addition to 
second level processing 
Investment 
abroad 
1. Upstream 
input 
materials  
Imported Import substations 
production of the 
main inputs for the 
domestic market 
Export of inputs == 
 
2. Upstream 
machinery 
Imported 
(repairs 
carried out 
locally) 
Production under 
license for the 
domestic market 
Export of basic machinery 
to less sophisticated 
markets; development of 
specialized equipment 
Export of all 
types of 
machinery to 
sophisticated 
markets 
1. Upstream 
engineering 
- Production 
- Project design 
- Consultancy 
 
 
- Semi-
imported 
- Imported 
- Imported 
 
 
 
- Domestic 
- Partly domestic 
- Partly domestic 
 
 
 
- Domestic 
- Domestic 
- Domestic (except for 
specialities) 
 
 
Export all 
types of 
engineering 
activities 
Source: Ramos (1998)  
                                                          
64 This dimension has an overlap with the product space theory which will be discussed in the next theoretical 
section 
Inputs Refining Smelting Extraction 
Metal 
products 
Capital goods, e.g. 
electrical machinery, 
trucks and bulldozers. 
Engineering 
services  
 
Forward linkages Backward linkages 
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 Unlike the forward and backward linkages that can be identified without any 
difficulty, the horizontal linkages are relatively difficult to recognize because linking an 
emerging sector to another existing one is not always obvious. Nonetheless, policy makers 
are encouraged to pay great attention to its potential development, because industrial 
experiences (such as in Finland and South Africa) show that it has been of extreme 
importance in developing unrelated industrial sectors. In these experiences, the horizontal 
linkages were mainly based on well-established upstream industry (Colombia Center for 
Sustainbale Investment, CCSI 2016).  
It is well documented in the literature that there have been significant developments in 
resource based manufacturing in recent years which further emphasizes the RBI strategy 
(Morris et al. 2012; Perez 2015). First, the rise in natural resource prices in recent years is 
expected to be maintained. Secondly, there is a high segmentation in resource based 
commodities. Perez argues that there is a wide spectrum of products and activities ranging 
from high volume and low price to small volume and high price commodities. Thirdly, the 
development in ICT makes information easily accessible to developing countries and enables 
them to enter more product segments and services. 
Fourthly, there has been a transformation of MNCs in the resource sector from foreign 
isolated firms into more interacting entities. Indeed, the concavity65 of the natural resource 
sectors has decreased substantially in the last four decades and has resulted in more 
opportunities for linkages to the rest of the economy (Morris et al. 2012). The deepening of 
globalization has intensified firms’ competition, which drives them to focus on activities in 
which they have distinctive competencies. Therefore, the other activities (non-core) are 
increasingly being outsourced to lower cost suppliers. In current global value chains (GVCs), 
this development has pushed large firms to concentrate in their core competencies, instead 
of mastering the whole value chain. This tendency to outsource non-core activities may 
create great opportunities for local suppliers (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001).  
 Because of these changes in the nature of RBI in recent years, Perez (2015) argues 
for the importance of building networks around the resource sector and creating a system of 
innovation. The complete network (value chain) should be developed, starting from capital 
goods to processing activities, and ultimately to packaging and distribution to the end users. 
                                                          
65 The natural resource concavity refers to the isolation of leading firms, which tend to be MNCs, from 
the domestic economy. 
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The system of innovation, she argues, should also include universities, R&D institutions and 
high-tech business. In such a system, this continued development in all the network players 
is crucially important. 
“Success in the natural resource industries depends on continuous improvement of 
technologies, companies, products and human capital, across networks that 
encompass research, engineering and design; construction, adaptation, installation, 
compatibility and maintenance; software and systems services; equipment and 
instruments; laboratory services; quality control, evaluation, measurement, 
certificates; conservation and packaging; transport, marketing and distribution; 
technical service to users; market intelligence; improvements and new products; 
patent lawyers; contract negotiation; training and education of specialized 
personnel; financial services; and so on: a far cry from raw materials only.” (p.18). 
Ramos (1998), Perez (2015) and Morris et al. (2012) show that industrial clustering 
is critical for the promotion of manufacturing development around the resource sector. The 
importance of regions and geography in economic and industrial development can also be 
seen in the new economic geography (NEG) literature (Krugman 1991; Porter and Stern 
2001; Scotchmer and Thisse 1992). This literature has constantly maintained that selected 
regions, where the industrial activities are located in transaction-intensive networks, have a 
powerful impact on the national industrial development.  
  The NEG view can be explained by three major factors: economies of scale, 
transaction cost and external economies (Krugman 1991). First, economies of scale are 
predicted to push firms to concentrate their manufacturing activities in a specific location 
rather than dispersing the industrial activities in multiple locations. In other words, 
increasing returns to scale is a major incentive for firms to concentrate the production 
activities geographically (Krugman 1991; Scotchmer and Thisse 1992). 
 Secondly, transportation costs are considered fundamental factors that influence 
location and clustering choices. While the neoclassical trade theory, in general, assumes no 
transportation costs, the NEG expects that only a fraction of the shipped product’s value 
arrives at the customer, and the rest of the cost is treated as a shipment cost. Therefore, larger 
firms and their suppliers may be encouraged to concentrate in certain geographical regions 
in order to reduce their transportation costs (Krugman 1993; Porter and Stern 2001). Thirdly, 
the NEG considers external economies to be a major contributor to firms’ clustering because 
111 
 
of labour pooling, technology spillover and the availability of specialized intermediary 
inputs (Krugman and Venables 1996). 
 It is important, here, to mention a related and growing strand of research within the 
Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG) literature which is concerned with regional 
diversification and path creation66 (e.g. Dawley 2014; Isaksen 2014; Martin 2010). This 
strand is based on the view that region-specific endowments and conditions have a 
substantial impact on the emergence of new industrial and services activities (Isaksen 2014). 
As Martin (2010) puts it,  “the pre-existing industrial structure of a region or locality does 
have an influence on whether a particular new industry develops there” (p.6). In this context, 
Boschma et al. (2012) identify four possible mechanisms for regional diversification: labour 
mobility between firms or sectors, social networking, entrepreneurial activities (such as start-
ups and spin-offs), and firms’ diversification. However, this literature, in general, has viewed 
regional diversification as an endogenous process whereby firms move into related activities 
within the same region (Trippl et al. 2017). Despite their importance in the emergence of 
new activities, actors such as research institutes, universities and public institutions have 
received only limited attention in this strand of literature (Mackinnon et al. 2018). 
 Mackinnon et al. (2018) have developed a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework of regional path creation from the perspective of Geographical Political Economy 
(GPE). This broad framework emphasises five fundamental elements of regional path 
creation: regional and extra regional assets (e.g. infrastructure, human capital and 
institutional assets); social, economic and institutional actors (e.g. local state and political 
leaders); market construction; the mechanism of path creation (e.g. transplantation and 
labour mobility); and institutional environments. This wide framework can provide an 
integrated explanation for the emergence of new economic activities in specific geographical 
locations. Accordingly, from the perspective of this GPE structure, the emergence of new 
activities in specific regions should be associated with the dynamics of capital accumulation, 
infrastructure development, technological upgrading, labour development, banks and 
venture capital funds and state regulations (ibid.).  
 The Product Space Theory  
In a series of studies, Hausmann and Klinger (2007), Hausmann et al. (2007) and Hausmann 
and Hidalgo (2011) show nations’ economic development as a process of producing and 
                                                          
66 Path creation here refers to the growth and emergence of new economic activities within specific regions 
(Mackinnon et al., 2018). 
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exporting more diverse and more sophisticated products. Their analysis shows that, as 
countries grow, they extend their export baskets towards higher-technology products that are 
made by few other countries. 
 In this framework, economic development is slow in countries with a production 
structure categorized by low value-added, agricultural, natural resources products, i.e. low-
wage and low-productivity activities. On the other hand, development is expected to be fast 
in countries producing high-added value and more sophisticated products, i.e. high-wages 
and high productivity activities.  
 Hidalgo et al. (2007) have developed the ‘product space’, which represents all the 
exported products in the world. They show that a country’s economic development is pre-
determined by its capabilities to produce more sophisticated products. ‘Capabilities’ here 
refers to all the factors needed to produce a specific product, such as capital, human resources 
and institutions. At the firm’s level, capabilities refer to production knowledge (‘know-
how’). This productive knowledge is what explains countries’ economic complexity. Unlike 
the neo-classical trade theory, this product space theory (PST) considers the industrial 
knowledge costly to transfer and to acquire (Hausmann et al. 2014). 
 The network is created using product level rather than aggregate sector level data. 
The authors use export data because it is more comprehensive and more readily available 
than the industrial output data. Although the authors are aware of some limitations in using 
export data67, this does not undermine the strength of the model or invalidate it (Felipe and 
Rhee, 2015).  Figure 4.5 shows the product space adapted from Hausmann et al. (2014) using 
1240 products (using a 4 digits Harmonized System). Appendix 4 outlines more details about 
the PST construction. 
 The product space represents products that are naturally grouped into linked 
communities. This may suggest that these communities require similar sets of industrial 
knowledge. Hausmann et al. (2014) identify  thirty-four communities.  Each community 
shows products that are more connected than outside the community68. 
                                                          
67 The product space theory is based on the utilization of export data. While it is widely considered a proxy for 
industrial output, in some cases it deviates from the actual industrial production. This can be explained by the 
domestic market size and trade openness. Nonetheless, highly disaggregated output for large number of products 
(i.e. 1024) and countries is not available. 
68 Hausmann et al. (2014) use network science algorithms to generate these communities.  
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An important implication of the product space is the lack of connectivity for products 
at the periphery (isolated) relative to those in the core. Core products, which include 
machinery, transportation and chemical products, are considered sophisticated products with 
high added value.  On the other hand, peripheral products, which include petroleum, tropical 
agriculture and animal products, are considered simple products with low added value. 
Furthermore, they are considerably less connected to other products than those in the core. 
This reflects the difficulty facing countries concentrating on producing peripheral products 
(such as the case of Saudi Arabia with its concentration on petroleum products) to diversify 
their production structure. On the other hand, countries that produce an abundance of core 
products find it relatively easy to jump from one product to another. 
Figure 4.5: The Product space network 
 
Source: Hausmann et al. (2014)  
 The Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework 
The growth identification and facilitation framework theory (GIFF) demonstrates the ‘flying 
geese’ theory, which assumes that previous experiences are a good guide for the future and 
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that countries with specific endowments can follow the footpath of similar countries. The 
GIFF is proposed by Lin and Monga (2011), and shows that economic development is not 
only about higher income and low poverty but is also about more complex production 
structures. This framework explains that governments are able to incentivize the private 
sector to upgrade and diversify the production structure by targeting specific sectors 
according to the country’s comparative advantage. Lin and Monga argue that firms investing 
within the comparative advantage are more likely to be profitable without significant 
government support. However, comparative advantage evolves over time. Thus, investing 
in the current comparative advantage alters the endowment structure, which then alters 
comparative advantage in the future. This continued process results in sustainable industrial 
upgrading and diversification.  
 The GIFF operationalizes a strategy proposed by  Lin (2010) which identifies sectors 
where a country may have a latent comparative advantage. Then it provides a guide for 
eliminating obstacles and providing incentives that facilitate the private sector’s entrance to 
the identified sectors. In this strategy, Lin prescribes six steps for government intervention. 
First, the government specifies a list of goods and services that have been produced over the 
last twenty years in a growing country with 100 per cent higher GDP per capita and with the 
same endowment structure. Secondly, from the list of targeted goods and services, the 
government gives priority to products already produced by the private sector and tries to 
support them by removing the obstacles in their development path. 
The third step is that, from this list, some products may be totally new to the domestic 
market, in which case the government may adopt certain procedures to attract firms from 
more industrialized countries and which are specialized in these particular products, to invest 
domestically. The fourth step is that the government should recognize and pay attention to 
any activities that were not specified in the first step and that have been self-discovered by 
entrepreneurs domestically and then to provide them with the necessary support. The fifth 
step is that, in countries with an unfriendly business environment and a poor infrastructure, 
the government should invest in industrial and export zones that can improve the 
environment in such a way as to attract domestic, as well as foreign investors, to invest in 
the specified sub-sectors. Finally, because of the great social value created by pioneers in 
these newly targeted activities, the government should reward them by providing some 
compensation. 
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4.3 Saudi industrial development strategies  
This section examines the industrial diversification strategies from the perspective of the 
three theories highlighted in the previous section: RBI, PST and GIFF. Each strategy is used 
in two ways: assessing the existing industrial performance and proposing potential targeted 
sectors. 
 Resource based industrialization in Saudi Arabia  
This part evaluates the performance of the Saudi upstream and downstream of the oil sector. 
Furthermore, it suggests sectors (which can also be sub-sectors or products) as potential 
targeted activities according to the RBI strategy. 
Before the 1930s, the Saudi economy utilized very limited natural resources. The 
government relied solely on import taxes and pilgrimage services (related to Hajj). However, 
the extraction of oil changed the economic situation dramatically. In 1933, a series of 
geological surveys were undertaken by California-Arabian Standard Oil Company 
(CASOC). Fruitless drillings had been taking place for nearly five years before oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities in 1938. The Saudi government increased its ownership 
in the company steadily until 1980 when it acquired the entire ownership of the oil company. 
In a royal decree, the company name was changed to the Saudi Arabian Oil Company 
(Aramco) in 1988. The government assigned Aramco the sole rights for exploration of 
petroleum resources. Other investors can participate in oil extraction but only in partnership 
with Aramco. 
To understand the industrial development in the oil cluster, it is necessary to analyse the 
backward (upstream) linkages and forward linkages (downstream) from the oil sector 
separately (see Figure 4.6). 
 Backward linkages 
The backward linkages exist in the upstream sector and can be divided into oil exploration 
and production. Exploration involves oil discovery, field evaluation and field development. 
Production, on the other hand, mainly involves oil extraction. This upstream sector 
comprises embodied inputs (such as machinery, equipment and structures) and disembodied 
inputs (human resources and services) that enable oil exploration and production to take 
place (Teka 2011). 
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The Saudi upstream capacity is enormous. In 2016, oil production capacity was 12.3 
million barrels per day making Saudi Arabia the second largest producer after the US (see  
Figure 4.7). The oil sector accounts for 28.6 of GDP69 (see Table 4.3), 74.2 percent of total 
exports, and 64.2 percent of total government revenues (SAMA 2017). In the meantime, the 
sector employs only 1.8 percent of private sector employment (179.6 thousand people70). 
Figure 4.6: The Saudi oil upstream and downstream industries  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Teka (2011) 
Figure 4.7: Oil production by country in 2016 
  
Source: Energy Information Administration (2017). 
                                                          
69 Including oil refining activities.  
70 Aramco alone employs 65,282 people. 
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Table 4.3: GDP by economic activity in 2016 (in million SAR)  
Economic activity Share Value 
1. Agriculture , Forestry and Fishing 2.5% 65,290.18 
2. Mining & Quarrying 25.4% 654,891.8 
a. Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 25.0% 643,125.2 
b. Other 0.5% 11,766.62 
3. Manufacturing 12.9% 331,376.3 
a. Petroleum Refining 3.2% 81,956.76 
b. Other 9.7% 249,419.5 
4. Electricity , Gas and Water 1.6% 40,620.9 
5. Construction 6.0% 154,592.1 
6. Wholesale & Retail Trade, Restaurants and hotels 10.7% 274,969.9 
7. Transport , Storage and Communication 6.4% 165,172.9 
8. Finance , Insurance , Real Estate and Business Services 13.1% 338,133.5 
a. Ownership of Dwellings 7.7% 197,241 
b. Others 5.5% 140,892.5 
9. Community , Social and Personal Services 2.3% 58,592.68 
10. Imputed Bank Services Charge 0.9% 22,826.06 
11. Producers of Government Services 19.1% 491,077.3 
12. Import Duties 0.9% 23,378 
Gross Domestic Product 100.0% 2,575,269 
Source: Saudi General Statistics Authority  
The state ownership of Aramco has given the government authority to impose a series of 
policies and programmes on the oil and gas value chain to increase the linkages to the domestic 
economy. The public ownership of the leading firms in the resource sector has been documented 
as a central factor in promoting RBI (Kaplinsky et al. 2012). Until 2015, Aramco had been giving 
local suppliers priority and support in their bidding process. However, there was no clear local 
content policy for Aramco’s local suppliers. This has been reflected on the local suppliers’ poor 
share of Aramco’s procurements. Over the last six years, Aramco’s local procurement has been 
around thirty percent, while seventy percent of machinery, materials and services were imported 
(Aramco 2016).  
A closer look at imported products and services that are not being produced domestically at 
all (around 6.5 billion SR annually)71 shows that drilling equipment is the largest segment with 
annual average purchasing of 2.0 billion SR, followed by chemical materials with 1.21 billion 
SR (see Figure 4.8). Table 4.4 represents major imported products in the two largest segments 
(drilling and chemical materials). This expenditure on imported products and services strongly 
emphasizes the need for policies towards greater domestic development of the upstream 
manufacturing and services. In other words, these products should be prioritized in the Saudi 
                                                          
71 There are other imported segments that are being produced domestically but with limited capacity. 
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industrial policy. Following Ramos (1998) and Perez’s (2015) industrial strategies, Saudi Arabia 
could have been a regional exporter of oil related manufacturing and services as opposed to 
being a net importer.  
In their work on resource based industries, Morris et al. (2012) argue that developing these 
backward linkages can also promote horizontal linkages into a wider range of products and 
services. For instance, developing the capabilities in producing certain electrical equipment for 
the oil extraction process allows Saudi firms to produce other sophisticated equipment that 
requires a similar set of capabilities.  
Figure 4.8:Largest imported products and services (in million SAR) 
 
Source: Aramco (2016) 
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Table 4.4: Totally imported drillings and chemicals   
Item Average spending in million SR 
1. Drilling 
1.1. Down hall equipment  
1) Liner hangers 364 
2) Packers 374 
3) Installation services 181 
4) Valve: sub-surface safety 80 
5) Isolation valves & accessories 75 
6) Nipple: landing 33 
7) Laterals & accessories equipment 19 
1.2. Advanced well completion  
1) Equalizer/ screens access 270 
2) Smart, accessories 140 
3) Gauges 53 
4) Expandable, casing & accessories 41 
5) Downhole wet connect system 26 
6) Cable, monitoring system 24 
7) Permanent downhole monitoring systems., accessories 13 
8) Coupling protector 8 
9) Expandable, screen 7 
2. Chemicals 
1) Salts 426 
2) Lubricants 111 
3) H2s scavenger 98 
4) Shale/borehole stabilizer 50 
5) Spotting fluid 22 
6) Thinner 16 
7) Emulsifiers & surfactants 9 
8) Oxygen scavenger 8 
9) Defoamer 6 
Source: Aramco (2016) 
 Forward linkages 
The development of forward linkages (downstream industry) in oil producing countries is 
categorized into oil refining and petrochemicals. In oil refining, crude oil is transformed into 
useful consumption and production products such as gasoline, diesel, fuel oils, jet fuel, 
kerosene and liquid petroleum gas (LPG). Aramco refinery capacity reached 3.1 million 
barrels per day in 2016, making Saudi Arabia the fifth largest in the world in terms of refining 
capacity after the US, China, Russia and India (British Petroleum, 2017). 
The Saudi petrochemicals industry, on the other hand, was promoted in the 1970s to 
promote economic diversification in addition to reducing the environmental impact and 
economic loss of burning the associated gas. This gas is either dissolved with oil or found 
free above the oil reserves (gas cap). Rather than flaring, the government decided to 
transform this gas into petrochemical exportable materials. In 1975, the Royal Commission 
for Jubail and Yanbu (RCJY) was established in order to develop world-class infrastructure 
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of the two cities (Yanbu and Jubail) and to accommodate petrochemicals related plants72, 
and the Master Gas System (MGS)73 was developed to feed these industrial cities. The cost 
of the two cities, in addition to the MGS, was 35 billion USD74. 
In 1976, the government founded a national company called the Saudi Arabian Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC). However, the company’s development was hindered by the 
lack of know-how in petrochemicals’ manufacturing. The first CEO of the company explains 
that they had capital, infrastructure and raw material (feedstock), but “what we did not have 
was the technological know-how and the commercial experience in the markets of the world” 
(Al-Zamil et al. 2017). 
In order to access the ‘know-how’ and to transfer petrochemicals technologies, 
SABIC set up joint ventures with a number of leading foreign chemical producers. SABIC 
was offering a guaranteed right to buy oil to attract foreign investors, which was particularly 
important after the Arab oil producers’ embargo in 1973. Back then, petrochemical 
companies were uncertain about future supply, and SABIC partnership was an opportunity 
to process and produce through guaranteed oil access. Therefore, companies, such as Exxon 
Mobil, Shell, Taiwan Fertilizer Company and Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, have established 
joint venture firms with SABIC.   
In order for firms to acquire sophisticated technologies, follow up investment might 
be necessary to adopt foreign technology (Lall 1992). For SABIC, after signing joint 
ventures with foreign technology leaders, further major investments were made to acquire 
know-how in petrochemicals manufacturing. Young Saudis were sent to Japan, Taiwan and 
the US to get on-the-job training abroad. The on-the-job abroad training was done through 
agreements with the companies that already had joint ventures with SABIC. However, 
SABIC’s administration found that in many cases foreign companies taught Saudis in classes 
rather than in plants,  and thus, the administration threatened to quit these joint-venture 
agreements if the training was not within the production facilities in order to ensure greater 
technology transfer (Al-Zamil et al. 2017). 
                                                          
72 Algusaibi (1999) argues that the RCJY with its unique management and governance structures is a critical 
factor in the later success of the Saudi petrochemicals industry.  
73 The MGS is a system of pipelines and gathering facilities that collect the associated gas by product.  
74 The cost of the project, 35 billion USD, is around the total annual Saudi budget in that period (Alzamil et al., 
2017)  
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SABIC played a critical role in the development of the Saudi petrochemical industry 
in two ways: developing human resources to lead many other, smaller petrochemical firms 
and creating positive information externalities and technology spill-over. Former SABIC 
employees are now leading (e.g. CEOs) several petrochemicals listed companies75. Creating 
technology spill-over, on the other hand, by SABIC was an opportunity for smaller firms, 
that had entered the market later, to copy some production and management expertise at zero 
cost (Al-Zamil et al. 2017). These two unique characteristics have been documented as major 
roles of SOEs in developing the domestic industries in recent successful industrial 
experiences (Amsden and Hikino 1994). 
 Since the 1980s, the Saudi petrochemicals industry has been growing steadily. 
Currently, the industry accounts for the largest export segment after oil. In 2016, it accounted 
for twenty-one percent of total exports (sixty-seven percent of non-oil exports) generating 
over 38 billion USD. The industry has accounted for 2.7 percent of GDP, and twenty-one 
percent of the total manufacturing sector (SAMA, 2017). In terms of employment, the 
petrochemicals industry provided approximately 121,760 direct jobs in 201776.  Table 4.5 
shows that  petrochemicals (chemicals and plastics) account for around thirteen percent of 
total industrial employment. Furthermore, data on fixed capital formation reveal that it 
accounts for more than forty-six percent of total industrial capital formation in 2015 (see 
Table 4.6). 
 While there has been a substantial development in the Saudi petrochemicals industry 
since the 1970s, its production output mainly lies within less sophisticated products. Table 
4.7 shows the Saudi production capacity since 2006 by major segments. Speciality 
chemicals, which is the most sophisticated segment, accounts for only 0.3 percent of total 
production capacity. Furthermore, it accounts for less than three percent of total sales. Figure 
4.9 shows total sales of petrochemicals output in 2016, where speciality chemicals are 
included in the category “Others”. 
 Saudi exports, accordingly, are also skewed towards less sophisticated products. 
Petrochemicals exports are dominated by basic organics such as ethers, acyclic alcohol, 
cyclic hydrocarbons (accounting for approximately thirty percent), and basic polymers 
(forty-three percent) (see Figure 4.11). This is unlike other developing countries, such as 
                                                          
75  This is in addition to other ex-SABIC employees who became leaders in private and government institutions. 
76 In addition, the petrochemicals sector generates significant indirect jobs, which was estimated to be between 267 
and 356 thousand in 2014 (GPCA, 2015). 
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India, China and Malaysia, that developed speciality and final consumer chemicals where 
petrochemicals exports are dominated by final consumption products, such as rubber tyres, 
rubber apparel, plastic housewares, soaps and paints. 
Table 4.5: Manufacturing labour force by size of firm 
Less 
than 5 
(5-19) More 
than 20 
Total Economic activity 
Share Number  
21,162 13,888 74,780 11.4% 109,830 Food products 
1,304 2,002 25,468 3.0% 28,774 Beverages 
112 61 47 0% 220 Tobacco products 
5,157 1,958 15,137 2.3% 22,252 Textiles 
58,626 14,654 7,645 8.4% 80,925 Wearing apparel 
158 150 1,884 0.2% 2,192 Leather and related products 
8,595 12,206 7,165 2.9% 27,966 Wood and of products of wood and cork 
229 1,294 15,149 1.7% 16,672 Paper and paper products 
2,523 3,618 12,188 1.9% 18,329 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
149 1,144 17,059 1.9% 18,352 Coke and refined petroleum products 
936 5,268 88,290 9.8% 94,494 Chemicals and chemical products 
49 207 6,848 0.7% 7,104 Products and preparations pharmaceutical 
636 3,224 23,406 2.8% 27,266 Rubber and plastics products 
4,855 15,696 112,402 13.9% 132,953 Other non-metallic mineral products 
301 1,887 45,487 5.0% 47,675 Basic metals 
39,504 41,219 54,644 14.1% 135,367 Fabricated metal products 
138 327 2,302 0.3% 2,767 Computer, electronic and optical products 
588 945 20,666 2.3% 22,199 Electrical equipment 
282 1,288 24,220 2.7% 25,790 Machinery and equipment  
244 1,429 6,133 0.8% 7,806 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
46 100 2,671 0.3% 2,817 Other transport equipment 
16,125 17,722 23,187 5.9% 57,034 Furniture 
688 720 6,167 0.8% 7,575 Other manufacturing 
23,713 5,399 34,171 6.6% 63,283 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
186,120 146,406 627,116 100% 959,642 Total 
Source: Saudi General Statistics Authority  
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Table 4.6: Capital formation by manufacturing activity (in thousands SAR, 2015) 
Manufacturing activity Gross capital formation  Share 
Food products 4,082,931 6.70% 
Beverages 807,328 1.30% 
Tobacco products 1,985 0.00% 
Textiles 703,127 1.20% 
Wearing apparel 756,530 1.20% 
Leather and related products 98,469 0.20% 
Wood and of products of wood and cork 498,138 0.80% 
Paper and paper products 640,444 1.10% 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 593,532 1.00% 
Coke and refined petroleum products 4,838,908 8.00% 
Chemicals and chemical products 27,580,673 45.40% 
Products and preparations pharmaceutical 197,914 0.30% 
Rubber and plastics products 490,706 0.80% 
Other non-metallic mineral products 11,091,681 18.30% 
Basic metals 379,019 0.60% 
Fabricated metal products 733,467 1.20% 
Computer, electronic and optical products 209,382 0.30% 
Electrical equipment 643,330 1.10% 
Machinery and equipment  460,545 0.80% 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 295,031 0.50% 
Other transport equipment 339,979 0.60% 
Furniture 1,254,976 2.10% 
Other manufacturing 189,568 0.30% 
Repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment 
3,805,238 6.30% 
Total 60,692,900 100% 
Source: Saudi General Statistics Authority  
 
Table 4.7: Saudi petrochemicals production capacity (in metric tons) 
 Petrochemicals 
production 
  
2006 
 
2011 
 
2016 
 
Capacity Share Capacity  Share Capacity Share 
Organics  
- Basic 15630000 35.3% 27760952 35.5% 35597330 36.9% 
- Fine chemicals 566285 1.3% 1002575 1.3% 2551154 2.6% 
- Intermediates 12064774 27.3% 21151161 27.1% 22110244 22.9% 
- Polymers 6375598 14.4% 14047533 18.0% 17352607 18.0% 
Basic Inorganics   
- Fertilizer Raw 
Material 4369800 9.9% 5625961 7.2% 8280105 8.6% 
- Inorganic 
chemicals 909312.5 2.1% 1128313 1.4% 1796175 1.9% 
- Mainstream 
Fertilizers 4210000 9.5% 7310000 9.3% 8430000 8.7% 
Specialty Chemicals  
- Specialties 94000 0.2% 164000 0.2% 290800 0.3% 
Total 44219769   78190494   96408416   
Source: unpublished data from the Gulf Petrochemicals & Chemicals Association. 
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Figure 4.9: Saudi petrochemicals sales by major groups (in 2016) 
 
Source: unpublished data from the Gulf Petrochemicals & Chemicals Association. 
Figure 4.10:  Saudi Petrochemicals exports in 2016 
 
Source: Hausmann et al. (2014). 
 In addition to its low added value, basic petrochemical prices are extremely volatile 
following the crude oil price. On the other hand, manufacturing and speciality chemicals, 
which are produced with a limited capacity in Saudi Arabia, are superior to the other types 
of petrochemicals because of their low price elasticity of demand and high added value. 
Figure 4.11 shows the correlation between crude oil prices, basic chemicals and 
manufacturing chemicals77. The figure demonstrates the high correlation between oil and 
basic organic chemicals. In the meantime, manufacturing chemicals have been increasing 
steadily since 2007 with a low correlation with oil price volatility. This trend emphasizes the 
                                                          
77 According to the North American Industry Classification System, the chemicals manufacturing group refers to 
organic and non-organic raw materials that have been transformed through a chemical process. This sub-sector is 
distinguished from basic and intermediate chemical products because of its further processing of basic chemicals 
(CENSUS, 2018). 
Basic chemicals
6%
Fine chemicals
54%
Fertilizers
4%
Intermediates
1%
Others
3%
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32%
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need to diversify away from basic chemicals towards speciality and final consumption 
products, which can lower the Saudi exports volatility following oil price fluctuation. 
A final feature of the Saudi oil cluster (both downstream and upstream) that should be 
highlighted here is the lack of development in major components of the oil innovation 
system. One example is the limited development of human resources (mainly technicians) 
who are capable of operating in more advanced upstream and downstream industries78. This 
is despite the long-lasting high demand for skilled workers by firms working in the oil sector 
(the limited supply of technicians in the oil sector is discussed in the Saudi Vision section). 
 Another example is the limited R&D in oil activities by universities and public research 
institutions. Nonetheless, a significant amount of R&D resources is being devoted to 
research on activities and industries in which Saudi Arabia has no competitive advantage 
(such as nuclear power, semiconductors, computer networks and artificial intelligence). Lall 
(1992) shows that technology transfer in under-developed sectors (such as semiconductors 
in Saudi Arabia) does not take place through R&D; rather it can be acquired through the 
process of reverse engineering and assimilation. In more advanced Saudi industries (such as 
oil, gas and petrochemicals in which Saudi Arabia has a revealed comparative advantage), 
R&D can be a crucial tool in competing with countries in the upper frontier in these 
industries. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
78 In an interview with Ex-Aramco and investor in the upstream sector in March 2018. 
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Figure 4.11: Basic and specialty chemicals compared to oil prices  
 
 
 
Source: FRED database. 
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 The Saudi Product Space  
In their product space theory, Hidalgo et al. (2007) use product level data, and measure 
countries’ diversification using Balassa (1965) concept of revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA). The RCA is the ratio of a country’s exports of a certain product in its total exports 
relative to the same share for the entire world. This study uses COMTRADE database data 
at the HS4 product level that allows the researcher to observe 1,024 products. Then, it is 
possible to construct the RCA indicator using the following equation: 
𝑅𝐶𝐴 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐 𝑝  / ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐 
 
𝑝
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑝 
 
𝑐
/ ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑐 𝑝
 
The indicator compares the share of a country (c) exporting a product (p) to the share of the 
world exports of that product. If a country has a value of 3 in exporting a certain product, 
this indicates that this country exports three times the world average, i.e. three times the fair 
share as Balassa defines it. Following Hidalgo et al. (2007), it is possible to identify the 
threshold of RCA to be equal to 1.00 to determine whether a country has a comparative 
advantage in a certain product. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia in 2015 has eighty products with 
RCA.  
 Table 4.8 represents these eighty products according to their product groups. The 
table clearly shows the concentration on exporting minerals, with eight mineral products 
making more than sixty-nine percent of the total exports basket. The chemical and plastic 
products are the second and third largest groups with 9.6 and nine percent respectively. Table 
4.9 represents the eighty products exported with RCA. The table reveals that crude petroleum 
oil is the largest exported product with RCA of 11.9, generating export value of 105.4 billion 
US dollars, and making approximately fifty-six percent of the total export basket. Crude 
petroleum is followed by refined petroleum oil with an export value of 18.4 billion USD. 
The two petroleum products are followed by three petrochemical products, polymers and 
ether, with a total value of around 20.2 billion USD. The table also shows that ethers has the 
highest RCA value among the all the exported products with 24.9. This means that Saudi 
Arabia exports more than twenty-four times the average global export of ethers. 
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Table 4.8: RCA products according to product groups 
HS2 Number of products with 
RCA>1 
Their percentage of total 
exports 
Animal and animal products 5 products 0.48 percent 
Vegetable products 1 product 0.07 percent 
Foodstuffs 5 products 0.44 percent 
Mineral products 8 products 69.50 percent 
Chemical and allied industries 27 products 9.61 percent 
Plastics and rubbers 4 products 9.00 percent 
Raw hides, skins, leather and furs 2 products 0.03 percent 
Wood and wood products 3 products 0.41 percent 
Textile and textile articles 6 products 0.16 percent 
Footwear None 0 percent 
Stone and glass 6 products 0.142 percent 
Metals 10 products 1.85 percent 
Machinery and electrical products None 0 percent 
Transportation  3 products 1.05 percent 
Total  80 products 92.36 percent 
Source: own calculations based on COMTRADE database 
Table 4.9: Description and value of products with RCA  
HS4 Description 
Export value (in 
million USD) 
RCA 
2709 Petroleum oils, crude 105,434.0 11.9 
2710 Petroleum oils, refined 18,660.6 2.8 
3901 Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms 10,332.0 11.9 
3902 
Polymers of propylene or of other olefins, in primary 
forms 5,781.0 
12.2 
2909 Ethers 4,929.5 24.9 
2711 Petroleum gases 4,235.1 1.2 
2905 Acyclic alcohols 4,137.5 12.0 
2902 Cyclic hydrocarbons 2,489.4 5.0 
8904 Tugs and pusher craft 1,624.3 24.8 
7601 Unwrought aluminium 1,271.8 2.1 
3105 Mineral or chemical fertilizers, mixed 1,124.2 4.0 
3102 Mineral or chemical fertilizers, nitrogenous 1,070.5 3.6 
2707 
Oils and other products of the distillation of high 
temperature coal tar 1,040.4 
4.5 
2814 Ammonia 797.6 7.8 
3907 Polyacetals 739.7 1.2 
7404 Copper waste and scrap 583.3 2.4 
2901 Acyclic hydrocarbons 512.5 2.1 
3402 Cleaning products 478.1 1.3 
2915 Saturated acyclic monocarboxylic acids 469.7 3.1 
4819 
Cartons, boxes, cases, bags and other packing 
containers of paper 410.2 
1.7 
2712 Petroleum jelly 396.8 8.4 
2503 Sulphur 394.4 7.8 
2009 Fruit juices 374.3 2.2 
4818 
Toilet paper of a kind used for household or sanitary 
purposes 357.9 
1.2 
8805 Aircraft launching gear 303.0 11.8 
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403 Fermented milk and cream products 273.4 5.5 
7602 Waste or scrap, aluminium 265.2 1.8 
401 Milk and cream 262.8 3.0 
2202 Waters flavoured or sweetened 260.9 1.3 
3305 Hair products 248.5 1.7 
3817 Mixed alkyl benzenes and mixed alkyl naphthalene 241.0 9.0 
402 Milk and cream, concentrated 239.9 1.1 
7305 
Other tubes and pipes of iron or steel having circular 
cross section 214.6 
1.7 
2910 Epoxides 201.9 4.5 
5603 Non-woven textiles 199.1 1.2 
2916 Unsaturated acyclic monocarboxylic acids 187.7 1.7 
7612 Aluminium cans and similar containers 181.9 3.2 
8309 Stoppers, caps and lids 177.5 2.4 
3206 Other colouring matter 172.7 1.3 
2906 
Cyclic alcohols and their halogenated, sulfonated, 
nitrated or nitro-sated derivatives 163.8 
7.5 
2815 
Sodium hydroxide; potassium hydroxide; peroxides of 
sodium or potassium 158.2 
2.9 
3003 Medicaments, not packaged 144.2 1.3 
804 
Dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, guavas and 
mangoes 132.5 
1.2 
3401 Soap 125.5 1.7 
1902 Pasta 124.3 1.2 
2903 Halogenated derivatives of hydro-carbons 111.9 1.1 
6807 Asphalt 100.5 4.3 
2931 Other organic and inorganic compounds 83.6 1.2 
5702 
Carpets, woven, not tufted or flocked, hand-woven 
rugs 76.9 
1.5 
7005 Float glass 76.5 1.3 
1515 Linseed oil, crude 71.1 1.5 
106 Live animals, except farm animals 69.3 4.4 
7303 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, of cast iron 66.7 2.7 
8709 Works trucks, self-propelled 55.4 3.7 
407 Birds eggs, in shell 54.9 1.1 
4105 Tanned skins of sheep or lambs 45.5 3.0 
2912 Aldehydes 42.7 1.7 
6809 Plaster articles 40.4 1.8 
2942 Other organic compounds 38.3 2.5 
2823 Titanium oxides 33.0 3.3 
2505 Natural sands 32.7 1.6 
2621 Other slag and ash, including seaweed ash (kelp) 28.6 6.1 
7223 Wire or stainless steel 28.2 1.2 
7004 Glass, drawn or blown 25.3 1.1 
2919 Phosphoric esters and their salts 20.4 2.1 
6906 Ceramic pipes, conduits, guttering and pipe fittings 20.1 9.8 
5404 Synthetic mono-filament 18.9 1.1 
4106 Tanned skins of other animals 17.7 1.5 
2802 Sulfur, sublimed or precipitated 12.3 3.7 
5704 Carpets of felt 12.3 1.6 
2839 Silicates; commercial alkali metal silicates 11.8 1.5 
7902 Zinc waste and scrap 11.2 1.7 
7903 Zinc dust, powders and flakes 7.4 1.5 
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4006 Other forms of vulcanized rubber 6.6 1.2 
3813 Preparations and charges for fire extinguishers 5.3 1.8 
6814 Mica articles 4.6 1.4 
5905 Textile wall coverings 2.9 2.3 
1522 Residues from treatment animal and veg waxes 1.5 1.4 
4502 Natural cork, debarked 0.5 1.3 
5405 Artificial mono filament  0.4 1.1 
Source: own calculations based on COMTRADE database 
 After constructing the RCA indicator for Saudi Arabia, the products are then 
visualized into the product space with colours reflecting their product groups. Figure 4.12 
represents the Saudi product space, which is dominated by minerals and metals, chemicals 
and plastic products. These products account for 61.2 percent of the number of products with 
RCA (90.0 percent of total export value). The figure also shows that the Saudi product space 
has no machinery and electronics products (in blue colour), which tend to be more central in 
the network (and more sophisticated) and thus are connected to a higher number of other 
products. Indeed, Hausmann et al. (2014) explain that the two highest communities in their 
product complexity index (PCI) are machinery and electronics, indicating that they require 
advanced industrial capabilities that are difficult to acquire. The lack of these central 
products in the Saudi industry makes it harder to move towards new sophisticated export 
groups, and thus might slow its industrial upgrading progress.   
 For comparison purposes, this section compares the Saudi product space with other 
resource-dependent developing countries: Venezuela, Chile and Malaysia. Figure 4.13 
shows that Saudi Arabia has a significantly more diversified and more sophisticated export 
basket than Venezuela. There are eighty products with RCA in Saudi Arabia, whereas 
Venezuela has only twenty-five. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has more core products that are 
more complex and sophisticated. On the other hand, Chile and Malaysia are substantially 
more diversified than the other two countries with 134 and 222 products with RCA 
(respectively). The figure also shows that Malaysia has more connected products in the core, 
which makes it easier for its industry to diversify (jump) into more sophisticated products. 
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Figure 4.12 The Saudi product space 
 
Source: based on Hausmann et al. (2014) 
 The product space demonstration of Saudi Arabia reveals the lack of diversification in 
addition to the concentration on peripheral products with low populated core. This 
production structure has a crucial implication for structural transformation. The revealed 
capabilities, by the current product space, show that it is difficult for Saudi Arabia to jump 
into a large number of sophisticated products. On the other hand, it is easier for Saudi Arabia 
to shift towards peripheral products, which will contribute relatively little to the industrial 
and overall economic development. 
 Jumping towards more sophisticated products requires the government to promote 
policies, offer financing and provide an infrastructure that allows the private sector to invest 
in new, sophisticated products (Hausmann et al. 2014). The priority in choosing more 
sophisticated products (i.e. to be targeted in the industrial policy) should be given to “close 
by” products to the existing products with RCA. These products are likely to be developed 
more quickly with a smaller amount of resources, because they require a similar set of 
capabilities to those eighty products with existing RCA. 
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Figure 4.13: The product space for selected countries in 2016 
  
  
Source: based on Hausmann et al. (2014) 
 Saudi Arabia, according to this theory, should target “close-by” products with a 
greater complexity such as more sophisticated chemical products (e.g. paints, chemical acids, 
artificial colours and artificial waxes), food stuff and wood products (e.g. frozen vegetables, 
mustard oil and packing boxes), transportation (e.g. space craft launch vehicles), machinery 
(e.g. surveying instrument) in addition to processed stone, glass and mineral products.   
To demonstrate the move towards closer products, Figure 4.14 shows two core 
sophisticated products in which Saudi Arabia has no RCA: Electronic integrated circuits and 
Cars79. In the Saudi product space, the former is considered far because it is isolated by 
products where Saudi Arabia has no RCA, i.e. Electronic integrated circuits require a set of 
capabilities that are significantly different from the existing Saudi capabilities. On the other 
hand, Cars is not far because it is located near to a product with a RCA, i.e. Cars is close to 
                                                          
79 This Figure uses two dimensions that serve this comparison: distance and complexity. The former refers to the 
distance between the existing Saudi products with RCA and the potentially targeted products. The smaller distance 
indicates relatively similar capabilities to the existing product structure. While the complexity dimension ranks 
products according to the Products’ Complexity Index (PCI). 
Malaysia Chile 
Venezuela Saudi Arabia 
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“Self-propelled work trucks”, in which Saudi Arabia currently has a RCA. This implies that 
it is less difficult for Saudi Arabia to start producing cars than producing Electrical integrated 
circuits, because the capabilities needed to produce cars are assumed to be relatively similar 
to what Saudi Arabia already has. Hidalgo et al. (2007) do not claim that  products ‘further’ 
from the existing RCA should not be targeted, but rather suggests that there is a trade-off 
between risk and return80.  
Figure 4.14: A comparison between targeting “close by” and “farther” product for Saudi 
Arabia  
 
Source: based on Hausmann et al. (2014). 
 
 
  
                                                          
80 In this regard, Hidalgo et al. (2007) argue that the industrial policy objective is also an important factor in 
choosing targeted products. 
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 The Growth Identification and facilitation theory 
4.3.3.1 Factor Endowment Analysis: What does Saudi Arabia have? 
Saudi Arabia is a capital-abundant and resource rich country.  It is not only rich in oil and 
gas, but also minerals. These minerals include aluminium, gold, phosphate and nitrogen. On 
the other hand, the country is known for its high temperatures and water-scarcity. There are 
neither natural lakes nor rivers and the average rainfall is significantly low. For instance, in 
the capital city, Riyadh, the average rainfall is four inches per year. The decreasing fresh 
water resource has forced the government, recently, to play an important role in rationalizing 
water consumption. 
The country’s long East and West coasts have given three important benefits to the 
Saudi economy that should be highlighted in this context. First, the water scarcity problem 
has been partly solved using sea-water desalination techniques. Through its twenty-one 
plants, Saudi Arabia is currently the largest producer of desalinated water in the world with 
4.2 million m3 per day (Saline Water Conversion Corporation, 2017). Nevertheless, it is only 
permitted for households but not for the agricultural sector, because of its enormous 
production costs. Secondly, it provides the country with the opportunity to invest in aqua-
culture industries (i.e. fishing related activities). Thirdly, the Arabian Gulf in the East and the 
Red Sea in the West have been important channels in facilitating international trade.  
From a comparative perspective, Saudi Arabia is not considered a labour-abundant 
country. It has low population density and is ranked 212th globally with a ratio of 12.7 
persons per km2 (World Bank, 2017). Immigrant workers account for 37.4 percent of the 
total population81 (see Table 4.10). Despite high unemployment among Saudi youth, which 
reached 12.7 percent in 2017, immigrant workers account for 81.7 percent of private sector 
employment (see Table 4.11).  
 Looking at the number of private sector workers by economic activity, there is a 
salient feature. The mining and quarrying sector, which is the main driver of the economy, 
accounts for only 1.8 percent of private sector employment. In contrast, the construction 
sector is the largest employer followed by trade, while the manufacturing sector employs 
                                                          
81 The percentage shows non-Saudis with working visa, which includes their families and dependents. 
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less than ten percent (see Table 4.11). By looking at the cost of labour, the average monthly 
salary for the private sector worker is 6,190 SR (see Table 4.12). 
Table 4.10: Distribution of Population by Age Group  
Age Nationals Immigrant workers   Total 
0-4  2,173,984 560,332 2,734,316 
 5-9 2,124,889 710,768 2,835,657 
10-14 1,901,515 582,469 2,483,984 
15-19 1,791,351 474,121 2,265,472 
20-24 2,020,844 505,299 2,526,143 
25-29 1,937,788 1,173,982 3,111,770 
30-34 1,748,949 1,398,881 3,147,830 
35-39 1,528,304 1,974,875 3,503,179 
40-44 1,285,343 1,846,826 3,132,169 
45-49 1,070,936 1,257,060 2,327,996 
50-54 853,736 772,475 1,626,211 
55-59 656,335 468,162 1,124,497 
60 and above 479,774 262,737 742,511 
69 - 65 310,377 104,157 414,534 
74 - 70 222,847 53,256 276,103 
79 - 75 143,601 20,636 164,237 
+ 80 176,784 19,248 196,032 
Total 20,427,357 12,185,284 32,612,641 
Source: Saudi General Authority for Statistics 
Table 4.11: Private sector employment by economic activity 
Economic activities Total 
 
Percentage 
of total 
Saudis Immigrant workers 
Number Percentage 
of sector 
Number Percentage 
of sector 
Post and 
Telecommunications 
370,698 3.60% 84,386 22.80% 286,312 77.20% 
Trade 2,479,032 24.30% 398,038 16.10% 2,080,994 83.90% 
Construction 4,158,907 40.70% 441,827 10.60% 3,717,080 89.40% 
Mining and quarrying 179,649 1.80% 99,130 55.20% 80,519 44.80% 
Other collective and 
social services 
877,095 8.60% 372,242 42.40% 504,853 57.60% 
Agriculture and fishing 102,817 1.00% 17,083 16.60% 85,734 83.40% 
Manufacturing 998,880 9.80% 200,268 20.00% 798,612 80.00% 
Electricity, gas and  
Water 
112,618 1.10% 52,642 46.70% 59,976 53.30% 
Financial, insurance, real 
estate and business 
services 
929,579 9.10% 204,729 22.00% 724,850 78.00% 
Other activities 1,520 0.00% 1,520 100.00% 0 0.00% 
Total 10,210,795 100.00% 1,871,865 18.30% 8,338,930 81.70% 
Source: Saudi General Authority for Statistics 
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Table 4.12: Average monthly wages per worker by educational level (wages in SR) 
Education level  Saudi Non-Saudi Average  
Illiterate 4,753 1,774 2,003 
Read and Write 4,915 2,020 2,137 
Primary 5,816 2,152 2,625 
Intermediate 7,502 2,271 3,140 
Secondary or Equivalent 8,309 2,908 5,930 
Diploma 9,587 4,339 7,319 
Bachelor Degree  12,003 7,771 10,074 
Higher Diploma/Master Degree 16,639 14,587 15,473 
Doctorate 25,622 16,085 18,561 
Total average  9,911 3,876 6,195 
Source: Saudi General Authority for Statistics 
4.3.3.2 Latent Comparative Advantages: What can Saudi Arabia potentially do well? 
The GIFF starts by choosing targeted products; tradable products that have been produced 
for the past two decades in fast growing economies with a similar endowment structure and 
GDP per capita that is not significantly higher than Saudi Arabia. However, there is a 
problem with choosing benchmark countries. Using the GDP per capita as an indicator for 
the industrial development of a resource-dependent country can be misleading (Felipe and 
Rhee 2015). For Saudi Arabia, the GDP per capita is 20.1 thousand USD, which falls just 
behind the average European country s (25.5 thousand USD), while the majority of 
industrially advanced developing countries are far behind (World Bank Database, 2017). In 
other words, the GDP per capita for Saudi Arabia does not reflect development of its 
industrial sector. Thus, using European developed countries as benchmarks is not suitable 
for Saudi Arabia according to the GIFF. 
 Alternatively, this study uses two indicators that reflect the industrial development 
of Saudi Arabia and serve the GIFF comparative purpose, namely the industrial GDP 
(manufacturing added value to GDP) and the Economic Complexity Index (Hausmann et al. 
2014). The first indicator has been used as an additional criterion in Lin and Xu (2016) in 
choosing benchmark countries in their GIFF case study on Uganda, while the latter indicator 
is widely utilized to evaluate and compare countries’ industrial sectors. 
 In order to choose appropriate benchmark countries, three lists of countries are used: 
the first is for developing countries with higher industrial GDP and ECI; the second is for 
countries with a similar endowment structure to Saudi Arabia; and the third group is for 
developing countries that have been growing in the last two decades. From the three groups, 
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five benchmark countries have been chosen that are included in all of them. The countries 
are Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Brazil82.  
 In terms of its endowment structure, Russia appears to be the country with the 
greatest similarity to Saudi Arabia. Russia is rich in oil. In 2016, it was the third largest oil 
exporter after the United States and Saudi Arabia. It accounts for twelve percent of global 
crude oil output with 11.2 million barrels per day (EIA, 2017). Moreover, Russia cannot be 
considered a labour-abundant country. Russia’s population intensity is 8.8 people per square 
kilometer (compared to 12.7 for Saudi Arabia). As for industrial performance, the industrial 
GDP of Russia is 14.5 percent (compared to 10.6 for Saudi Arabia). Finally, Russia’s ECI is 
0.14 relative to minus 0.35 for Saudi Arabia. Table 4.13 shows all five benchmark countries 
and compares them to Saudi Arabia.  
Table 4.13 Selected indicators for the benchmark countries  
Country 
World 
ranking 
ECI 
MVA to GDP 
2007-2016 
Growth rate 
1997-2006 
Growth 
rate 
2007-2016 
Natural 
resource 
Populatio
n density 
Russia 34 0.14 14.5 5.13 1.72 Oil 8.8 
Brazil 44 -0.10 13.7 2.68 2.06 Oil 23.8 
South Africa 42 -0.03 16.8 3.44 2.13 Minerals 39.6 
Mexico 25 0.57 17.6 3.28 2.16 Oil 65.6 
Malaysia 14 1.03 23.3 4.43 4.78 Oil 94.9 
Saudi Arabia 92 -0.35 10.6 2.93 3.86 Oil 12.7 
Source: Hidalgo et al. (2007); World Bank database (2017) 
 After choosing the five countries, the next step is to identify products that have been 
produced by these countries in the last two decades, which are potential comparative 
advantage for Saudi Arabia. Following previous studies, key exported products are 
considered through calculating the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and the export 
shares for each country (Lin and Treichel 2011; Lin and Xu 2015). Using these criteria, the 
key exports for Russia, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Mexico and Malaysia have been 
evaluated and are shown in Table 4.14. 
 
                                                          
82 Following Lin Xu (2015) and Lin and Treichel (2011), this analysis allows for some heterogeneity in the selected 
countries. 
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 The resulting list of products could be shortlisted through analysing their potential 
feasibility, given the Saudi endowment structure. First, extremely labour intensive should be 
eliminated from the list, given that Saudi Arabia is not a labour intensive country. As a result, 
products that fall within the textile and garments sectors should be eliminated from the list. 
Secondly, agricultural and food products that need large amounts of water in the production 
process should not be shortlisted given the scarcity of underground water and the non-
existence of rivers and lakes in the country. Thus, agricultural, dairy and meat products 
should not be targeted in this strategy, with the exception of aqua-culture and poultry sub-
sectors. 
 Apart from products exported by the benchmark countries, the GIFF uses two 
additional criteria. One criterion targets sub-sectors based on the domestic market demand. 
In addition to the international markets’ demand, the domestic market demand is vital in 
targeting a sub-sector. Following Lin and Xu (2015),  the shares of top imported products 
are used as an indicator of the Saudi market demand for products. Among the largely 
imported manufacturing products, the country should consider those with limited economies 
of scale and, hence, might be produced domestically. Table 4.15 shows the top fifteen 
imported products to Saudi Arabia.  
 The other criterion is to scale up domestic self-discoveries. To identify domestic 
manufacturing discoveries, Lin and Xu (2015) suggest using the gain of products with 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) over time. The RCAs are calculated for 1995 and 
2015 for Saudi Arabia, and the gained (explored) products are shown in Table 4.16. Saudi 
Arabia did not have the comparative advantage in producing these forty-two products in 
1995, but was able to produce them in 2015 with a comparative advantage. The GIFF states 
that these products should be supported in the Saudi industrial policy. It worth mentioning 
that the first two products in the table (with the highest RCA) are among very few 
transportation products in the Saudi exports basket.   
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Table 4.14: Key exports in Mexico, Malaysia, Brazil, Russia, South Africa  
 Mexico Malaysia Brazil Russia South Africa Saudi Arabia potential 
Animal products Bovine meat, 
crustaceans and honey 
Concentrated milk, 
poultry and eggs. 
Poultry, bovine and 
pig meat, edible offal, 
crustaceans, 
concentrated milk, 
eggs and honey 
 
Frozen fish and 
crustaceans 
Fish fillet, bovine 
meat and crustaceans 
Animal products are mainly produced for 
the domestic market, with the exception of 
dairy products that are being exported to 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Fruit, vegetables 
and food 
products 
Tropical fruits, 
vegetables, nuts, beer, 
sugar, chocolate, fruit 
juice, cereals and 
canned food 
Palm oil, rice, flowers, 
pepper and cocoa 
butter, coffee and tea 
extracts 
Soybeans, coffee, 
corn, rice, fruits, sugar, 
soybean meals, fruit 
juice and waxes 
Wheat, barley, 
linseed, and cereals  
Fruits, nuts, wine, 
fruit juice and 
soybean oil   
Fruit, vegetables and food products are 
mainly produced for the domestic market. 
The major exception is date products 
which are exported to global markets. 
Textile, garment, 
footwear and 
leather 
Hats Textured yarn, shorts, 
trousers, water proof 
footwear, and gloves 
Twine and rope, 
coconut fibers, rubber 
footwear, footwear 
parts, and bovine 
leather 
- Tent and sails fiber, 
prepared wool, and 
shirts 
There is no significant manufacturing in 
the textile, garments and footwear 
products.  
Processed metals, 
stones, and glass 
Padlocks, iron springs, 
copper pipes, razor 
blades, metal stoppers, 
iron radiators 
Copper wires, copper 
bars, copper foil, iron 
structure, articles of  
cement and concreate, 
glass materials 
Steel ingots, copper 
wires, building stones, 
glazed ceramic and 
refractory bricks 
Copper wires, 
ferrous products, 
rolled iron, asphalt 
and cement articles 
Rolled stainless-steel 
and iron, aluminium 
plating, , and float 
glass 
Metal stoppers, iron pipes, aluminium bars 
and cans, asphalt, float glass, plaster 
materials and ceramic materials are 
produced with a RCA.   
Wooden and 
paper products 
Wood charcoal, facial 
tissue, paper notebooks 
and labels  
Plywood, sawn wood, 
rough wood, shaped 
wood, wood fiberwood, 
particle boards, veneer 
sheets paper notebook, 
postage stamps and 
sulfate chemical wood 
pulp 
Shaped wood, 
plywood, swan wood, 
wood carpentry, wood 
fireboard, sulfate 
chemical wood pulp, 
coated and uncoated 
pulp, and dissolving 
pulp 
Swan wood, rough 
wood, plywood, 
fuel wood, veneer 
wood, sulfate 
chemical wood 
pulp, uncoated 
paper, newsprint 
and chemical wood 
pulp.  
Fuel wood, rough 
wood, wood 
charcoal, wood 
stakes, chemical 
wood pulp and 
uncoated paper  
Paper containers are the only product 
produced with RCA. The lack of wooden 
products is mainly a result of the absence 
of trees and forestry in commercial 
quantities.    
Manufactured 
fertilizers 
Phosphate fertilizers Nitrogenous fertilizers Mixed mineral 
fertilizers 
Mixed mineral 
fertilizers, potassic 
fertilizers and 
nitrogenous 
fertilizers 
Mixed mineral 
fertilizers 
Already has a revealed comparative 
advantage in mixed mineral fertilizers and 
nitrogenous fertilizers.  
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Plastic and 
rubber 
Rubber tyres, plastic 
lids, rubber pipes and 
rubber belting 
Rubber apparel, plastic 
lids, rubber pipes, 
rubber thread, 
pharmaceutical rubber 
products and rubber 
sheets 
Rubber tyres and 
plastic pipes 
Rubber tyres Rubber tyres and 
rubber belting 
While intermediary plastic and rubber 
products exist, there is no final product 
with revealed comparative advantage.  
Medical and 
pharmaceutical 
products 
Medical and 
pharmaceutical 
products 
- Medical and 
pharmaceutical 
products 
- - Limited medical products targeting the 
domestic market with small export value. 
 
Specialty or 
consumer  
chemicals 
Hair products, dental 
products, essential oils 
Soap, chemical material 
for electronics, and 
photographic films 
Dental products, 
gelatin, hair products 
and vegetable tanning 
extracts 
Radioactive 
chemicals and 
precious metal 
components 
Soap, radioactive 
chemicals, pesticides 
and dentifrices 
Products such as soap, cleaning products 
and hair products have RCA. However, 
their share is relatively small compared to 
the intermediary (basic) chemical 
products. 
Transportation Cars, trucks, tractors, 
vehicle parts and 
trailers 
Bi-wheel vehicle parts 
and tug-boats 
Planes, ships, buses 
and tractors  
Planes, ships, boats 
and tractors 
Cars, trucks, boats 
and trailers 
Cars, ships and planes production does not 
exist. However, there is a RCA in work 
trucks and air-craft launching gears. 
 
Machinery Engine parts and 
electric motors 
- Engine parts, 
construction vehicles , 
electrical motors, 
electrical motor parts, 
stone processing 
machines, harvesting 
machinery and gas 
turbines 
Nuclear reactor 
parts and power 
engines 
Centrifuges, stone 
processing machines, 
and construction 
vehicles 
There are no products exported with RCA. 
Even in the domestic market, the size of 
Saudi machinery products is trivial. 
However, there is a potential growth of 
machinery related to the upstream oil 
sector. 
Electrical and 
electronics  
Computers, telephones, 
video displays, 
insulated wires, air 
conditioners, 
refrigerators, lighting, 
electrical control 
boards, microphones 
and headphones  
Semiconductor devices, 
printed circuit boards, 
computers, telephones, 
office machine parts, 
broadcasting equipment 
and air conditioners 
- Navigation 
equipment 
Broadcasting 
equipment and 
telephones 
There are no products with RCA. 
However, some electrical products such as 
fridges and air conditioners assembly have 
been growing in recent years.  
Source: Own calculations using the revealed comparative advantage analysis and export shares in the last 20 years, based on COMTRADE database.
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Table 4.15: Top fifteen imported products 
 HS4 Product description  Import value share 
1 8703 Motor vehicles for transport of people (except buses) 12875937695 9.9% 
2 8525 Radio and TV transmitters, television cameras 4069602154 3.1% 
3 3004 Medicaments, therapeutic, prophylactic use, in dosage 3544087363 2.7% 
4 8803 Parts of aircraft and spacecraft 2704286581 2.1% 
5 8704 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods 2190769672 1.7% 
6 7108 Gold, unwrought, semi-manufactured, powder form 2162853637 1.7% 
7 8471 Automatic data processing machines (computers) 1661070076 1.3% 
8 8481 Taps, cocks, valves for pipes, tanks, and boilers 1625588965 1.3% 
9 8708 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 1440211667 1.1% 
10 4011 New pneumatic tyres of rubber 1327815260 1.0% 
11 8415 Air conditioning equipment, machinery 1251979432 1.0% 
12 2402 Cigars, cigarettes, tobacco or tobacco substitute 1181299610 0.9% 
13 8517 Electric apparatus for line telephony, telegraphy 1173430267 0.9% 
14 8431 Parts for use with lifting or moving machinery 1095527236 0.8% 
15 8504 Electric transformers, static converters and rectifier 1010654597 0.8% 
Source: own calculation based on COMTRADE database. 
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Table 4.16: Products that have gained RCA (1995-2015) 
 HS4 RCA Product description 
1 8904 24.76 Tugs and pusher craft 
2 8805 11.82 Aircraft launching gear 
3 2712 8.36 Petroleum jelly 
4 2906 7.46 Cyclic alcohols and their halogenated, sulfonated, nitrated or nitro sated derivatives 
5 2621 6.06 Other slag and ash, including seaweed ash (kelp) 
6 2707 4.50 Oils and other products of the distillation of high temperature coal tar 
7 2910 4.50 Epoxides 
8 3105 4.00 Mineral or chemical fertilizers, mixed 
9 8709 3.65 Works trucks, self-propelled 
10 2915 3.09 Saturated acyclic monocarboxylic acids 
11 2942 2.54 Other organic compounds 
12 5905 2.29 Textile wall coverings 
13 2009 2.15 Fruit juices 
14 7601 2.13 Unwrought aluminium 
15 2919 2.08 Phosphoric esters and their salts 
16 6809 1.77 Plaster articles 
17 3813 1.75 Preparations and charges for fire extinguishers 
18 2916 1.74 Unsaturated acyclic mono-carboxylic acids 
19 7305 1.72 Other tubes and pipes of iron or steel having circular cross-section 
20 7902 1.69 Zinc waste and scrap 
21 4819 1.68 Cartons, boxes, cases, bags and other packing containers of paper 
22 2912 1.66 Aldehydes 
23 5704 1.63 Carpets (felt) 
24 2505 1.59 Natural sands 
25 7903 1.49 Zinc dust, powders and flakes 
26 2839 1.47 Silicates; commercial alkali metal silicates 
27 1522 1.38 Residues from treatment animal and vegetable waxes 
28 4502 1.32 Natural cork, debacked 
29 3003 1.29 Medicaments, not packaged 
30 2202 1.28 Waters flavoured or sweetened 
31 3206 1.27 Other colouring matter 
32 7005 1.26 Float glass 
33 1902 1.24 Pasta 
34 5603 1.23 Non-woven textiles 
35 3907 1.22 Polyacetals 
36 4006 1.19 Other forms of unvulcanized rubber 
37 7223 1.18 Wire or stainless steel 
38 2931 1.16 Other organic and inorganic chemical compounds 
39 7004 1.13 Glass, drawn or blown 
40 5404 1.12 Synthetic monofilament 
41 5405 1.07 Artificial monofilament  
42 402 1.06 Milk and cream, concentrated 
Source: Own calculation based on COMTRADE data 
4.3.3.3 What sub-sectors can be targeted based on this analysis? 
Combining the three criteria used in this section - products produced by benchmark countries, 
products with high domestic demand and self-discovered products – results in wide range of 
sub-sectors that can be targeted by the Saudi government.  
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From the first criterion, six sectors (or sub-sectors) emerge very noticeably: aqua-
culture, consumer plastics and rubber (i.e. final products), medicines, speciality chemicals, 
small trucks and boats (i.e. assembly manufacturing) and fridges and air conditioners. From 
the second criterion, there are also six sub-sectors: motor vehicles, telecommunication and 
television cameras, computers, parts for vehicles, parts for aircrafts and parts for lifting 
machinery. Finally, from the self-discovery criterion, there are five major products: tugs and 
pusher craft, aircraft-launching gear, processed glass, processed metals, milk and cheese.  
What, therefore, are the specific sectors that should be targeted from the above list? 
Lin and Monga (2011) argue that the criterion for choosing from the list of sub-sectors 
should focus on three main elements: the sector’s upside potential in terms of employment 
and growth, the growth feasibility given the private sector’s industrial capabilities and the 
public sector regulatory structure. A detailed firm level value chain analysis, they argue, can 
be a useful way to address this question. This value chain analysis should also compare the 
domestic production costs relative to other competing countries.  
Nonetheless, previous studies show that the list could be narrowed using a simpler 
screening criterion (Lin and Treichel 2011; Lin and Xu 2015). This screening relies on the 
previously discussed endowment structure of Saudi Arabia in addition to the existence of a 
supply chain. Export or domestic production values are used as indicators of the supply 
chain’s existence in the country. To assess the existence of the supply chain in some Saudi 
sub-sectors, this analysis uses export data at the product level from COMTRADE, published 
and unpublished reports of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, and the Saudi Industrial 
Clusters Programme (SICP) reports. Table 4.17 shows whether the pre-identified sub-sectors 
satisfy the screening criterion.   
The majority of the sub-sectors satisfy the screening criteria. Exceptions are milk and 
cheese, electronics and car industries. Milk and cheese do not meet the criteria because of 
their reliance on large amounts of water in the production process. This is unlike the 
aquaculture and poultry industries, which can be great opportunities to meet the Saudi 
government goal of achieving high food security levels without exploiting the scarce water 
reserves. Electronics and cars do not satisfy the screening method because of the non-
existence of the domestic supply chain. Nevertheless, the GIFF argues that the government 
can still promote industries that are totally new to the domestic manufacturing sector, such 
as the car industry. This can take place by attracting foreign investors through setting up 
joint ventures or promoting export processing zones (Lin 2010). However, for electronics 
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manufacturing, Saudi Arabia has a significantly larger labour cost than those developing 
countries that have a RCA in the electronics sector (such as China, Malaysia, and 
Philippines), which makes it difficult to enter this industry through export processing zones 
as suggested by Lin83.  
Table 4.17: Potential subsectors screening 
Subsector Product is 
not labour 
intensive 
Low water 
consumption 
in production 
Supply chain exists in Saudi Arabia and raw 
material exists 
Aquaculture  Relatively 
yes. 
Yes, for 
seawater 
farming.  
In addition to the domestic production, Saudi Arabia 
exports small quantities of fisheries, which indicates the 
existence of the supply chain. 
Poultry Relatively 
yes. 
Yes The domestic production is significant. In addition, 
Saudi Arabia exports small quantities of poultry to 
neighboring countries, which indicates the existence of 
the supply chain. 
Milk and cheese Relatively 
yes. 
No.  Yes. There is a large domestic production. The 
government has supported the sector in the past for food 
security reasons. 
Speciality 
plastics and 
rubber and 
rubber tires 
Yes Yes The supply chain for speciality plastics and rubber exists 
because of the production and export of a number of 
these products. In addition, there is an abundance of raw 
material coming from the petrochemicals industry. For 
rubber tyres, there is a significant demand, and the input 
materials are available; however, domestic production 
does not exist.  
Medicines and 
speciality 
chemicals 
Yes Yes Yes. There is an abundance of raw material coming from 
the oil and petrochemical industries.  
Cars Yes Yes For cars, the supply chain does not exist, because there 
is neither car vehicles nor car-parts production 
domestically. However, key input materials such as 
aluminium, rubber, and plastic are available abundantly 
in Saudi Arabia.   
Small trucks, 
boats and lifting 
machinery 
Yes Yes Yes, supply chain exists for small trucks, boats, and 
lifting machinery, because of the existing domestic 
production and exports.  
Fridges and air 
conditioners  
Yes Yes There is a significant production for domestic use, which 
indicates the existence of the value chain. 
Electronics Relatively 
no.  
Yes The supply chain does not exist at all, because of the 
non-existence of domestic production.  
Tugs and pusher 
craft, aircraft 
launching gear 
and aircraft 
parts 
 Yes  Yes The first two items are produced with RCA, which 
indicates the existence of a supply chain. However, 
aircraft parts exist for very limited applications; mainly 
for military aircraft. 
Processed glass 
and metals and 
construction 
materials 
Yes Yes Yes. The supply chain does exist. Raw materials are 
available; they come from the mining and petrochemical 
industries. The construction materials industry, 
particularly, has grown in terms of capacity and 
diversity significantly in the last two decades. 
Source: own analysis based on COMTRADE data, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund’s reports 
and the Saudi Industrial Clusters Programme reports. 
                                                          
83 The East Asian tigers entered the electronics industry through labour-intensive industries. However, over time 
countries were able to move up the value chain towards high value added activities (Wade, 1990). 
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 Saudi Vision 2030 
Saudi Vision 2030 was promoted in 2016 to reduce the economy’s reliance on oil revenues 
and to promote its diversification84. Unlike the previous five-year national development 
plans that had started in the 1970s, this vision is considered to be the roadmap for  economic 
and social developmental actions85. The Vision’s promotion was coupled with a governance 
model that supported the realization of the development goals (see Figure 4.15). A major 
strategic objective of the vison is to develop and diversify the Saudi manufacturing sector. 
Figure 4.15: Vision 2030 Governance 
 
Source: Vision 2030 
 Under the National Transformation Program (NTP), which was a first phase of 
Vision 2030, the government targets the development of the following major manufacturing 
sectors: oil and gas, minerals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals and renewable energy. 
Targeting these sectors was coupled with specific milestones. For instance, the NTP expects 
to increase dry gas production capacity from 12 to 17.8 billion standard cubic feet (SCF) per 
day, the oil refining capacity to increase from 2.9 to 3.3 million barrels a day, the mining 
sector contribution to GDP to increase from 64 to 97 billion SR, and the pharmaceutical 
industry’s share of GDP to increase from 0.98 to 1.97. Within the agriculture and food 
industries, the NTP have mainly targeted the aqua-culture and poultry industries, because of 
                                                          
84 In addition, Vision 2030 targets increasing the efficiency of government and the development of the education, 
health, infrastructure, tourism and entertainment sectors.   
85 The former Minister of Industry, Abdulaziz Alzamil, has argued that the previous five-year plans were not actual 
plans that were based on clear targets and strategies. Instead, they were like a “wish list” for the Saudi ministries 
(Alzamil et al., 2017). To large extent, this can explain the failure of the government to achieve economic and 
industrial diversification despite the written plans to promote new industries and activities since the early 1970s. 
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their suitability for the Saudi natural resources and water scarcity condition. Finally, the 
government targets the increase of local content in public procurement. This also includes 
the localization of state and SOEs’ expenditure, which can promote the growth of a number 
of sectors and activities. Table 4.18 shows the manufacturing targets detailed in the NTP.   
 The government has also announced several Vision realization programmes and 
initiatives that foster achieving 2030 goals. One of the programmes targets the promotion of 
one hundred national promising companies. The criteria for promoting these companies are 
based on their potential non-oil exports, manufacturing added value and employment. Indeed, 
supporting leading domestic firms can be a crucial factor in developing the domestic 
manufacturing sector (see Amsden and Hikino 1994). 
Table 4.18: Major manufacturing sector targeted in the NTP 
Strategic objective 2015  2020 Target  Unit  
Increasing annual non-oil commodity 
exports  
185 330 Billion SR 
Increase the number of exporters  1190 1500 Number of exporting firms 
Lower the average time to export  15 7 Days 
Promote high value-added manufacturing  432 516 Number of products with high added 
value  
Increase the dry gas production capacity  12 17.8 Billion standard cubic feet per day 
Increase the capacity introduced from 
renewable energy and localize its 
manufacturing 
 
3,450 7,107 Megawatts 
- Increase the share of renewable 
energy 
0 4% Share of total energy sources 
Develop and expand the mining sector  64 97 
 
Contribution to GDP output in SR 
- Increase the mining sector 
employment 
65 90 Thousand jobs 
Increase local content in capital and 
operational expenses 
30 40 Percentage of total government and 
SOEs’ procurements.  
Increase domestic added value in the 
chemicals related industries 
252 309 The total industrial production in the 
four Saudi petrochemicals industrial 
cities of Yanbu, Jubail, Ras Al-Khair 
and Jazan 
Develop the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing 
0.98 1.97 Share of GDP 
- Promote local producers  20% 40% Share of locally produced to total 
market size 
Promote production in aquaculture farms  30 100 Thousand tons 
Promote poultry production  42% 60% Share of locally produced to total 
market size 
Source: Saudi Vision 2030 
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 In cooperation with the Ministry of Energy, Minerals and Industry (MEMY), 
Aramco promoted a unique programme to support oil upstream manufacturing. Until 2016, 
local suppliers were heavily supported by Aramco but with no official mechanism. In some 
cases, the local supplier wins a bid to supply materials to Aramco even though its price is 
twenty percent higher than a global supplier. However, the government and Aramco were 
not satisfied with the local content levels. Thus, they decided to take a further step in growing 
the linkages from the oil sector by introducing a local content strategy called In Kingdom 
Total Value Add (IKTVA) 86 . Aramco’s CEO explained that continuing to import 
machineries, material and services is not sustainable in the long-term. What Saudi Arabia 
and Aramco are missing is a mechanism that enables local suppliers to compete with foreign 
suppliers (Alnasser 2016). 
 IKTVA targets an increase in Aramco’s locally produced purchases from thirty to 
seventy percent by 2030, creating 500,000 jobs and exporting thirty percent of the locally 
produced materials. The programme is expected to increase the domestic added value and to 
promote industrial diversification (Aramco, 2016). To drive, monitor and measure this 
programme, Aramco developed a formula to rank the localization of its suppliers: 
IKTVA score =   
A+B+C+D+R
E
 * 100 
Where A: the localized goods and services (in USD) 
B: the total amount of salaries paid to Saudis (in USD) 
C: training and development paid for Saudis (in USD) 
D: the development of small suppliers (i.e. tier two or three suppliers) (in USD) 
R: research and development (in USD)  
E: expected revenue from Aramco’s purchases or contracts (in USD) 
To encourage potential suppliers to produce locally, Aramco announced the amount of 
its expected spending on materials and services in the period (2017-2026) in extensive detail. 
The amount is projected to be 1.4 trillion SR (330 million US dollars) over ten years, and 
will be spent as follows: drilling equipment is expected to account for fifty-two percent of 
                                                          
86 The word “IKTVA” in Arabic means satisfaction. 
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the total amount, followed by the Maintain Potential Program87 with fourteen percent and 
process facilities with twelve percent (see Figure 4.16).  Within each segment, Aramco 
projected the details of the quantities needed. The projected demand for drilling equipment, 
for example, is shown in Table 4.19.   
Figure 4.16: Aramco’s projected spending by sectors (for 1.4 trillion SR over 10 years) 
 
Source: IKTVA (2016) 
 
Table 4.19 Projected demand for drilling and equipment (2017-2026) 
Item Quantity 
Inflow and injection control devices 1.2 million units 
Oil well trees 13,900 units 
Hanger assemblies  33,000 units 
Casing heads 14,00 units 
Cement 6.8 million tons 
Mud products (drilling fluids) 636 million gallons 
Source: IKTVA (2016) 
 
Kaplinsky et al. (2012) have shown that local content policies, such as IKTVA, are 
a critical factor in promoting linkages from the resource sector. A strategic vision to develop 
production linkages should be coupled with policy instruments like “local content policy” 
(p.57). Furthermore, IKTVA’s in-advance procurement agreements can reduce local 
                                                          
87  Aramco’s Maintain Potential Program (MPP) is responsible for managing all the maintenance, expansion and 
revamping operations of the company.  
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suppliers’ production and borrowing costs. Columbia Centre of Sustainable Investment 
(CCSI, 2016), on promoting linkages around the extraction sector, have argued that in-
advance purchasing agreements can help small suppliers who do not have adequate capital 
to access finance at lower cost. 
 In the Saudi case, after 2016, if a supplier wants to win a new contract, it has to pay 
attention to its IKTVA score. Therefore, companies such as General Electric (GE), which is 
a first-tier supplier to Aramco, are negotiating with some of its foreign suppliers to locate 
their manufacturing in Saudi Arabia in order to increase its score in IKTVA and to ensure 
the sustainability of its contracts with Aramco. Such a process reduces the reliance on 
imported products and services and increases the manufacturing added value significantly.  
In 2016 Siemens announced the production of a gas turbine facility in Dammam 
(Siemens 2016). Similarly, GE in 2017 announced the establishment of a joint venture firm 
in Dammam to produce special power turbines (Reuters 2017). In the same year, during the 
IKTVA annual conference, Schlumberger announced that it would open a drilling equipment 
facility in Dammam. The facility will specialize in oil and gas extraction equipment. 
Schlumberger expects that Saudi-workers in the firms will be approximately sixty-two 
percent. Similarly, several other first-tier suppliers have moved some of their production 
facilities to the Eastern region of Saudi Arabia (Aramco 2017). By the end of 2017, the local 
content of Aramco purchasing is expected to be approximately 43 percent. This number is 
considered the highest in the company’s history (IKTVA, 2017). 
 IKTVA is expected to generate 69,000 direct jobs by 2030. However, the challenge 
facing Saudi Arabia in oil related manufacturing is the limited number of high-skilled human 
resources (mainly technicians). At the moment, there are six training institutions that qualify 
Saudi technicians to meet the demands of the oil cluster. This is in addition to ten centres 
currently under development. However, the Ministry of Labour, in co-ordination with 
Aramco, plans to establish twelve additional centres by 2030 to meet the high demand for a 
high quality Saudi technical workforce (Aramco 2016).  
 The limited number of skilled technicians might also hinder the opportunity to absorb 
foreign technical knowledge and thus can be an obstacle for the Saudi industrial development 
strategy. Amsden (2001) argued that the training of technicians is a critical factor in 
industrial development and, above all, in absorbing foreign technologies.  “A critical factor 
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in the transfer of technology is the extent to which the technology is completely understood 
by the transferor” (Teece 1977, p.247). Indeed, reverse engineering (copying and adapting), 
which is a fundamental mechanism in transferring technologies to developing countries, is 
not expected to take place without having highly skilled technicians (and engineers) who can 
learn the tacit of the imported technology (Lall 1992).  
 In coordination with the Ministry of Energy, Minerals and Industry  SABIC, in 2018,  
promoted a similar programme to IKTVA called Nusaned 88 .  The programme aims to 
increase its local content purchasing through: procuring its plants’ requirements from 
domestic suppliers, and attracting foreign suppliers to Saudi Arabia (i.e. mainly seeking to 
transfer foreign technology). In addition to the procurement spending, it offers opportunities 
for product conversion of its basic chemicals and the commercialization of its technologies 
and patents. The programme, furthermore, offers advice, support and financing to its 
beneficiaries (SABIC 2018). 
 Furthermore, the government in 2018 has organized an event to promote further local 
content through domestic industrial suppliers. In this event, over 82,000 products were 
offered to local suppliers by ministries, public institutions and SOEs. These entities include 
Aramco, SABIC, the Saudi Mining Company, the Saudi Electricity Company, the National 
Water company and the National Water Sanitation Company. These products range from 
simple pipes and wires to equipment and engines, which are imported from abroad. The 
government targets localizing these products in order to reduce balance of payment pressure 
and to create greater job opportunities. 
 Industrial strategies review and implications 
This section compares and contrasts the industrial strategies discussed earlier, and then 
provides some policy implications for Saudi industrial policy makers:  
 The RBI strategy seeks to develop the manufacturing sector around the natural 
resource, i.e. upstream and downstream. Applying the RBI strategy to Saudi Arabia shows 
that the oil cluster is under-developed in general. The upstream industry supplies only forty-
two percent of Aramco’s procurement while fifty-eight percent was imported in 2017. With 
regard to the downstream industry, and despite its steady growth in the last four decades, 
sophisticated speciality and consumer chemicals are produced with limited capacities. The 
                                                          
88 “Nusaned” means support in Arabic. 
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RBI analysis suggests that Saudi Arabia needs to promote materials, equipment and 
machinery for the upstream industry, in addition to high-tech products within the 
downstream industry that can increase the domestic added value and reduce export value 
fluctuations following changes in oil prices.  
 The second strategy is the product space theory (PST), which identifies industrial 
diversification opportunities that require industrial capabilities that are similar to Saudi 
Arabia’s existing capabilities. The PST shows that Saudi Arabia exports eighty products 
with RCA. These products are concentrated on the “periphery” (which tends to be simple 
manufacturing and natural resource products) with fewer products at the “core” (which tends 
to be high added value and more sophisticated products). Nevertheless, the PST does not 
suggest jumping towards “far-by” products such as electronics, planes and ships; rather it 
suggests starting with “near-by” chemical products (such as chemical acids, artificial colours, 
artificial waxes and paints), food stuff and wood products (such as frozen vegetables, 
mustard oil and packing boxes, dairy products), transportation (such as space craft launch 
vehicles), surveying instruments and electrical wires, in addition to processed minerals and 
stones. 
 The third strategy, the GIFF, suggests targeting sectors based on products that are 
produced by benchmark countries, products with high domestic demand, and self-discovered 
products. For Saudi Arabia, the GIFF suggested targeting a wide range of industries: 
aquaculture, poultry, speciality plastics, speciality rubber (including rubber tyres), speciality 
chemicals and medicines, processed glass and stones, small trucks, boats, aircraft parts, 
lifting machines, fridges and air-conditioners. The GIFF shows that the cars and electronic 
sectors can be targeted but only through attracting FDI because of the limited domestic 
industrial knowledge in these sectors. In short, targeting the GIFF industries by the 
government can substantially upgrade the existing production structure.  
 Fourthly, the Saudi Vision’s industrial plans have great similarities with the RBI 
because of their emphasis on the oil upstream industry, downstream industry, the mining 
industry and other resource-based activities. In addition, the Vision targets the increase in 
local content public procurements.  
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 While the evaluation of these strategies depends on several factors, including the 
Saudi government’s capacity and commitment in promoting industrial policy 89 , it is 
necessary to briefly highlight some limitations and strengths of these strategies. The RBI, 
which focuses mainly on promoting sectors in the upstream and downstream of the oil sector, 
has a major advantage over the other strategies because of the state ownership of the oil 
company (Aramco) and other leading chemicals and mining companies (e.g. SABIC and 
Maaden). This gives the government a substantial authority to implement this strategy90. 
However, the RBI is unlikely to generate adequate employment opportunities and synergy 
to other sectors of the economy91 (Roemer 1979). In addition, it does not solve the export 
fluctuation problem following the rapid changes in the oil price, because it suggests a range 
of activities and products that have high price correlation with oil. 
 The PST suggests products that are closely related to the existing product structure 
and does not suggest great diversification towards sophisticated products. In other words, 
the PST shows that the Saudi industrial capabilities allow it to produce a range of relatively 
simple products (mostly on the periphery) with a limited number of sophisticated products 
(in the core). However, Wade (2012) and Chang (Lin and Chang 2009) show that Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NIC) have upgraded their industrial structures significantly by 
targeting sectors that are not close to the existing comparative advantage.  
 Finally, the GIFF suggests a more sophisticated industrial structure and greater 
employment opportunities than the PST and pays greater attention to the Saudi endowment 
structure (e.g. water scarcity). In addition, unlike the PST, it gives domestic demand major 
importance in choosing the targeted sectors.  
 By looking at the four industrial strategies, including Vision 2030, in terms of 
industrial upgrading, potential job creation and export stability, this research suggests 
                                                          
89 For example, Khan and Blankenburg (2009) argue that targeting high-tech and machinery products requires a 
greater role and capacity by the government relative to resource based manufacturing.   
90 Kaplinsky et al. (2012) argue that the national ownership (as opposed to foreign companies) of the extraction 
firms is a fundamental factor in the success of the RBI. In addition, Kaplinsky (2015) shows that in additive value 
chains, which exist mainly around natural resource production, governments have greater power to impose 
traditional industrial policies; because the production process takes place sequentially within a relatively small 
geographical area (typically in the same country). This is unlike other types of manufacturing (e.g. machinery and 
electronics) that exist in vertically fragmented GVCs. 
91 Roomer (1979) also shows that the dominance of multi-national corporations (MNCs) in the downstream sectors 
of natural resources has created a great barrier for domestic firms, because they enjoy a significantly lower 
production cost due to their economies of scale and technologies, in addition to their economies of marketing and 
management. 
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maintaining the support of RBI industries (as in Vision 2030), in addition to complementing 
it with the GIFF sectors which can stimulate greater industrial diversification.   
 Industrial policy recommendations  
Based on the above analysis of the three industrial strategies and Saudi Vision 2030, this 
study suggests the following policy recommendations: 
1. Saudi Arabia should further support the resource-based industrialization (RBI) both 
upstream and downstream. Greater attention has to be paid to the upstream industry 
because of its lack of development and its importance in creating horizontal linkages to 
non-related industries (CCSI 2016). In the downstream industry, consumer and speciality 
chemicals should be promoted because of their high-added value and low correlation 
with oil prices. 
2. In addition to the RBI, this research encourages the government to target the set of sectors 
proposed by the GIFF, namely: poultry, aqua-culture, speciality plastics, speciality 
rubber, rubber tyres, speciality chemicals and medicines, processed glass, processed 
stone, boats, small trucks, aircraft parts, lifting machines, fridges and air-conditioning 
systems. 
3. The targeted set of sectors should be evaluated and reviewed periodically in terms of 
development in their domestic and international demands. 
4. The government should encourage horizontal linkages from the oil sector towards other, 
non-related, activities (i.e. see Figure 4.17). Ramos (1998) and CCSI (2016) suggest the 
formation of industrial clusters to stimulate these synergies (linkages) from oil sector 
manufacturing to non-oil activities.  
5. The local content policy promoted by Vision 2030 should be maintained and further 
supported. In addition to its importance in supporting the upstream oil industry, this local 
content policy can support the targeted sectors (i.e. in Step 2) by requiring SOEs and 
government agencies to purchase them locally. 
6. Finally, coordination and alignment between the Saudi National Industrial Strategy, the 
Local Content Unit92, other government agencies, the national oil company (Aramco) 
and other SOEs should be ensured. This is particularly important because a lack of 
coordination between the industrial policy stakeholders may result in the failure of the 
industrial diversification process (Rodrik 2004). 
                                                          
92 A government office that is responsible for applying the local content policy. This office reports directly to the 
Council of Economic and Development Affairs. 
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Figure 4.17: Production linkages from the Saudi oil cluster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Ramos (1998) and Morris et al. (2012) 
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4.4 Financing the industrial diversification plan 
Innovation and industrial diversification requires risky, patient and developmental finance, 
not any kind of finance (Mazzucato 2013), whereas private financial institutions are risk-
averse and prefer funding traditional projects (UNCTAD 2014). Furthermore, such 
institutions shy away from funding long-term industrial projects. Felipe and Rhee (2015) 
argue that in developing countries that target the development of the industrial sector, it can 
be difficult to fund large scale industrial projects as private banks and investors are reluctant 
to offer long-term financing. However, as far as natural resource countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, are concerned, using natural resource revenues to finance structural transformation 
and industrial diversification plans through development banks, for instance, can actually be 
an effective fiscal strategy (Lin 2011). 
 Industrial entrepreneurs face serious financing difficulties in Saudi Arabia, where 
private financial institutions do not like funding the establishment of highly sophisticated 
and long-term industrial projects. Instead, they favour funding projects within traditional 
sectors, such as construction, trade and hospitality. Within the manufacturing sector, they 
tend to finance the operational costs of existing firms, but when it comes to establishing new 
projects, they typically finance them through personal loans or by supporting another already 
existing business for the same entrepreneur, because of the high risk involved in establishing 
a new industrial project. In both cases, the entrepreneur has to have significant collateral 
assets and a high credit score. Furthermore, firms investing in risky projects (which is the 
case in the majority of high-tech products) can be charged substantially higher interest rates 
(interviews with officials in corporate departments in Saudi private banks, March 2018). The 
question that needs to be addressed here is: What about funding industrial entrepreneurs who 
do not have an extended credit history or personal assets that allow them to get personal 
loans or other existing running businesses?  
 This section examines the role of public financial institutions in bridging the 
financing gap facing industrial entrepreneurs and in promoting the government’s industrial 
diversification plans. It starts by studying the role of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, 
and then looks at the role of the state in funding industrial SMEs.  
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 The Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
The single most important institution for funding the Saudi industrial sector is the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund (SIDF). Indeed, Vision 2030’s industrial development plan 
identifies the SIDF as an “industry enabler”. This Fund was established in 1974 to develop 
the industrial sector by providing medium- and long-term loans. Since its establishment, the 
Fund has been guided by several developmental considerations; namely, achieving high 
local added value, introducing new products to the domestic market, providing import 
substitutions, creating new job opportunities, transferring and localizing foreign 
technologies, promoting regional development and encouraging non-oil exports (interviews 
with officials in the SIDF, February and March 2018). 
 Since its creation, the SIDF has approved a total amount of 137.3 billion SAR 
through 4,079 loans. These loans contributed to the creation of 2,988 new industrial firms 
(38.5 percent of the total number of factories in the country) and the expansion of 1,091 
existing firms. A review of the total approved funding for the major industrial sectors shows 
that the chemicals sector received the highest total amount, 52.8 billion SAR, accounting for 
38.5 percent of the total value. This percentage is a clear reflection of the demand for 
chemicals projects by entrepreneurs (interview with high official at the SIDF, March 2018). 
This was because of the sector’s competitiveness, in terms of cheap feedstock prices and 
greater industrial capabilities, and which has been evolving since the government’s 
establishment of SABIC in the 1970’s. The second largest sector is engineering and metal 
products with 28.6 billion SAR of approved loans, representing 20.8 percent. Figure 4.18 
shows the shares of the major industrial sectors in terms of value and number of approved 
loans. 
 To some extent, SIDF lending has followed the country’s development stages. For 
instance, between 1975 and 1985, the cement and building materials sector was by far the 
largest recipient of SIDF funding because of the significantly high demand for construction 
projects for infrastructure and residential development. However, since the late 1980s after 
the petrochemical infrastructure had been established by the government, the chemicals 
sector has been the largest recipient (SIDF annual reports).  
 SIDF contributes to industrial diversification by encouraging entrepreneurs to invest 
in new areas. When the technological knowledge becomes available and the profitability is 
evident in a particular sector, SIDF no longer approves any further loans in this sector. For 
instance, the Fund has supported several cement and cement brick factories since the 1970s 
but has recently stopped because of the increase in the local supply and a significant 
reduction in the associated risk. In other words, the Fund is sending out a signal to 
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entrepreneurs, encouraging them to search for new opportunities (new products) in order to 
be supported. On the other hand, investors in these sectors can still access credit through 
private banks that clearly understood the sector, given that a considerable number of firms 
have already demonstrated its profitability (interview with a credit analyst at SIDF, February 
2018). 
Figure 4.18: The number and value of approved loans from SIDF 
 
Source: SIDF annual report (2017). 
 
 While SIDF has been considering different developmental factors, such as import 
substitutions, in their targeted sector criteria, there has, in fact, been a lamentable lack of 
coordination between the Fund and other government agencies, such as the Ministry of 
Economics and Planning, the Ministry of Trade and Investment and the Ministry of Energy, 
Industry and Mineral Resources. A clear example of the coordination failure is that the SIDF 
used to target sectors or projects based on their own economic and financial analysis, i.e. 
there was almost no communication with other agencies in this regard. This can be explained 
to a large extent by the absence of a proper industrial strategy and a governance framework 
in Saudi Arabia (interviews with officials at SIDF, February and March 2018). It is argued 
in the literature that such a lack of coordination can be a major reason for the under-
developed industrial sectors in many developing countries despite strong support from the 
government (Khan 2015) as well as from state development banks in particular (Macfarlane 
and Mazzucato 2018). 
 Nonetheless, since the promotion of Vision 2030 in 2016, SIDF officials have 
noticed a significantly higher degree of communication and coordination between the Fund 
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and other public entities and SOEs. Currently, the Chairman of the Fund is the Minister of 
Energy, Industry and Mineral resources (MEIM) instead of the Minister of Finance. This has 
allowed the Fund to closely align its strategies with MEIM’s industrial strategy, especially 
in terms of targeted sectors. Furthermore, the Fund has now established a Vision Realization 
Office (VRO) which is responsible for aligning the Fund’s decisions and activities with 
Vison 2030.  
 An example of the Fund’s increased coordination with other relevant agencies is that 
when Aramco officials went to Europe to promote their local content programme (IKTVA), 
SIDF accompanied them to provide funding opportunities (of up to seventy-five percent of 
the total project cost) for foreign suppliers who wanted to move to Saudi Arabia. Another 
example is that, when MEIM announced that it would remove the government’s energy and 
electricity subsidies in 2017, SIDF provided an extensive study for MEIM, showing the 
potential difficulties domestic producers would face because of the sudden increase in their 
production costs, and, therefore, recommended keeping the subsidy or at least postponing its 
demise until firms get prepared to meet the new tariff. As a result, the Ministry followed the 
Fund’s advice and postponed its orders for the industrial sector, while applying the new 
(higher) tariff to the agricultural and residential sectors (interview with a researcher at the 
SIDF, February 2018). 
 An important consideration for any project appraisal by SIDF is the promotion of 
regional inclusive growth and employment. While SIDF funding covers up to fifty percent 
of the total project costs, the funding reaches seventy-five percent if the region is targeted 
by the government93, with the repayment period stretching to twenty years (instead of fifteen 
years). In 2016, fifty-one percent of approved loans (twenty-five percent of the value) went 
to projects in targeted regions (SIDF annual reports). Indeed, this was a major contributor to 
the development of Jizan Industrial City, for instance, which is located in the far south of the 
country 94. 
 Moreover, SIDF provides its customers with a wide range of unique technical, 
financial and marketing expertise, in addition to monitoring and supervising the project 
implementation process95. In some cases, leading industrial enterprises apply to the Fund, 
not only for funding, because their connections and credit records allow them to easily access 
finance, but because they are interested in the Fund’s industrial expertise. For instance, the 
                                                          
93 The Saudi government target some regions and cities for inclusive growth purposes. 
94 According to SIDF annual reports and official’s interviews in February 2018. 
95 Interviews with officials in domestic private banks reveals that domestic private banks do not offer wide range 
of industrial expertise, because it costs them a significant amount of resources. Instead, they target sector, projects 
or operations with significant lower risk, that do not require advanced technical know-how.  
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Fund prepares an Industry Study that covers the domestic market opportunities, export 
markets, an extensive forecast of domestic supply and demand, an evaluation of the 
production process, the domestic availability of input materials, a fixed capital and 
operational costs analysis, and the potential machinery required and its foreign suppliers. In 
specific cases, the Fund even sends some of its analysts abroad to test the technology that is 
to be used by a potential borrower. Such trips include investigating the production materials 
and facilities as well as meeting potential foreign partners (interviews with officials at SIDF, 
February and March 2018).  
 Furthermore, the Fund deals with firms as partners rather than customers. In some 
cases, beneficiary firms have suffered from serious financial problems and the Fund has then 
offered them some help in the form of financial expertise and by contacting potential equity 
investors who could help solve their problem. The goal here is to maintain (or develop) these 
productive firms because of their contribution to the national economy (interview with a 
CEO in a chemicals manufacturing group, March 2018). 
 Unlike the so-called crowding-out argument whereby state investment banks push 
private banks away from lending to productive firms, SIDF has been crowding-in private 
banks. In an IMF publication, Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli (2013) show that a rise in the 
share of state-owned banks is associated with lower credit to the private sector. In another 
IMF  publication, Andrews (2005) shows that state-owned banks are likely to channel the 
limited financial system resources to unproductive activities and this crowds out more 
productive activities. In Brazil, the development bank (BNDES), which is considered  as an 
important enabler for  industrial development and responsible for seventy percent of long-
term banks lending between 2013 and 2015, is accused of crowding-out private lending (see 
Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2018). For instance, in its survey of the Brazilian economy, 
OECD (2013) criticized BNDES for crowding-out private lending and hindering the 
development of domestic financial markets96. 
 Nevertheless, interviewing Saudi officials in private banks has shown that the SIDF 
has been stimulating their lending for industrial projects. The SIDF crowding-in process has 
four aspects. First, before the establishment of the Fund in 1974, credit to the manufacturing 
sector was insignificant. Banks were more familiar with the household, trade and 
construction sectors. But after its creation, the Fund demonstrated, to private banks, the 
feasibility and profitability of lending to the industrial sector. Secondly, the Fund does not 
                                                          
96 The OECD (2013) argued that while credit in Brazil is rising substantially, there is a scarcity in long term financing. 
The report maintains that this lack of financing by private banks is mainly caused by the heavy participation of 
BNDES in the long-term lending (p.10). 
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provide loans that cover operational costs and this has created new opportunities for private 
banks to capture. Thirdly, the Fund’s borrowers usually have short-term loans, called 
“bridging loans”, from commercial banks, because the Fund’s borrowers receive their loan 
payments based on actual expenditure (i.e. the procurement of machinery or the construction 
of a building). Thus, in many cases borrowers are able to get short-term loans (bridge loans) 
from private banks that allow them, for example, to purchase the machinery they require. 
They then have to provide specific documents, such as receipts and customs documents, to 
receive disbursements from the Fund97. 
 Fourthly, it was frequently emphasized during this research - by interviewing 
officials in private banks - that sharing the risk with SIDF was a major incentive for private 
banks to lend some risky industrial projects. Despite the fact that they preferred syndicated 
loans for risky projects, private banks had considerable respect for the Fund’s proven 
industrial capabilities. In other words, private bankers have claimed that they get encouraged 
to fund specific firms that have been approved by SIDF.   
Some of the most sophisticated products that have been recently produced in the 
country could not have been introduced to the domestic industry without the support of the 
SIDF. For instance, in 2008, the Fund approved 1.2 billion SAR for the establishment of a 
firm (a subsidiary of a company called Cristal) which is specialized in the production of 
titanium dioxide (Tio2). In 2014, SIDF funded Cristal with an additional 1.2 billion SAR for 
another factory to produce titanium sponge, which has a wide variety of applications in 
airplane production to reduce fuel consumption and weight. Currently, the company is 
among the top titanium industrial application suppliers in the world98. In its 2014 report, 
Cristal’s CEO claimed that: 
“Cristal would not have been established, were it not for the financial, material and 
technological support of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), the 
indisputable backbone of Saudi industry, set up by the government to develop the 
industrial sector in the country. When SIDF was approached for support to set up in 
YIC [Yanbu Industrial City] the first TiO2 producing factory in the Middle East and 
North Africa, it offered considerable help, despite the fact that at the time such 
projects were outside the scope of SIDF’s expertise, making it therefore unable to 
properly evaluate it. But instead of declining the request for support due to a lack of 
                                                          
97 While users of SIDF resources have claimed that this process (bridge loan financing) increases their cost of 
lending, others have been struggling to get short-term bridge loans from private banks (according to an interview 
with an SIDF beneficiary in February 2018). To solve this issue, the SIDF plans to offer a “letter of credit” by the 
middle of 2018 to solve this problem (according to a high official at SIDF in March 2018). 
98 According to an SIDF unpublished report (2015). 
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the necessary expertise to evaluate it, SIDF took the enterprising step of recruiting 
experts and did a detailed study and approved the project. This decisive action taken 
by SIDF led to the creation of Crista”  (Cristal 2014, p.10). 
  
  Nonetheless, it is still important to question whether the size of SIDF assets is 
sufficient to meet the country’s needs and plans for a more sophisticated and diversified 
industrial base. The Fund’s initial capital was 500 million SAR but was continuously 
increased until it reached 40 billion SAR in the late 2000s. In 2017, the government raised 
its capital to 65 billion SAR, in order to meet the Vision’s industrial development plans 
(SIDF annual reports). While this increase is expected to give the Fund greater capacity to 
increase its lending in the future, SIDF officials have nevertheless argued that meeting the 
government’s industrial plans may require an even larger capital size (interviews with 
officials in SIDF, February and March 2018). Compared to other national development 
banks, namely, KfW in Germany, BNDES in Brazil and CBD in China, SIDF’s total assets 
to GDP are only 2.5 percent, which is significantly smaller than those in these other countries 
(See Figure 4.19). 
 Given the current constraints on fiscal resources in Saudi Arabia following the fall 
in oil prices, which has resulted in a tighter fiscal policy, one SIDF official has argued that 
raising funds on the local financial market is the key to increasing the Fund’s lending 
capacity (an interview with a high official in SIDF, March 2018). This would have only a 
limited impact on the fiscal deficit but could leverage the Fund’s resources significantly. 
Indeed, this process is already taking place in many state development banks around the 
world (de Luna-Martínez and Vicente 2012). Nonetheless, this should not side-track the 
SIDF from following its original developmental agenda. In other words, it should not be 
deterred from funding strategic, risky and long-term projects. Indeed, Chandrasekhar (2016) 
argues that some development banks have adopted market-oriented practices, including 
accessing capital from the financial markets, and this has ultimately resulted in 
transformations of institutions’ agendas. He explains that some of these development banks 
have become purely commercial banks. For instance, Chandrasekhar highlights that, in 
India, the State tried to reduce the reliance of the Industrial Finance Corporation of India 
(IFCI)  on the central bank and the govenrment, and thus requred it to access finance through 
the finanical markets. Because this would mean borrowing at the market’s prevailing interest 
rate, the role of IFCI has been transformed. This transformation has resulted in limited access 
to long-term finance for the industrial sector and infrastructure projects. 
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Figure 4.19: Assets to GDP for SIDF compared to other national development banks 
 
Source: SIDF, KfW, CDB and BNDES 2016 annual reports. 
 Financing SMEs 
Although the 2030 industrial plan is heavily dependent on local content requirements, in 
which small- and medium-sized suppliers play an important role, financing is a critical 
obstacle facing SMEs. According to the Saudi SMEs Authority (SMEA), fifty-nine percent 
of SMEs consider financing to be a major difficulty. By looking at their share of credit, it 
can be seen that Saudi SMEs receive only two percent of the total domestic credit provided 
to the private sector (See Figure 4.20). These modest funding figures reveal how essential 
the role of the state is in financing SMEs in general and small industrial firms in particular. 
 In 2006, the government started a loan guarantee programme for SMEs (Kafalah), 
with initial capital assets of 200 million SAR. Since its establishment, the programme was 
managed by SIDF until 2016, and it is currently under the auspices of SMEA. In 2016, the 
programme supported 1,711 SMEs, but manufacturers represented only ten percent of the 
total number of businesses guaranteed by Kafalah (See Figure 4.21). After creating this 
programme, some banks realized there was some profitability in lending to small businesses 
and therefore initiated departments for the financing of SMEs. Officials in private banks 
have shown that, for businesses that have an annual revenue lower than 30 million SAR, 
there is a significantly high risk in lending to them (especially in the industrial sector) and 
such businesses could not have been funded without the Kafalah programme (interviews 
with officials in private banks, February and March 2018). The government therefore needs 
to play a much bigger role in financing industrial SMEs. 
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 A senior official in Kafalah programme has argued that the sector must be further 
supported by the state through some regulations, such as specifying a share for SME credit 
within the banks’ total credit portfolio. He also maintained that creating a public SME bank 
with sufficient capital could be a vital tool for tackling and easing some of the SMEs’ funding 
struggles (interview with a senior official in the Kafalah programme, March 2018). However, 
supporting enterprises based on their size (as he suggested) may not solve the problem. It 
should be highlighted here that such a proposed bank (SME bank) should focus on sectors 
and products that are targeted by industrial policy makers. 
Figure 4.20: SME finance as a share of the total credit to the private sector 
   
Source: The Saudi Financial Sector Development Program (2018) 
Figure 4.21: Kafalah guarantees by sector 
 
Source: Kafalah annual report (2017). 
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 Within the agricultural sector, SMEs are mainly supported by the Saudi Agricultural 
Development Fund (SADF) 99 . Because of the high risk associated with lending for 
agricultural projects (mainly because of limited rainfall and water reserves), private banks 
focus on lending to large corporations only (interviews with officials in SADF and private 
banks, February and March 2018). This makes the role of the state even more important 
when it comes to funding the government’s targeted sectors in Vision 2030: aquaculture 
production, poultry, and highly efficient greenhouses. 
 Like other public financial institutions before 2016, SADF has had only limited 
coordination with other public entities, such as the Ministry of Economics and Planning or 
the Ministry of Environment, Water and Agriculture. Thus, there was no clear SADF 
strategy in place for targeting specific sectors. However, there has been a noticeable change 
in the degree of coordination and communication with the other relevant agencies since the 
2030 Vision was launched and promoted. Currently, the fund focuses on the Vision’s three 
targeted agricultural sectors. These sectors accounted for 69.7 percent of SADF lending in 
2017 (SADF, 2018). In addition, SADF has been recently concerned about supporting the 
production of fabricated cattle feed, commonly called cattle cubes, which serve as a 
substitute or a supplement for grass. This sector is jointly supported by SADF and the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), because of the latter’s expertise in supporting 
manufacturing activities (interview with a high official in SADF, March 2018).    
 Industrial SMEs’ access to venture capital (VC) is trivial in Saudi Arabia, despite its  
importance in promoting innovation in manufacturing related activities (Keller and Block 
2012; Murray 1999). The supply of venture capital is mainly focused on low-risk services 
such as trade, hospitality, ITC and mobile applications. Indeed, VC investors have been 
deterred from investing in manufacturing start-ups because of the significantly high 
associated risks and the large initial fixed capital costs (interview with a private venture 
capital investor, March 2018). 
 While venture capital investment in new companies, such as SMEs, has been 
promoted by state investment banks around the world (Griffith-Jones and Tyson 2013; 
Mazzucato and Penna 2016), the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) has, since its 
establishment, been focusing solely on debt financing, with no consideration of venture 
capital financing. Furthermore, the Public Investment Fund, which is amongst the largest 
Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in the world, focuses exclusively on mega-domestic 
                                                          
99 SADF is a state owned fund that was established in 1963 and manages capital assets of 30 billion SAR. 
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development and infrastructure projects, in addition to promising opportunities abroad100. In 
other words, both SIDF and PIF do not provide VC funding for SMEs 101.  
 Thus, in addition to the establishment of SME bank, the researcher argues here that 
establishing a Saudi public venture capital fund (or programme) specializing in funding 
targeted strategic sectors and products can be a major instrument in financing industrial 
diversification plans. 
4.5 Conclusions:  
This study has examined the issue of promoting and financing industrial diversification in 
Saudi Arabia. First, it showed the importance of industrial diversification as a main pillar of 
the Saudi long-term growth and development. Then, it applied three industrial upgrading 
strategies to the Saudi context, and finally evaluated the role of the financial system in 
supporting the industrial diversification and upgrading. 
 First, the resource based industrialization (RBI) analysis reveals that the upstream 
industry is underdeveloped. While the downstream industry is relatively well established, it 
lacks diversification towards speciality and consumer products. Thus, the RBI suggests 
further development in the upstream and downstream sectors. Secondly, the Product Space 
Theory (PST) shows that the Saudi industry is concentrated on producing petroleum, mineral 
and petrochemical products, but not machinery and electronics. Nonetheless, the PST 
suggests a wide range of products that are close to the existing structure, with limited 
sophisticated products. 
 Thirdly, the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework (GIFF) suggests a 
wide range of products (including transportation and machinery) that can upgrade the 
industrial basket significantly. After contrasting the four strategies in terms of industrial 
sophistication and potential employment opportunities, this study shows that the GIFF is 
superior to the others for the Saudi context. Thus, in addition to maintaining Vision 2030 
which focuses on RBI and local content policy, this study suggests also utilizing the GIFF 
to achieve greater industrial diversification and sophistication. 
 This research also shows that Saudi private financial institutions are not likely to 
fulfil the potential industrial demand for financing. Indeed, private banks are already shying 
                                                          
100 PIF invests domestically in mega-projects within the mining, entertainment, tourism and technology sectors and 
infrastructure. This is, in addition, to its investment abroad in companies such as POSCO engineering and 
construction, UBER and others.    
101  This is despite the existence of initiatives by the state and SOEs for establishing small venture capital 
programmes in the last decade. The two major initiatives are Wa’ed and Dussur. The former was established by 
Aramco to facilitate debt and venture funding for entrepreneurs in various industrial and service sectors. Dussur, 
on the other hand, was jointly established by Aramco, SABIC and the PIF to invest in small firms within the oil, 
gas, maritime, power and water sectors. 
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away from funding the establishment of new industrial enterprises, providing financing for 
sophisticated industrial activities and long-term manufacturing projects, whereas in the 
venture capital industry, private funds are mainly focused on investing in low-risk services 
like hospitality, trade and IT applications. 
 Thus, the study stresses the importance of public financial institutions in financing 
industrial upgrading. While their role has been crucial in promoting the industrial sector in 
the past, Saudi public financial institutions should now play an even greater role in order to 
meet the potential demand and to promote greater industrial diversification. The most 
important financial institution in supporting the manufacturing sector is the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF), which has been a critical enabler of industrial development 
through its financial and technical support. Nonetheless, the industrial upgrading requires of 
SIDF an even greater capacity and a larger role. Its current total assets represent only 2.5 
percent of GDP, which is substantially smaller than the size of other national development 
banks, such as KfW, BNDS and the CDB, despite the fact that their countries have a lesser 
need for structural change and industrial diversification. 
 Furthermore, in spite of the government’s emphasis on increasing the role of local 
suppliers for SOEs and government agencies, SME firms face a huge challenge in terms of 
accessing debt and equity funding. On the debt side, Saudi SMEs’ share is 2.5 percent of the 
total credit to the private sector, which is considered to be among the lowest in the world. In 
the venture capital sector, on the other hand, there are no public institutions that are 
specialized in funding small entrepreneurs, despite the existing financing gap. Therefore, 
establishing public financial institutions (or programmes) specialized in funding SMEs 
through debt and equity financing in targeted industrial sectors could be a critical tool for 
achieving industrial innovation and diversification.  
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 Concluding remarks 
Despite a significant windfall in resource revenues, many resource-dependent developing 
countries have not been able to channel them towards innovative and higher-technology 
industrial activities. These countries suffer from highly concentrated production and export 
baskets on primary products that have resulted in low employment opportunities and high 
balance of payment fluctuations. This lack of industrial development in many resource-
abundant developing counties is mainly explained by public policy failure (Ramos 1998; 
Morris et al. 2012). Nevertheless, despite its wealth and dominance, the mainstream 
resource-curse literature does not provide policy makers in these countries with instrumental 
policy implications. The researcher embraces Wright and Czelusta’s view in this regard:  
“The resource-curse hypothesis seems anomalous as development economics, since 
on the surface it has no clear policy implication but stands as a wistful prophecy:  
Countries afflicted with the ‘original sin’ of resource endowments have poor growth 
prospects. The danger of such ostensibly neutral ruminations, however, is that in 
practice they may influence sectoral policies” (2004, p.36). 
 This research aims to study the role of financial and industrial policies in promoting 
and financing industrial diversification in resource-dependent countries. After examining the 
related literature carefully, this research tried to answer these important questions in three 
separate chapters: 
A. Does financial deepening promote industrial diversification and upgrading in resource-
dependent developing countries?  
B. Can state-directed credit and financing help to promote industrial diversification?  
C. What type of industrial strategy should a resource-dependent country follow? What are 
the sectors that can be targeted? What is the role of the financial system in supporting 
these targeted sectors?  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 examined Question A on the relationship between financial development and 
the diversification and complexity of exports. Developing and liberalizing the financial 
system are standard recommendations for these countries by the IMF and the World Bank. 
The IMF (2016), for instance, maintains that developing and deregulating the financial 
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market is a key to economic diversification in these countries. Furthermore, a growing strand 
of literature claims that there is a financial sector curse in these countries, i.e. lack of 
development, which contributes to the lack of economic and industrial development. 
Financial deepening, this strand argues, is an essential instrument to escape the resource 
curse through the channelling of resource revenues towards productive investments (e.g. 
Beck and Poelhekke, 2017; and Beck, 2011). Contrary to this view, this study examined 
thirty-eight resource-dependent developing countries between 1995 and 2013, and showed 
that, while the financial system has grown significantly, export diversification and 
complexity have declined. Statistically, panel data regression models have failed to find a 
significant impact of finance on export diversification, but found a negative impact of 
finance on export complexity. This chapter speculates that by the financial sector’ risk 
aversion and short-term motives. Rather than funding risky and high technology projects 
that are expected to result in greater industrial upgrading, unregulated financial development 
might benefit traditional projects and sectors within the country’s comparative advantage. 
Therefore, this study argued that a general financial development policy recommendation is 
not expected to be a key for industrial diversification in these countries.  
Chapter 3 examined Questions B and C regarding the role of the state in promoting and 
financing the industrial diversification and upgrading. This chapter did so by looking at two 
countries that were resource dependent, yet managed to diversify their economies, namely 
Chile and Malaysia. In Chile, industrial diversification has been towards resource-based 
sectors, whereas in Malaysia it was towards a wider range of activities including electronics 
and machinery. The main goal of this chapter was to investigate the role of government in 
financing the emergence of what have become major industrial sectors. Contrary to Beck 
and Poelhekke (2017) and IMF (2016) who argued for the need to deregulate the financial 
system and reduce state-directed credit to achieve economic diversification, a central finding 
of this study is that the government, in both countries, has been a catalyst in financing the 
emergence and development of targeted industrial sectors. Among other tools, public 
development banks and venture capital institutions were vital in providing pre-identified 
sectors with risky and developmental finance. Finally, in a closer look at the major roles of 
public financial institutions in both countries, in the context of industrial diversification and 
structural transformation, this chapter provided evidence that they are developmental (e.g. 
policy-guided), innovation supporters, technology transfer enablers and challenge-led 
institutions. 
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Chapter 4 is concerned with Questions B and C, but focuses on promoting industrial 
diversification in a resource-dependent country that has not successfully diversified its 
economy: Saudi Arabia. The chapter highlighted the role of industrial policies in promoting 
industrial diversification in these countries. It reviewed three main industrial strategies for 
resource-dependent countries: resource-based industrialization (e.g. Perez 2015), the 
Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework (i.e. Lin 2011) and the product space 
theory (i.e. Hausmann et al. 2014). These strategies have been used to assess the current 
Saudi production basket and, then, to outline a possible diversification strategy. Furthermore, 
these strategies have been compared and contrasted with the recently launched Vision 2030 
by the Saudi Government. Furthermore, the chapter investigated the role of the Saudi 
financial system in supporting industrial development. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with high-ranking officials at major development financial institutions to evaluate 
their role.  
This chapter argued that Saudi Arabia should maintain its support for resource-based 
industries (e.g. as in Vision 2030). However, it should also target a set of non-resource 
industrial sectors that can generate greater employment opportunities, reduce export 
fluctuations following oil prices and increase the sophistication of the industrial basket. More 
specifically, the analysis suggested the utilization of the sectors identified by the GIFF as a 
guide for targeting these non-resource sectors. Finally, after analysis of the role of the 
financial system, the chapter argued that private financial institutions in Saudi Arabia are 
not likely to provide the industrial sector with the needed financing because of their extreme 
risk-aversion behaviour. This can be seen in their reluctant to finance small entrepreneurs 
and industrial enterprises in general. Greater state participation in the financial system is 
required to bridge these financing constraints and to promote industrial diversification. 
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 Study contribution 
This thesis makes the following contributions to the existing literature: 
1. It contributes to the Dutch-Disease literature by raising doubts on the claim made by 
mainstream economists and international institutions such as the IMF about the need for 
financial development and deepening in resource-dependent countries to mitigate the 
Disease and to achieve industrial and economic diversification (i.e. Beck 2011; Van der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). Indeed, this research questions the willingness of private 
banks to fund high-tech and largely sophisticated manufacturing activities because of the 
high risk involved. This work not only argues that unregulated financial development is 
not likely to promote industrial diversification, but also that it may encourage firms in 
resource-dependent countries to specialize on producing products within the existing 
comparative advantage (i.e. raw materials) and other already established competitive 
sectors. 
2. It questions the argument made in the existing literature on the negative impact of state-
directed credit on economic diversification in natural resource countries (Beck and 
Poelhekke 2017; IMF 2016). In order to counter this claim, this research provides 
evidence on the critical role of industrial banks and public venture capital funds in 
providing developmental, patient and risky finance that has contributed to the upgrading 
of the manufacturing sectors in resource-dependent countries. 
3. It adds to the industrial policy literature by supporting the argument of Chang and 
Andreoni (2016)  in which they show that certain policies, e.g. state directed credit, may 
help countries to mitigate the Dutch-Disease. This study provides strong evidence for 
this view by showing the role of state-directed credit in promoting new industrial 
activities in resource-dependent countries, namely Chile, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.  
4. It reviews different industrial strategies, in the case of Saudi Arabia, that can serve as a 
reference for other resource-dependent countries and suggests targeting a set of sectors 
and products that are suitable for resource-dependent countries. These suggested sectors 
include resource-based industries and non-resource-based industrial sectors, that can 
result in greater industrial diversification. 
This thesis also makes secondary contributions that include the following:  
5. Unlike the public banks crowding-out argument that has been highlighted in the 
mainstream literature (e.g. Andrews 2005; Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli 2013), this 
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research argues that public banks can crowd-in private financial institutions to fund the 
industrial sector.  
6. It supports the argument of Macfarlane and Mazzucato (2018) which claims that the lack 
of coordination between public financial institutions and other industrial policy 
stakeholders, may hinder their potential role in supporting industrial development. An 
example of this coordination is in the nature of targeted sectors. 
 Policy implications 
The policy recommendations derived from this research have already been discussed in 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3. The following summarizes the key implications: 
1. This research suggests that financial development and de-regulation are not appropriate 
recommendations for industrial diversification and upgrading in resource-dependent 
developing countries. This is because financial institutions may not be motivated enough 
to fund risky and long-term industrial projects because of their risk-averse and short-
term aims. Therefore, a generalized financial development (or deepening) policy 
proposal may benefit currently competitive sectors or those within the existing 
comparative advantage. In free market setting and without government selective policies 
towards more sophisticated manufacturing, technological upgrading is not expected to 
take place (Amsden 2001; Chang 2011; Lall 1992; Wade 1990). For financial 
development (or deepening) to be effective in promoting innovative industrial activities 
in the developing world, in general, government intervention may be required to assure 
the financing of innovation (Dymski 2003). 
2. Rather than investing natural resource rents in sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) that 
typically invest in foreign financial markets102, this research argues for the need to utilize 
part of these rents in the establishment of, and support for, development financial 
institutions (i.e. development banks) that support domestic industrial development. In 
the context of structural transformation, such institutions can play a vital role in 
supporting strategic and higher technology products. This is particularly important when 
private financial institutions are mainly focused on funding traditional sectors at the 
expense of high technology and strategic sectors103. 
                                                          
102 Van der Ploeg and Venables (2009 and 2012), for example, strongly suggest establishing SWFs to invest the 
resource windfalls overseas to mitigate real exchange rate appreciation and economic volatilities.   
103 In addition to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 that demonstrates targeting traditional sectors by private 
financial intuitions, interviewing officials in the Saudi financial system strongly supports this view. 
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3. This work by no means underestimates the macro-economic and industrial challenges 
facing resource-dependent countries as a result of the influx of wealth104 and instead it 
highlights the importance of suitable economic and industrial policies, e.g. directed 
credit to targeted sectors, to mitigate the Dutch Disease and promote industrial 
upgrading. 
4. It suggests the establishment of institutions (or programmes) that specialize in 
investments in acquiring technologies that exist overseas, e.g. Fundacion Chile. Such 
institutions are critical for industrial diversification and upgrading. This is because 
technological upgrading in developing countries typically takes place through relative 
innovation, e.g. copying and adapting already existing technologies abroad (Lall 1992; 
UNCTAD 2007). 
5. This research suggests that the focus on only resource-based industries (RBI) may not 
be sufficient to achieve great industrial diversification. The case study of Saudi Arabia, 
which was analysed in this context, suggested continuing the promotion of RBI sectors 
(the oil and mineral upstream and downstream industries) in addition to the wide range 
of industrial activities that were identified by the Growth Identification and Facilitation 
Framework (GIFF). More specifically, it suggests targeting the following sectors: oil and 
mineral upstream and downstream manufacturing, speciality chemicals and medicines, 
speciality plastics, speciality rubber, rubber tyres, processed glass, processed stone, 
building materials, boats, small trucks, aircraft parts, lifting machines, fridges and air-
conditioning systems, poultry and aquaculture. 
6. Because of its significantly low share of credit given to SMEs (2 percent of total credit), 
Saudi Arabia needs to establish institutions (or programmes) that focus on supporting 
small entrepreneurs in targeted sectors. This is particularly important since one of the 
objectives of Vision 2030 is to increase the local content level in public and SOEs 
procurements. 
7. While some resource-dependent countries are considering privatizing public resource-
leading firms, this research suggests that this can have a substantial negative impact on 
the industrial and economic development process, because national extraction companies 
are typically more committed to domestic economic development (Morris et al. 2012). 
Therefore, governments should not look at privatizing these companies through financial 
                                                          
104 In addition to historical evidence that shows the short-term negative impact of resource revenue on real 
exchange rate, the first chapter supports this notion empirically by showing that exchange rate appreciation has a 
negative impact on export concentration and complexity. 
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cost and benefit analysis only (i.e. IPO income) but policy makers should also consider 
industrial, economic and social development aspects. 
 
 Conclusion  
Contrary to the rich literature on the natural resources curse that maintains an adverse impact 
of natural resource wealth on economic and industrial development, this research argues that 
wealth in natural resources can fuel the manufacturing industry in two ways. Firstly, resource 
revenues can be channelled to non-resource manufacturing sectors. The state, through its 
participation in the financial sector, can play a critical role in directing the resource revenues 
towards strategic and innovation sectors. This research maintains that public industrial banks 
and venture capital funds can be instrumental tools supplying the industrial sectors with 
patient, risky and developmental finance. Secondly, through technological upgrading, 
linkages from the resource cluster can stimulate diverse industrial activities. Nonetheless, 
because technological change is not a straightforward process, this development is not 
expected to take place without the promotion of suitable industrial policies. Therefore, this 
thesis argues that industrial diversification and upgrading in resource-dependent developing 
countries are not likely to take place in industrial and financial market settings free of state 
intervention.  
With regard to research limitations, the researcher acknowledges several 
shortcomings in this thesis and suggests possible areas for future work. 
First, in relation to the empirical analysis of the impact of financial development on 
industrial diversification in Chapter 2, the implemented cross-country statistical analysis did 
not account for major country-specific factors that can be critical in the industrial 
diversification process. Thus, a deeper understanding of the determinants of industrial 
diversification requires country-specific analyses that can consider the role of critical factors 
such as society, history, politics and geography. 
Secondly, in relation to the case studies on Chile and Malaysia in Chapter 3, the 
chapter has examined the role of the state in promoting and financing industrial 
diversification although it has focused solely on one major industry in each country, i.e. 
farmed-salmon in Chile and semiconductors in Malaysia. A more complete story of the 
industrial diversification in both countries requires a study of other major industrial sectors. 
In Chile, these sectors include wine, fruits, forestry and chemicals, whereas in Malaysia 
those sectors include steel, machinery, telecommunications, chemicals and palm oil.  
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Thirdly, Chapter 3 has examined promoting and financing the emergence of new 
industrial sectors in Chile and Malaysia; however it did not explore production linkages from 
the main resource sectors (copper in Chile and petroleum in Malaysia) to new emerging 
industries. Thus, Chapter 3 could be extended to investigate expected linkages from the main 
resource sectors to relatively new industrial activities (e.g. expected linkages from oil 
production to electronics and machinery manufacturing in Malaysia) following the traditions 
of Hirschman’s (1981) production linkages and Morris et al. (2012) horizontal linkages.  
Examples of studies that are concerned with linkages from the resource sector to unrelated 
industrial activities are Ramos (1998) and Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment 
(CCSI) (2016), which highlight critical linkages from the Finnish forestry sector to the 
telecommunications and machinery industries.  
Fourthly, Chapter 3 has discussed the role of some institutions in acquiring foreign 
technologies – but only briefly- despite the importance of technology transfer for industrial 
diversification in developing countries (Amsden 2001; Lall 1992). One institution, in 
particular, that could be further investigated is Fundacion Chile (FCh) which played a critical 
role in the emergence of several industrial activities in Chile through its investment in over 
sixty-five companies (Fundacion Chile 2008). Despite many studies that have highlighted 
its importance in promoting economic diversification in Chile (Andreoni and Chang 2014; 
Katz 2006; Rodrik 2004), the related literature noticeably shows that the role of this unique 
institution in promoting technological change needs to be further examined. More 
particularly, the researcher suggests future research on FCh’s process of identifying potential 
opportunities in the Chilean industrial sector, its establishment of new firms that can 
demonstrate new technologies and, more importantly, its diffusion of transferred 
technologies to other entrepreneurs in the economy.  
Fifthly, in relation to Chapter 4 which is concerned with promoting and financing 
industrial diversification in Saudi Arabia, the chapter has contrasted three diversification 
strategies, namely Resource Based Industrialization (e.g. Ramos 1998), the Growth 
Identification and Facilitation Framework (Lin 2011), and the Product Space Theory 
(Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009). However, these strategies mainly consider the existing 
industrial capabilities, endowment structure, production diversification away from oil and 
gas, the cost of labour, job creation and water scarcity. This analysis could be extended to 
account for other important factors in targeting new sectors, such as balance of payment 
considerations, regional economic development, production linkages with local economic 
activities and environmental impact factors. One possible way to account for some of these 
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considerations is to apply a detailed supply chain analysis for each potential product or sector. 
Another possible way that would account mainly for cross-sectorial production linkages is 
to use input-output analysis (Leontief 1951, 1986) in targeting new economic activities (for 
instance, see Marconi et al. (2016) for a recent work on industrial strategy using input-output 
approach). 
Finally, the research has investigated the role of public development banks, in 
Chapters 3 and 4, in three resource dependent developing countries. However, there is a need 
for further quantitative research that can examine the role of public development banks in 
supporting technological upgrading and industrial diversification empirically (Lazzarini et 
al. 2015). More specifically, investigating their impact in developed, emerging and 
developing countries using longitudinal data (e.g. panel longitudinal data) can be 
instrumental in advancing our understanding of their role in technological change and 
industrial upgrading. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Data collection  
This research has utilized available data in the form of published reports, studies and open 
databases to investigate the role of governments in financing industrial development. 
However, some data and information about some financial institutions are not available 
publicly (e.g. in published form). Thus, the researcher contacted these institutions to obtain 
access to unpublished data. Nonetheless, they were not sufficient because some important 
insights are not available in published forms. In such a case, Kriksson and Kovalainen (2015) 
argue for the effectiveness of collecting the required information using interviews; “a 
common reason for the use of interviews in business research is that they are an efficient and 
practical way of collecting information that the researcher cannot find in a published form” 
(p.94). Table A.1 summarizes the semi-structured interviews process, followed by Tables 
A.2, A.3 and A.4 which present the interviews guide, questions guide, interviewees’ details 
and a copy of the academic ethical approval. 
 
Table A.1: Interviews guide 
Interview questions structure                        Interviewees 
 
Source: author’s design 
 
Derived from the thesis 
research question: the role of 
the financial system in 
promoting industrial 
diversification 
Literature on the role of public 
finance in industrial 
development 
Literature on the role of state in 
the industrial upgrading and 
diversification 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
 
Public financial 
institutions 
 
Commercial financial 
institutions 
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Table A.2: Questions guide 
  
i. Interviews with public financial institutions 
 
Panel A: Diversification mission  
1- How do you evaluate the role of your institutions in promoting industrial diversification?   
2- What criteria do you use to evaluate a potential project? Do you give a higher priority for projects 
that introduce more sophisticated products to the national industry?  
3- What criteria do you use in estimating the interest rate and collateral on your loan? Do you charge 
firms investing in new activities/technologies similar rate to those investing in traditional industries? 
 
Panel B:  Coordination  
1- Do you take into consideration the national development goals when you lend to a private firm?  
2- Can you talk about your coordination with other public/private agencies before and after you fund 
a project?   
  
Panel C: Industrial expertise   
1- Do you offer your customers any set of industrial expertise? i.e. the provision of economic and 
technical advice; the development of technological and managerial expertise; the means 
of ensuring financial soundness; and the establishment of efficient distribution and marketing 
practices  
  
Panel D: Capacity   
1- How do you evaluate your financial capital size relative to the domestic industrial sector needs 
for finance?  
2- When you have a shortage of capital, what tools do you use to overcome it? have you 
considered issuing financial guarantees?  
  
Panel E: Accountability  
1- How do you prevent firms from enjoying "free ride"? i.e. firms accessing cheaper finance and 
industrial expertise without contributing to the industrial development. 
2- What kind of requirements and conditions that your clients should meet? i.e. export percentage or 
output quality standards?  
  
ii. Interview with private financial institutions   
Panel A: Diversification mission   
1- How do you evaluate the role of your institutions in promoting industrial diversification?   
2- How do you evaluate a potential project? Do you give a higher priority for projects that introduce 
more sophisticated products to the national industry?  
3- What criteria do you use in estimating the interest rate and collateral on your loan? Do you charge 
firms investing in new activities/technologies similar rate to those investing in traditional 
industries? 
 
Panel B: Industrial expertise   
1- Do you offer your customers any set of industrial expertise? i.e. the provision of economic and 
technical advice; the development of technological and managerial expertise; the means 
of ensuring financial soundness; and the establishment of efficient distribution and marketing 
practices. 
 
Panel C: Risk decision  
1- For a certain project that is investing in a new technology project, do you prefer a syndicated loan? 
Does it matter whether the co-investor is the SIDF or another bank? Why? 
4- For projects in new activities/technologies, what impact do public financial guarantees have on 
your lending decision?  
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Table A. 3: Interviewees details 
Category Participant employer Number of 
participants 
Positions 
Saudi public financial 
institution 
The Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF) 
Four Two senior managers, 
an economic researcher 
and a financial analyst. 
Saudi public financial 
institution 
The Saudi Agriculture 
Development Fund (SADF) 
Two Senior manager 
Saudi public financial 
institution 
The Saudi development fund 
(SDF) 
One Senior manager 
Saudi private financial 
institutions 
Commercial banks Two Senior managers 
Saudi private financial 
institutions 
Venture capital institution One Fund founder 
Chilean public institution The Chilean export promotion 
agency (ProChile) 
One Trade advisor 
Chilean public financial 
institution 
The Production Development 
Corporation (CORFO) 
One Senior manager 
Malaysian public 
financial institution 
The Malaysian Industrial 
Development Finance 
One Senior manager 
Malaysian public 
financial institution 
The Malaysian sovereign wealth 
fund (Khazanah) 
Two A senior manager and 
an economic researcher 
Independent 
development institutions 
The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (CEPAL) 
Two Industrial economists 
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Table A. 4: Ethical approval 
 
Muir Houston, Senior Lecturer 
College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer 
Social Justice, Place and Lifelong Education Research 
University of Glasgow 
School of Education, St Andrew’s Building, 11 Eldon Street 
Glasgow G3 6NH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5/02/2018 
 
Dear Sultan Altowaim 
 
College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee 
 
Project Title: Financing industrial and export diversification in resource dependent developing 
countries.  
 
Application No:  400170095 
 
The College Research Ethics Committee has reviewed your application and has agreed that 
there is no objection on ethical grounds to the proposed study. It is happy therefore to 
approve the project, subject to the following conditions: 
 
 Start date of ethical approval: 10/02/2018 
 Project end date: 30/09/2019 
 Any outstanding permissions needed from third parties in order to recruit research 
participants or to access facilities or venues for research purposes must be obtained in 
writing and submitted to the CoSS Research Ethics Administrator before research 
commences. Permissions you must provide are shown in the College Ethics Review 
Feedback document that has been sent to you. 
 The data should be held securely for a period of ten years after the completion of the 
research project, or for longer if specified by the research funder or sponsor, in 
accordance with the University’s Code of Good Practice in Research: 
(https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_490311_en.pdf) (Unless there is an agreed 
exemption to this, noted here). 
 The research should be carried out only on the sites, and/or with the groups and using the 
methods defined in the application. 
 Any proposed changes in the protocol should be submitted for reassessment as an 
amendment to the original application. The Request for Amendments to an Approved 
Application form should be used: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/colleges/socialsciences/students/ethics/forms/staffandpostgraduat
eresearchstudents/    
 
Yours sincerely, 
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Appendix 2: Technological intensity classification 
Lall (2000) classified exported products into five major groups. First, primary products (PP) 
group includes coal, crude petroleum, gas, ore concentrates, fresh fruit, and meat. Secondly, 
the resource based (RB) group includes simple manufacturing products and has two sub-
segments: agriculture based products (e.g. prepared fruits, processed meat and beverages) 
and other resource based products (petroleum products, base metals (except steel), cement, 
and gems). In general, these products arise from the availability of natural resources, and so 
they do not give an important indication of the competitiveness of the exporting country.   
The third group is the low technology (LT) group, which has well-diffused and stable 
technologies. Barriers to entry and scale economies for LT products are generally low. 
Examples of these products are footwear, textile fabrics, plastic products, clothing, leather 
manufacturing, furniture, jewellery and toys. Fourthly, there are medium technology (MT) 
products, which tend to have scale and skill-intensive technologies. In mature economies, 
MT products are at the heart of industrial activity, which includes automotive products and 
parts, motorcycles and parts, chemicals and paints, synthetic fibres, iron and steel, pipes 
and tubes, engines, industrial machinery and ships. Finally, the high technology (HT) group 
comprise products with high R&D investment and rapidly changing technologies. This 
group requires a high level of technology infra-structure and specialised technical skills, 
e.g. telecommunications equipment, television sets, cameras, transistors, optical and 
instruments, power generating equipment, pharmaceuticals, and aerospace.  
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Appendix 3: The role of the Malaysian Government in attracting foreign direct 
investment 
Penang state is considered the least endowed state with natural resources in Malaysia, 
which explains why it used to be called the “dying fishing village” (Wigdor 2016). In the 
1970s, the government was advised to shift its export oriented manufacturing towards the 
North; to Penang state. This advice was implemented in the early 1970s after promoting the 
National Economic Policy (NEP), which started attracting foreign investors through Free 
Trade Zones (FTZ) and Licensed Manufacturing Warehouse (LMWH). These are planned 
to accommodate the manufacturing activities for export purposes. The two policies were also 
coupled with the Malaysian Investment Development Agency (MIDA) fiscal incentives.  
In the period (1971-1979), employment and manufacturing added values have risen 
by 44.7 and 46.4 percent respectively. This growth was mainly led by foreign investors such 
as Intel, Motorola, Hitachi, Advanced Micro, and National Semiconductor, with a few local 
firms such as Penang Electronics which was established in 1970 (Best and Rasiah 2003).  In 
some cases, the state played a stronger role by directly approaching potential investors from 
the US, Europe, and Japan to relocate in Malaysia (Rasiah 2015). 
 Following the currency appreciation in the mid-1980s, several foreign electronics 
firms threatened to leave Malaysia if MIDA did not renew their expired financial incentives. 
For example, in 1985, Intel announced that it would consider moving its assembly plant to 
Manila. This indeed motivated the government to offer more incentives105. In 1986, Malaysia 
launched its first Industrial Master Plan (IMP1) which continued to utilize the Pioneer Status 
(PS) and the Investment Tax Allowance (ITA) incentives. In addition, the state designed a 
new incentive scheme for High Tech Companies (HTC). A HTC qualifies for a PS with 100 
percent income tax exemption for a period of five years, or ITA of 60 percent of its capital 
expenditure for five years. In order for companies to benefit from these incentives, they must 
meet two requirements. First, the company must be engaged in one of the activities identified 
by MIDA. Table A.5 shows the most recent list of activities which has been effective since 
March 2012. Secondly, the company must either spend at least one percent of its gross sales 
on local R&D, or ensure that at least seven percent of its employees in the scientific and 
                                                          
105 Intel opened its first international production facility in Penang in 1972. Now, Malaysia now accommodates 
several Intel operations (Intel, 2006).  
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technical staff hold diplomas, college degrees, or experience of five years in the field (MIDA 
2016).  
 Another important incentive is the Reinvestment Allowance (RA) which was 
introduced in 1986. It is designed for existing firms that re-invest for the purpose of 
diversification, expansion, automation or modernization. The RA gives a sixty to seventy 
percent tax deduction for capital expenditure. This incentive is given for a period of fifteen 
years beginning from the re-investment date. It is argued that the RA incentive is very critical 
for companies in the electronics industry because of the rapid change in technologies, and 
thus firms continuously need to upgrade their production facilities (Best and Rasiah 2003). 
Export processing zones (EPZ) have played a critical role in the growth of electronics 
exports. Currently, there are eighteen zones. The main reason for their growth in Malaysia 
(and in East Asia in general) is the increase in production fragmentation. This is explained 
from the perspective of GVC theory by the nature of the vertically specialized GVCs. In this 
chain, production takes places in a parallel fashion which makes it possible for firms to 
specialize in their core competencies and outsource the other activities. Thus, EPZs are a 
very effective instrument for developing countries in order to “thin in” the GVC. However, 
countries are expected to move up the value chain by upgrading their manufacturing 
capabilities (Kaplinsky 2015; UNIDO 2015).  
In response to complaints by foreign investors engaged in high-tech production about 
the low labour skills, the state acted remarkably quickly to overcome this problem (Felker 
and Jomo 2007). Thus, different types of incentives were promoted for the private sector to 
co-operate with the Government in developing the labour capabilities. The first is the Human 
Resource Development Fund (HRDF) which requires firms with fifty employees or more to 
contribute to the fund with one percent of their total training invoice. Then, firms use the 
one percent as an approval to reclaim their total training expenditure. The HRDF was an 
instrumental tool to push foreign investors such as Intel and Motorola to develop domestic 
labour skills (Lall 2004). 
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Table A. 5: List of promoted activities and products for High-Tech fiscal incentives 
I. Design, development and manufacture of advanced electronics and computing 
1. High-density modules or systems 
2. Advanced display 
3. Advanced semiconductors devices 
4. Advanced connectors 
5. Data storage devices or systems 
6. Advanced substrates 
7. Information and telecommunication products, systems or devices 
8. Digital entertainment or infotainment products 
9. Optoelectronic equipment, systems or devices 
10. Electronic security and surveillance systems or devices 
11. Electronic machines, equipment, system or devices 
12. Advanced electronic components 
II. Professional, medical, scientific and measuring devices or parts 
1. Medical equipment, parts or components 
2. Medical implants, medical devices, parts or components 
3. Testing, measuring or laboratory equipment or apparatus 
III. Bio-technology 
2. Pharmaceuticals 
3. Fine chemicals 
4. Bio-diagnostics 
IV. Advanced materials 
3. Development and manufacture of: 
a) polymers or bio-polymers 
b) fine ceramics or advanced ceramics 
c) high strength composites 
2.    Nano-particles and their formulations thereof 
V. Alternative energy technology 
 Design, development and manufacture of products, equipment, systems , devices or components for use 
in alternative energy sectors 
VI. Iron and Steel 
Super fine wire of diameter 2.0 mm and below 
Source: MIDA (2016). 
In 1989, Penang state, with some foreign firms, established the Penang Skills 
Development Centre (PSDC). The centre’s mission is to promote and share the 
manufacturing sector knowledge and experience. There are members of the Government, 
education sector and the manufacturing sector all participating in this Centre. Each 
participating firm is authorised to send a representative agent to the Training Committee 
which is divided into sub-committees. Each sub-committee has the task of evaluating firms’ 
training and their effectiveness, in addition to helping knowledge sharing between the 
members. The number of companies participating in the centre rose from twenty-four with 
thirty-two courses in 1989 to 81 firms with 495 courses in 1998 (Best and Rasiah 2003). Lall 
(2004) argues that the centre was a critical mechanism to bring MNCs together with local 
firms to solve different labour skills difficulties. Since then, eleven states out of thirteen in 
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Malaysia used the PSDC concept to establish their own labour-skills development centres 
(PSDC 2016).  
In addition to establishing specialized training institutions, the government offered 
two other fiscal incentives targeting the labour skills development: the double deduction for 
firms’ approved training which is designed for smaller companies with fewer than fifty 
employees, and the exemptions from import duties, excise duties, sales tax for any 
equipment, machinery or materials used for training purposes (Best and Rasiah 2003) 
Following the successful experience of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, high-
technology companies were also attracted by specialized infrastructures called technology 
parks. These technology parks (or technology industrial clusters) are argued to be an 
important element of upgrading the industrial sector and increasing manufacturing added 
value (UNIDO, 2015). These technology parks could offer large pools of labour specialized 
in technology related activities, a large pool of firms supplying input materials required for 
electronics manufacturing, reduce transportation costs and locate firms near to regional 
research and innovation centres (Kaplinsky 2015). 
The Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment founded the Technology 
Park Malaysia (TPM) in 1988. The park is located in the capital, Kuala Lumpur, and contains 
an automation and design centre, technology training centre, laboratories for advanced 
manufacturing materials, a centre for technology and communications, and Innovation and 
Incubation Centre (IIC). Furthermore, the park offers rental offices equipped with high 
quality infrastructure for low cost. By 2011, the park hosted 192 companies employing 5,564 
workers in the information communication technologies, green technologies, and bio-
technologies (TPM 2011).  
 In partnership with the government of Kedah state, the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry founded the Kulim High-Technology Park (KHTP) in 1995. This park 
specializes in hosting firms qualified for MIDA’s new incentive “High-Technology 
Companies”. The Park currently hosts thirty companies with a total investment of 
approximately 34 billion RM. Major tenants are Intel, Fuji Electric, and Panasonic (KHTP, 
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2016). Governments of other states followed suit later; the states of Penang, Malacca106, 
Sarawak, and Johor established similar high-tech parks. After promoting the “2020 Vision” 
to transform Malaysia into a developed country, the Malaysian Super Corridor (MSC) was 
established in 1996 as a high-technology manufacturing and trading zone. Beside various 
non-financial incentives, the MSC offers its tenants the following financial incentives: 
Pioneer Status with 100 percent tax exemption for five years or 100 percent Investment Tax 
Allowance; R&D grants (this is specific for Malaysian majority ownership companies), in 
addition to duty-free import of multi-media equipment (MSC 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
106 Malacca Technology Park was established in 1993 to accommodate government supported projects in aerospace 
components and advanced composite materials.  
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Appendix 4: The product space construction 
The product space shows a network connecting products that are more likely to be co-
exported. This method is based on a product complexity measure called the Product 
Complexity Index (PCI), which represents the capabilities required for its production. “It is 
calculated as the mathematical limit of a measure based on how many countries export the 
product and how diversified those exporters are” (Hausmann et al. 2014). Accordingly, the 
authors use the PCI to devise the Economic Complexity Index (i.e. on average, how complex 
the country’s exports are). The higher the ECI is for a country, the more complex the 
products it exports.  
 Each circle in the product space represents a product. The different colours symbolize 
a product group. The link between two products represents the similarities in the required 
capabilities to produce them. For example, the link between cotton and shirts is stronger than 
the link between cotton and automobiles. The similarity between the capabilities needed to 
produce the two products is presumed by the likelihood of co-exporting both of them. For 
example, the likelihood of a country to export shirts given it exports cotton and vice versa is 
the conditional probability P(shirts/cotton) and P(cotton/shirts). Hence, products that show 
few common capabilities are not likely to be co-exported and connected in the product space 
(Hausmann et al. 2014).    
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